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GOVERNOR STRATTON

ON LAW DAY
May 1, 1958,

was

Day-USA" by
proclamation. On that
G. Stratton, Governor of

designated

"Lau:

Presidential and Gubernatorial

date, the Honorable William
Illinois, delivered
as

the

of

Law

a

public

principal feature of
Day.

lecture

at

the University,

the Law School observance

Governor Stratton's address
C ontinued

Mr.

Peter

Fiszpatrick delioering his lecture

on

follows.
on

page 19

Chief Justice

Edward Douglass White.

Edward

Douglass

White

sponsored a lecture by
Fitzpatrick, distinguished member of the
Chicago Bar, on Chief Justice Edward Douglass
White. Mr. Fitzpatrick's paper follows.]
When Wilson named Brandeis to the Supreme
Court seven past presidents of the American Bar Asso
ciation testified against his confirmation. Ex-president
Taft wrote to his wife: HI hope White will not end
his judicial career with an apoplectic fit caused by
[In April, the

Law School

Mr. Peter

a

the nomination."! At about this time Brandeis con
ferred with White. Perhaps, because the opposition
to Brandeis recalled to White's memory the charge

bribery that once had been leveled against him
when he fought the Louisiana Lottery, he immediately
accepted Brandeis and insisted that Brandeis should
look on him not as the Chief Justice but as a father.
Following this meeting, in circulating a draft opinion,
of

Brandeis

the copy to be delivered to White,
Justice." In returning the draft opinion,

wrote on

"Father Chief

White showed

appreciation of

the

spirit of

Continued

on

the

ex-

page 34

Cooernor Stratton

Hall.

delivering

his Law Day Lecture in Breasted
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The Hinton
The final round of the Hinton Moot Court Com
petition was held last month. The Hinton Competition

student-administered
signed to supplement the
is

a

moot

which all students participate
tutorial

course.

court

moot court

during

The School awards

program, de

arguments
the

prizes

in

first-year

to

the win
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Competition
The

argued was Commissioner of Internal Rev
Doyle, 231 F.2d 635 (C.A. 7, 1956). Acting
as counsel for the Commissioner were C.
John Am
of
B.
A.
Oberlin
stutz,
College;
Youngstown, Ohio,
case

enue v.

Robert T. Cornwell, of Oklahoma City, A.B., Central
State College; and Robert L. Reinke, of South Bend,

team, and the team which represents the Law
School in the national moot court
competition is

A.B., Wabash

selected from among those participating.
This year, the Bench for the final round

Crain, of Costa Mesa, California,
College, Francis J. Gerlits, of Chicago,
Ph.B., University of Notre Dame; and John G. Satter,
Jr., of Sioux City, Iowa, A.B., University of South

ning

com

of the Honorable David L. Bazelon, Judge of
the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum
bia, the Honorable John S. Hastings, Judge of the

Circuit Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and
the Honorable Walter V. Schaefer, JD'28,
Justice of
the Supreme Court of Illinois.

to right, The Honorable John
Hastings, Judge of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, The Honorable
Walter V. Schaefer, JD'2B, Justice of the Illinois Supreme
Court and The Honorable David Bazelon, Judge of the U.S.

College. Appearing for the taxpayer
Brody, of Auburn, Maine, A.B., Bates

Morton A.

College;

was

posed

Left

were

E. Gene

A.B., Pomona

Dakota. The latter team was awarded the decision.
During the current year, the chairman of the Moot
Court Committee, which conducts the Hinton Com
petition, has been Robert T. Cornwell.

Court

of Appeals [or the

District

the court which heard the
COU1't

Competition.

of Columbia, who comprised
final argument of the Hinton Moot

Vol. 7, No.2
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Recognition- Organizational
Picketing and Right-to-Work
By

BERNARD D. MELTZER

Professor of Law,
University of Chicago Law

The

Laws

School

speech delivered to the Labor Committee
Chicago Association of Commerce and Indus
try. Reprinted, with permission, f1"01n the January,
1958, issue of the Labor Law [oumal, published by
Commerce Clearing House, Chicago.]
[From

a

the

of

A

The final argument in the Hinton Competition begins.

recurring problem of policy is the reconciliation
of the interests of individuals and those of
groups
which are favored by the law because
meet, or
at

least

they
thought to meet, important social needs.
problem which underlies the controversy

are

It is this

about the two topics which I have been asked

dis

to

( 1) recognition and organizational picketing,
and (2) the so-called
"right-to-work" laws. Accord
before
to
these topics, I want briefly
ingly,
turning
cuss

-

remind you of the general framework for reconcil
ing group and individual interests which has heen
to

embodied in

our

national labor

policy.

The

Wagner Act, closely following the analogy of
political elections, embodied the principle of free
choice

by the individual employee and the principle
majority rule. It also provided for the establish
ment of election
machinery for determining the em
uncoerced
ployees'
preferences with respect to repre
sentation. The Taft-Hartley Act, without
disturbing
those provisions, made it plain that the
principle of
free choice meant that the right to
reject a bargaining
of

representative
Finalists in the Hinton Competition, left to right, the team of:
Clarence J. Amstutz, [r., of Ohio, A.B., Oberlin College; Rob
ert T. Cornwell of Oklahoma, AB., Central State College;
and Robert L. Reinke of Indiana, A.B., Wabash College.

the

was

select

entitled

to

the

same

respect

as

The

right
Taft-Hartley Act, like
the Wagner Act, entitles a union to
bargaining rights
only if it has the uncoerced support of a majority of
the employees in the unit. In a. Board-conducted elec
tion, a majority of those voting is in general entitled
to
speak for the entire unit.
The bargaining agent, under the
majority rule prin
ciple, has broad and exclusive authority in negotiating
to

one.

the terms and conditions of

employment.

ployer

representative

no

must

one

else.

bargain

with the

The

em

and with
The interests of the individual and of

smaller groups within a bargaining unit are thus sub
ordinated to, and may be sacrificed to, the interests
of the entire group, subject only to the

representa

tive's

duty

of fair

representation

of all

Continued

employees,
on

page 45

Winners of the Hinton Competition, the team of, left to
right,
Morton A. Brody of Maine, A. B. Bates College; Francis J.
Gerlits of Chicago, Ph.B., University of Notre Dame; E. G.
Crain of California, A.B., Pomona College; and John G.
Satter,

lr., of Iowa, A.B., University of South Dakota.
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The Class
by

It looks like the

group of

Four of

oj I938

RICHARD

JAMES STEVENS, JD

Class of 1938 has grown into

a

mort

gage-plastered citizens. Of course this conclusion is
on the
incomplete evidence of thirty-eight ques
tionnaires returned. Perhaps some of our experts in
the analysis of statistical evidence, such as Harry Kal
ven, Jr., who has been working night and day, through
courtesy of the Ford Foundation, on a massive study
of the functioning of the jury system, or Paul Schwie
bert, Director and Actuary for United Insurance Com
pany, can point out the glaring fallacies in this con
of now, however,

on

the evidence

at

hand, that's about the way it looks.
Take this matter of offspring, for

example. The
who
were
thirty-eight
foolhardy enough to answer
the questionnaire, admitted to a total of eighty-seven
children and two

grandchildren-an

descendants each.

average of 2.34

Frank Mahin is the

only proud
grandfather in the class, boasting of two grandchil
dren-one girl and one boy. Three of us are neck and
neck in the children derby, with five each-Thomas
Megan, Conway Ashton and Richard James Stevens.
Lee Shaw, Melvin Cohen and John Lynch are right
on

their heels with four youngsters each. Nine are
position, with three each-Bob Mac

in the "show"

donald, Frank Mahin, William Pettigrew, Homer
Rosenberg, Donald A. Morgan, Arthur B. Sachs, John
Canright, Harry Kalvin, Jr., and Lydia Levinson
Rashman.

practice of law. Twenty
of us are active in the practice and almost all of the
twenty are either partners or have their own indi
vidual practice. Sixteen of the twenty are in firms.

Apparently,

we

like the

(Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather &
Chicago); Henry Hill (Mayer, Friedlich,
Spiess, Tierney, Brown & Platt of Chicago); Richard

Robert Macdonald
Geraldson of
F.

Mullins

Cohen

(Am &
(Leonard M.

Mullins

of

Wichita);

Melvin

& Melvin Cohen of

Chicago);
(Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Gerald
son of
Chicago); Harry Schulman (Perlman, Rubin
& Schulman of Chicago); Donald A. Morgan (Davis,
Lee C. Shaw

Morgan & Witherell of Peoria); Willis E. Parkinson
(Parkinson & Stewart of Glenwood Springs, Colo
rado ); Zalmon Goldsmith (Petersen & Goldsmith of
Aurora); Sheldon E. Bernstein (Newmyer & Bress
of Washington); Irwin J. Askow (Askow and Stevens
of Chicago); Maurice Rosenfield (Friedman, Zoline
& Rosenfield of Chicago); John R. Lynch ( Robertson
& Lynch of Lafayette); Marcus Cohn (Cohn & Marx
of Washington); Robert A. Crane (Hubachek & Kelly
of Chicago); Richard James Stevens (Askow and
Stevens of

Chicago).

our

firms: Franz M.

own

Joseph

(New York);
Rosenberg (Chicago); Arthur
B. Sachs ( Chicago) ; John R. Canright ( Lanikai,
Oahu, Territory of Hawaii).

'38

good, solid, tax-paying, child-rearing,

As

have

us

Homer E.

based

clusion.
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Six of us are prominent in the insurance field:
Frank M. Mahin is Branch Claim Manager for Lum

bermen's Mutual

Conway

Louisville;

in

Casualty Company

attorney for Beneficial
Salt Lake City; Stanford

A. Ashton is office

Life Insurance

Company,

Miller is Vice President of

Employers

Reinsurance

City, Missouri; Walter F. Ber
Corporation
dal is Claims Manager for Allstate Insurance Com
pany, Atlanta Branch; Paul W. Schwiebert is Director,
in Kansas

and

President

Vice

Actuary

for United Insurance

Company of America; John F. Shallenberger is Man
ager of Capitol Life Insurance Company in Denver,
Colorado.

positions with corporations: Thomas
Attorney for the Chicago, Rock
Megan
Island and Pacific Railroad Company in Chicago;
Warren R. Kahn is Vice President of Harry Alter
Company in New York; Roger A. Baird is General
Attorney and Assistant Secretary for Kimberly-Clark
Corporation in Neenah, Wisconsin; Myron L. Duhl is
Assistant Secretary of Ekco Products Company in
Chicago; William S. Pettigrew is Patent Attorney for
General Motors Corporation in Detroit; Robert E.
Hay thorne is counsel for American Marietta Company
Six of

in

have

us

is General

1.

Chicago.
Only two

stone

is

of

us

teach law full time:

School; Harry Kalven, Jr.,

Quintin John

of Law

Associate Professor

Yale Law

at

is Professor of Law at the

of

Chicago, in addition to being Director
Jury Project. Several of us have
dabbled in teaching on occasion: Henry L. Hill has
lectured on Aviation Law, his specialty, at North
western University, Franz
Joseph has been Professor
of Law at Institut de Droit Compare; Irwin J. Askow
has taught Business Law at Northwestern Univer
University

of the Law School

sity;
of

Maurice Rosenfield has lectured at the

Chicago Law School.
Only three of us presently

are

active in

University

government

work, but their activity has been enough
for the
ant

rest

of

us.

Marie Cole

Solicitor with the

Berger
Department

to make up
has been Assist

of

Agriculture;

Attorney for the OP A; active in the office of
Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation of the State De
Senior

partment; Acting Chief of the Distribution Section
of UNRRA:

attached to the

Headquarters

of the

UNRRA Balkan Mission at Cairo, Egypt; in Decem
ber of 1944 she was wounded by tank fire in Athens.

Affairs Officer in the Office of

She served

as

Dependent

Area Affairs and later

Foreign

was

appointed

At

torney for the Point Four Program in the Near East
and Africa Region, finally serving as Chief of the

The
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University of Chicago

ALUMNI NOTES
We note with great pleasure the continually in
creasing number of alumni who have become mem

JD'22, of Elk
judiciary.
Point, South Dakota, has been appointed United
States District Judge. Judge Beck, who has practiced
law in South Dakota since his graduation, has been
Republican National Committeeman from that state
bers of the

AXEL

J. BECK,

for the past ten years. E. HAROLD HALLOWS,
JD'30, has been appointed a Justice of the Supreme

School's alumni is L. HOWARD BENNETT, JD'50.
practicing in Minneapolis since his graduation,

After

Judge Bennett recently became a member of the Mu
nicipal Court of that city. Doubtless the most color
ful judicial office held by an alumnus is that now filled
by PHILIP R. TOOMIN, JD'26. After an extensive
period of private practice in Chicago, he was recently
appointed a Justice of the High Court of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands. His Court currently
sits in

past president of the Wisconsin
is

a

member of the House of

Bar Association.

Delegates

Bar Association, and has for many years
in the law school of Marquette University.
can

ARTHUR

He

of the Ameri

J. MURPHY, JD'22, recently

taught

became

ciation of

Appellate Court. After many
years of private practice in Chicago, Judge Murphy
served as a Judge of the Superior Court of Cook
County. Probably the youngest judge among the

in the Carolines.

meeting

of the Women's Bar Asso

Professor BERNARD MELTZER,
Chairman of a panel discussion of

Chicago,

JD'37, acted as
"Recognition Picketing." Among other participants in
the panel were LEE SHAW, JD'38 and ABNER J.
MIKV A, JD'51.
DONALD L. HESSON,

a

member of the Illinois

Truk,

At the annual

Court of Wisconsin.

Justice Hallows, formerly a mem
ber of the firm of Hoffman, Hallows and Cannon, is a

5

Law School

now a
a

member of the

LLM'42,

English Bar,

writes that he is

and in

practice

as

London, where he occasionally sees
ROBBINS, JD'23, who has been in prac

Barrister in

ALBERT H.
tice in both

England

Dean Levi at

meeting

a

recent

and the United States.
luncheon meeting of New York.
B. Pidot, '30.

The

arranged by George

was

The Fifth Annual Alumni Fund Campaign is now under way.
Shown above are, left to right, [. Gordon Henry, '41, Co
Chairman; Dwight P. Green, '12, Honorary Chairman; and
Bernard Nath, '21, Chairman.

Class

of

1938

East Africa

Region.

In 1954 Marie

was

granted

the

Rockefeller Public Service Award for outstanding
public service. Under this award she spent approxi

mately one year in Samoa and other Pacific islands.
Presently she is back in Washington on the staff of
the Regional Director for the Near East and South
Asia of the International Cooperation Administration
as
Operations Officer. Quite a colorful career!
Karl E. Lachmann also has had
ernment

career.

Department

He

was

of Interior;

an

interesting gov

Assistant Solicitor to the

Special Attorney

at

the Office

of Price Administration; Chief of International Tax
Section, Fiscal and Financial Branch, Bureau of Eco
nomic Affairs, United Nations; was in the private

practice of law in Arlington from 1940 to 1943; was
Prosecuting Counsel at the Nuremberg trials; Deputy
Executive
ence on

Secretary

of the United Nations Confer

the Declaration of Death of

Missing Persons,

Lake Success, in 1950; was Secretary, Technical As
sistance Conference on Comparative Fiscal Admin
istration in

Geneva, 1951; and

presently

is Chief of

International Tax Section Fiscal and Financial
Bureau of Economic
tariat. He is

sociation;

a

Branch,
Affairs, United Nations Secre

member of the American Economic As

American

Society

of

International

Law;

National Tax Association; Society for Comparative
Legislation and International Law, England; Societe
Continued

on

page 54
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The

The Personal

Damage

is the absence of data

Law, and

The

Jury,

issues which

yond

Injury

our

places

to
jury behavior on damage
important topic generally be

as

an

reach.

The purpose of this comment is not to supply the
necessary data. The Jury Project at the University of

Award
by

Vol. 7, No.2

HARRY KALVEN,

Chicago Law School has for several years now been
studying the jury empirically.' It has progressed far
enough to reaffirm that the jury's handling of damages
is an extraordinarily interesting
topic. It has also pro
gressed far enough to realize that it would take a full
life time of empirical research to document the many

JR.

Professor of Law,
University of Chicago Law School
Director of the Jury Project
(Reprinted with permission from 19 Ohio State
Law J ournal 1.58)
The

nuances

in this

corner

of

jury

law. In any

the

event

A few years ago Professor Jaffe in. one of his cus
tomarily wise and urbane articles! observed: "I suggest

that the crucial controversy in personal injury torts to
day is not in the area of liability but of damages." I

think he is

right

on

several counts. First the criticism
awards it at least

of

personal injury
cerned today with their

level

as

much

as

with their

con

frequency.

Second it is my impression that on the bar's view the
difference between lawyers-at least plaintiff lawyers
is measured more in terms of what they would get in a

given case than it is in terms of winning or losing.
Again, as a matter of simple arithmetic there is of
course a
greater difference between a $30,000 and a
is between

$10,000 verdict than there
and

verdict for the defendant. And

a

up the
-it is
most

point

Professor

selecting

the

Jaffe

troublesome issue in

tort to strict

was

appropriate

most

a

$10,000

finally

to

one

pick

concerned with

award level that is the

proposals

liability compensation

to

shift

areas

of

schemes."

Jaffe went on in the passage quoted to
why damages received so little attention in
law school study and in the secondary literature on
tort." "Questions of liability," he continued, "have great
Professor

wonder

doctrinal fascination.

ticularly
easily to
matters

their

Questions

magnitude-do

of

damage-and

par

not lend themselves

discourse. Professors dismiss them

of trial administration.

airly

Judges consign

so
as

them

uneasily to juries with a minimum of guidance, occa
sionally observing loosely that there are no rules for
assessing damages in personal injury cases. There is
a.nalogy for this situation in Jerome Frank's complaint
that fact finding, though of paramount importance, is
neglected by teachers who devote themselves too ex
clusively to appellate law. This may reflect not so
much their judgment of relative importance (as Judge
Frank supposes) as the relative adaptability of the
subjects to conceptualization. And so it probably is
with the subject of damages."
Once again I think he is right. And I would add
only this-the reason the law of damages escapes ready
conceptualization is because it is so pre-eminently jury
law. Damages even more than negligence itself is law
written by the jury. I would suggest therefore that it

Hans Zeisel

project

will within the

the results of its

next

inquiries

year or so begin to publish
and I shall not attempt to

report them

in any substantial way here. I should like

therefore

essay

the

to

no more

than

few reflections

a

on

in

topic,
part engendered by my over-all ex
with
the
perience
project materials and in part by my
in
experience
teaching torts. And in so doing I shall

frequently step well beyond
dulge in speculation.

the

project

This comment then will consider four

first the

of freedom

degree
damage issues; second, the light
the existing law of damages when,
points:
on

we

data and in

closely related

accord the

jury

that is thrown
so

to

speak,

on

it is

The Unioersitq
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of Chicago

held up against the mirror of jury equity; third, the
role of damages both as an index of the propensity of
jurors with different backgrounds and experience to
the

see

role

different ways, and also its
kind of solvent that makes jury consensus

a

as

matter in

same

.

itself; and finally

in the deliberation process

possible

briefly on the differences be
jury in deciding damages questions.

I should like to touch

judge

tween

and

I

jury

is in many ways like that of the

on

issues of

jury

on

any
It derives first of all from the institutional

issue.

arrangements under which the jury is permitted to
deliberate in private and to report its decision out by

general

injury damages

schedule but be
case.
man

common law
per
be not limited by

de

novo

for each individual

no

afoot in the law of

premise
of

they

premise

computed

There is in brief
is the

of

is that

companion

standard man,

no

reasonable

damages." Joined

with this

notion that it is the function

damages
plaintiff whole: he is not,
that is, to bear any part of his accident loss himself,
if there was a legally wrongful accident." It is this
tort

make the

to

which Professor

in

particular
challenges, but so long

premise
two

premises

there

damages.

And the

the harm

on a case

The court's

damages

are

vice is the

as

cannot

jury

by

is of
case

opportunities

Jaffe bravely

the system accepts these
specific rules of

be many

necessity

left free

to

price

basis.
for control of the

jury

on

severely limited. Its basic de
damage instruction itself which can

general

than convey to the jury the large headings
under which it may award damages. Since these are
do

claimant is

proprietor,

a

no more

law

that the

recognizes

volves

complex

a

can

loss components down into subordinate questions of
fact as to medical expense, economic loss, and pain

suffering. Medical expense and economic loss do
have some objective reality but the warrant to add
and

the

immediate freedom

pain
jury
suffering gives
to price the
injury subjectively. And where,

as

is

so

often the case, there is an issue not only of accrued
loss but of loss in the future the facts as to medical
expense and economic loss become enormously more

value

by

default but

of

computing

judgment

add several

institutional

suspects that the

one

damages

well

as

determination of fact. And that with

negligence itself
interstitially, to

as

damages

the law intends the

jury

to

in

literal

a

as

with

legislate

fill out the vague general formula.
jury's freedom and discretion is not
for the

by preference-preference

com

munity sense of values as the standard by which to
price the personal injury. And on this view the jury's
role in setting personal injury damages is not so
different from its role in setting general damages in
defamation.
Could the jury's freedom and autonomy over dam
ages be reduced without a drastic change in the
Let

system?

us

take

instruction.

Today

sentence

two.

or

more

effectively

came

more

sums.

But I

My impression

first

series of

a

not at all certain

on

the

does not much

sum

if any.

just
to

jury

be

to

compute
component

what effect this

It is

jury's approach

a

major

char

that it

damages
damage

itself with the

concern

com

might

but searches rather for

that is felt to be

appropriate. Whether
jury away from its

accountant

as an

that the

assignment

ascertaining
jury,

damage
long complex

a

is that it could be

so

am

acteristic of the

single

tends to be

it

conscious of its

would have

ponents

second look at the usual

a

communicated

gestalt approach

and

I confess I am,

as

only rarely control by excluding evidence
by withdrawing an item of damage from the jury.
And finally there is its power to set aside excessive or
inadequate awards. The practical trick of using ad
ditur and remittitur has given some possibility of con
trol here, but it is today the recognized practice to use
that power sparingly indeed."
Perhaps this has been said too quickly. It is true
that to price a punch in the nose or a broken leg is at
first blush a difficult value judgment. But the law
appears to avoid the impossible here by breaking the
court

or

is

by objective data. The
ambiguities of damages as fact issues
degrees of freedom to the [ury."?
If one is tempted to read reasons into

a

the

child it is

a

or

substantially less limited
upshot therefore is that the

broad the chief message of the instructions to the
jury is to tell them how free they are.? Beyond this
so

housewife?

a

apparent that the jury's task

damages by

therefore

it is only with the wage earner
reasonably clear. As soon as .the

again

that economic loss is

On this view the

verdict.

Further the cardinal
sonal

And

ambiguous.

arrangements,

The freedom and discretion of the

damage

7

Law 'School

any instruction could turn the
to

a more

explicit

concern

I do not know.

ing component
a
fairly firm impression
sums

from

the result would be in

our

general

with add

But I do have

project

materials that

to increase

damages
seriously assesses
the components in a case of any magnitude they are
likely to add up to a surprisingly large figure. I take
it this is one reason why the plaintiff bar sometimes
expresses a preference for the accountant type juror
in a case where damages are substantial and well

rather than to deflate them. If

documented.
one

secret

one

And I would suspect also that this is
success of Mr. Belli and his col

of the

leagues-their rhetoric at the blackboard is directed to
stimulating the jury to compute. Not simply sentiment
but arithmetic

existing

seems

to

Other considerations

that

be

on

their side under the

rules.

use

of

special

would force the

jury

to

be

the component items.P It

to

mind.'! It is

possible
procedures on damages
more
explicit in weighing
is my impression that the

come

verdict

8
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.

special

verdict is much less

frequently

used

dam

on

ag�s however than on liability. And it is not unlikely
that the jury could easily escape the special verdict
control and tailor its
the fact

so

appropriate

specific damage

answers

after

make them accord with the "felt"
overall sum.l" Similarly one wonders

the plaintiff paying his attorney out of his award. And
"as with contributory negligence we may not mind too
much the jury eroding the rule-? as a crude de facto
reform.
Another detail is

to

as

in trial

whether radical

procedure whereby
changes
example the jury would not be instructed on the
damage issue until they had completed their decision
on
liability would make a diflerence.l" One matter that
has impressed us is the sheer time gap between the
time the jury hears the damage instruction and the
first time they are ready to turn seriously to it in the
for
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case."? Here the

jury

and the

considering

Consideration of the

instruction

damage

suggests

other

question

as

arose as

to the

recent

propriety

comparable
thought this improper. The
thought it might prove helpful to

reviewing
the trial

court

if done in

judge

view to bench trials.

asked:

should

'Why

is any

a

good

jury

moderation, but limited

The court went
a

judge

would not have?' I

reason,

except perhaps,

the task, are called on to assess
such as this, the more one can

am

remain silent? This has two
court

like

a

aspects. First should the
teacher not only tell the jury what

good

it is to do but also

certain

anticipate
probable
understandings and negate them in advance? In two
wrongful death cases we have been able to study by
post trial interview it is apparent how readily such
misunderstandings can arise. In the one case the jury
simply does not understand that it is not being asked
to place a value as such on human life; therefore the

point

arises with

course

here since the

propriety

misunderstandings

and wis

I would favor it

general instruction standing alone

expose the

to

nothing

The
such

controversial matter.

a

jury

needless

to

seems

and

misconceptions

more.

The second aspect of the "silent" instruction is more
important and clear damage rules are

familiar. Several

normally kept
not

from the

told that his

damage; they

jury altogether.

lawyer's

fees

are

not

Thus

awarded from the time of

they are
plaintiff's

part of

told that interest is

are not

injury; they

not to

are

be

not told

that the award is not subject to federal income taxa
tion.!" The law on these points is perfectly clear-in
fact it is

ironically the only clear part of damage law.
The non-disclosure of the law to the
jury raises an
obvious policy dilemma. Undoubtedly in
the non
part

disclosure

stems

from

A

photograph

of

Salmon P.

Chase, with

a

Silver, JD'28.
tice Chase to

Ohio,

My

is

as

dear

part

it stems, I suppose, from an ambivalence toward the
rules themselves. We are not so sure how we feel about

letter,

is

reproduced on
shortly

written

election of 1860, when Chase
candidate for, Senator from

a

follows:
in the future is

even

he has not been educated in

adopt
men

our

or

ideas, therefore,

in the

As to your

and

study suggests

Stansbury,

tolerably clear to me
approaching certainty, that
next President, and that
by
his election the power of slavery in this
country will
be broken. What lies beyond I see not. I
hope the
Administration will be Republican, and that faithful
Republicans will be called into the Cabinet, and that
all will be well. To that end I shall honestly, sin
cerely and earnestly labor. I do not know Mr. Lincoln
personally. All I hear of him inspires confidence in
his ability, honesty and magnanimity. These
qualities
justify the best hopes, but we must remember that

that

is well founded. IS And in

of, and

portrait of Chief
Jus

except the probability,
Mr. Lincoln will be our

with the

our

presidential

a

letter from Chief

friend,

Nothing

that the instruction

sensitize the

Mr. E. A.

a

The text of that

Governor

suspicion
only
jury and stimulate them to do
something they otherwise might not do-a suspicion
will

a

page 55

autographed portraits and
of the United States Supreme Court
has been presented to the Law School by Louis H.

was

is of

on

Justices

minimum subsistence notions rather than the direct

support.l''
anticipating

Perhaps it is
English court but

An extensive collection of

letters of

this page.
before the

court

case

From The Silver Collection

clearly substantial the jury somehow gets the notion
that damages are a sort of welfare payment based on
of loss of

new

their minds

Continued

Justice

dom of the

keep

hard to escape the conclusion of the

that any human life must be worth at least $5,000. In
the other case where damages for loss of support were

measure

there

mis

in the deliberation

intensity

some

sure

jurors,
damages in a

directed to the actual issues the better."

they

not

that if

gree do the instructions fail

control because

its

"It may be
have something before
on:

to

to

a

of his

awards in other

precedent

interesting point that has in recent years
broken through on the appellate level. To what de
one

English

issue without

The trial court

cases.

him which

deliberation."

suggested by a
judge was trying the

in

shaping

own

course

of

of

our school, and
may not
either in the selection of

measures.

matter, you

things

appointments from

in

New

and

enough acquainted
Washington to know that
are

York,

New York Senators

Representatives
leading men will be prin
cipally consulted. Where the President has personal
knowledge and personal confidence he may act upon
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of Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, with a letter in his
handwriting. From the Louis Silver Collection recently prePortrait

that,

as,

were

I

aside from such

President, I might in your case; but
knowledge and confidence, decisions

be based

must

chiefly

on

the recommendations of

the heart of the party. Of course, I
to
pledge
you that I shall always stand ready to pro
mote your interests, when I can do so effectively and
men

nearest

without

injustice

to the claims

upon

me

of citizens

in the way of
in New York
friends
efforts
of
your
my aiding any
and
the
yet it is too
positions you desire;
regarding

of my

own

state.

I know

nothing

to

service to you.
I have no expectation of

9

seated to the Law School.

Further details elsewhere in this

issue.

you some time complained of. That you have been
faithful to the cause, to your convictions, and to Re
publican principles I know. Were I so situated as

independently,
significant proof of

to act
a

not

be

boat;

wanting.

I bear

To me,

now

say whether circumstances may not arise
which will prevent me from being of any valuable

early

Law School

of

no

and had the power to give you
my affection, that proof should

But I

am

only

a

passenger in the

command.

loyal devotion to the cause has proved
anything but wealth. For ten years I have
a

prize
given my almost undivided attention to this affair,
and my private interests have suffered greatly. If I
a

could

honorably do so, I would have willingly retired
public employment, and given myself to the
profitable business of private life, in which I

from all

any other rela
tion to the Administration than that of Senator; nor
do I desire any other.

occupying

Your references to your own affairs give me pain.
I supposed you had got rid of the pecuniary troubles

more

am

sure

far

more

enjoyment

is to be found than in

public.

Faithfully

your
S. P. Chase

friend,
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Some Alumni of The Law School Now

Practicing

Vol. 7, No.2

tn

New York

Zeft, Edwin L. WeisZ, JD'19, of Simpson Thacher and
Bartlett. Mr. Weisl is shown with Senator Lyndon Johnson
during his service as Special Counsel to the Senate Subcom
mittee on the Preparedness of the Armed Forces. (New York
On the

Times

Photo)

George B. Pidot, JD'30, of Shearman and Sterling and Wright.

Monrad C.

versity.

Paulsen, JD'42, Professor of Law, Columbia Uni

Vol. 7, No.2

The University

of Chicago

of the School's younger alumni in New York. Left to
right, seated, Alan C. Swan, JD'57, of Milbank, Tweed, Hope
and Hadley; Frederick A. Yonkman, JD'57, of Winthrop, Stim
son, Putnam and Roberts; Wilson R. Augustine, JD'57, of the
Office of Mr. Arthur D. Emil; Renata W. Beghe, JD'54, of
Carter, Ledyard and Milburn; William W. Jochem, JD'54,
A group

Law School

11

of Cravath, Swaine and Moore. Standing, Herbert W. Park,
JD'57, of Debeooise, Plimpton and MacLean; Wesley J.
Liebeler, JD'57, of Carter, Ledyard and Milburn; Allen S.
Person, JD'57, of Shearman and Sterling and Wright; and
Charles T. Beeching, Jr., JD'55.

The Honorable Irvin C. Mollison, JD'23, Judge of the U.S.
Before becoming a member of the Court,
Judge Mollison, a member of the class of 1923, practiced in
Chicago for many years, where he served as a member of
the Chicago Board of Education and was, and still is, asso
ciated with numerous learned societies, and civic betterment
Customs Court.

groups.

12

Ben Herzberg, JD'22, of Hays, Sklar and
Assistant United States Attorney.

The Law School Record

Herzberg,

a

Vol. 7, No.2

former

Robert H.
ties and

O'Brien, JD'33. Formerly

a

member of the Securi

Exchange Commission, Mr. O'Brien was associated for
several years with American Broadcast-Paramount Theaters,
Inc., ultimately as financial vice-president and secretary. He
is now Vice-President and Treasurer of Loeu/e, Incorporated.

Alex L. Hillman,

'24, publisher, President of Hillman Periodi

cals, Inc., formerly Special Counsel,

U.

S. Senate Committee

Appropriations, and U.S. Senate Committee of Foreign
Relations; Recipient of Freedoms Foundation Award, Director
of numerous companies.
on

The

Vol. 7, No.2

Herman

Odell, JD'36,

a

distinguished

Unioersiu; of Chicago

Law School

13

solo practitioner.

John N. Hazard, JSD'39, Professor of Public Law, Columbia
University, Vice-President of the American Foreign Law As
sociation, the American Branch of the International Law Asso
ciation and the Section of International and Comparative Law
of the ABA; an authority on International Law and Soviet
law in particular.

Frank H. Detweiler, JD'31, of Cravath, Swaine and Moore,
Chairman of the Committee on the Surrogates' Courts of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York; member of
the Distribution Committee of the New York Community Trust.

14
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Donald B. Cronson, JD'48, of Cravath, Swaine and Moore, for
merly law clerk to Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson.

Charles B.

Baker, JD'38, President of Universal Atlas

Cement

Company.

Byron E. Kabot, JD'41 formerly law clerk to Mr. Justice
Stanley Reed, now with the International Paper Company.
,

Sylvester Petro, JD'45, Professor of Law, New
widely known for his work in labor law.

York University,

The

Vol. 7, No.2

University of Chicago

Law School

Charles E. Brown, III, JD' 48, of J. H.

Bernard D. Cahn, JD'33, who served extensively with the
SEC, was associated with the War Production Board and 1:Jith
Military Government during the war, and is now in private

practice, specializing

in SEC matters.

Jerome S. Katzin, JD'41 at
Utilities Division of the SEC,
and Company, and active in
,

terprises.

of the Public
associated with Kuhn, Loeb
number of other business en

one

now
a

time Director

15

Whitney and Company.
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Kent V.

Vol. 7, No.2

Lukingbeal, JD'42, of Dewey, Ballantine, Bushbu,

Palmer and Wood.

George F. James, [r., JD'32, a former member of the Law
School Faculty, now Treasurer of the Standard-Vacuum Com
pany.

Jorge E. Illueca, JD'55, of Panama City, Panama. Mr. Illueca
is now residing in New York, where he represents his country
on the Security Council of the United Nations.

Vol. 7, No.2

The UniversitJ}

of Chicago

Law School
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Magill, JD'20, of Cravath, Swaine and Moore, [ormer
Undersecretary of the U.S. Treasury Department.

Roswell

Lowell C. Wadmond, JD'24, of White and Case. He has
served, among many other civic activities, as President of the
M etropoiitai: Opera.

John B. Howard, JD'42, Director of the International Training
and Research Program of the Ford Foundation. Before joining
the Foundation, Mr. Howard was a senior adviser in the United
States Department of State. He had served as Special As
sistant to the Secretary of State, Regional Adviser to the Bureau
of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, and in a
variety of other positions.
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Advancement

FACULTY PROFILE

Karl Nickerson
typical day for Karl
early for it is during the

Llewellyn

Nickerson

A
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By

Llewellyn begins

the Law

of

KARL N. LLEWELLYN

The

Professor of Law,

Law

University of Chicago

School

hours before breakfast that

preparing coffee,
which he maintains is best done by steeping, he begins
the day's work. Whatever his project, the first draft
much of his work is done.

After

invariably is done on yellow, lined,
legal-sized paper, and usually in pencil, a yellow
lead pencil. These implements are important in the
craft of lawyering to Mr. Llewellyn, who is not con
vinced that an attorney can function as efficiently
on a white, unlined leaf.
During the morning and
fills
the
he
throughout
day,
up several pages with let

[Reprinted, by permission, from The Student
yer, the Journal of the American Law Student
ciation, Volume 3, Number 4, April, 1958.]

Law

Asso

of written work

read, letters

authors of articles he has

ters to

to

edi

tors, ideas for lectures or articles, and perhaps poetry.
He produces such a quantity of material that only a

part of

it is

one

of the

Llewellyn's working

time

at

notices first and most about the Law School

of

University

is

time

the

make

no

a

body, nor
striking amount

and instruction. There is

sound work in the

new

material and

the law has been spent

Llewellyn's life in
teaching. After receiving

Professor
in

he served

School,

work there
est in

instructor in law while he

an

Sterling, although

.

his LLB from Yale Law
He then

JD.

a

accepted

a

with the New York law firm of Shearman

position
and

as

his work for

completed

deleting other. His
nearly all of

remarkable since

is

to

be

more

he
of

a

probably

instrument law than

negotiable
in the

considered his

continuation of his inter

the start of

as

of law. While

member of

practice
opportunity to work with the
New York banks in revising the forms which they used
in international trade. From his experience with
a

career

a

he

developed

of credit and cable transfer
tinued

work

throughout

as

the Chief

cial Code.

his

then served

teaching
on

the

con

and is evident in his

career

was a

and

guest

Visiting

the materials and

ciplines.
Although
other school

as

returned

to

University

at the

Professor of Law

at

University

of

Harvard Law School.

[oined the University of
Professor of Law in which

In the actual

presentation of his

Llewellyn is much
when he taught his first

the

can

at

all rivals

workshop practice
distinguishing

the

on

importance

of

of the other social dis

indeed be doubted whether any
Chicago's stress on theory and

it

the

in basic lines of

legal craftsmanship,

characteristic of the school remains

the way in which that stress is fitted into harmony
with such other attributes as have been mentioned, the

way in which all such
ing, rounded whole.

things

merged

are

This characteristic becomes

most

into

clear if

a

work

one

runs

the eye over the history of American law schools and
notes how each notable advance has tended to come
at

one

or

another

high price

growing point of the decade
been

same

class in

Chicago

Law

capacity

he is

materials in class,
today as he was

Negotiable

Continued

on

or

exciting

or

in

the

exaggeration. The
region has always

for the teachers concerned and for

some

Instru
page 30

most

and the

important

matters

moment in

Take for

Leipzig

presently serving.
Karl

teachings

various

In 1951 he

School

political and social problems native to
legal field; neither can uniqueness

of Columbia

faculty

professor

vision, range, the human back

at Yale Law School. He

Llewellyn

where he held the chair of Betts Professor of Law.
He

no

of

of the best of the students; but the bulk of the
need formed and sustained lines of in
who
class,
have
struction,
commonly missed out in regard to

of the Uniform Commer

After two years,

continue his

interest in letters

questions which has

career

Reporter

an

and the

on

enough
personal contact
uniqueness merely in sus

be found in sustained insistence

the firm he had the

banking problems,

in the presence of a
in one small
to

select student

old lecture notes, but always reworks the mate
rial he has in the light of his present thinking on the
constant revision

development and use of
techniques in addition

in the

uniqueness merely

tained insistence

subject, adding

full

usual case-class and occasional lecture.

possible

ground

large

of instruction

battery

more

There is

a

scholars and teachers.

distinguished

uniqueness

no

varied

to

full of

faculty

There is
a

in the presence of

uniqueness merely

no

home and in his law school office is spent in prepar
ing lectures to be presented to his classes. He never
uses

is the combination of

Chicago

fire and drive with roundedness and balance. There

highly

worked into final form.

ever

Much of Professor

What

introducing

which

were

example

the

huge gain

schools at all.

Here

which

was

order and of system in legal training,
a reckonable course of
study for the

of

not at

the

place

the focus of conscious attention.

a

came

from

beginning

of

the substitution

hap-hazardness

of the older reading-and-apprenticeship approach. It
was another huge gain to develop the full-time teacher,
whose teaching of his students can become his life,
and is in no event merely a by-product or a touch of
Continued

on

page 28
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Law School

and

relationships

within that

Governor Stratton

society

Continued

determines what shall and shall not be law.

from

page 1

opportunity to talk to you here today is one
anticipating for some weeks. It is good
be here, especially since we are today honoring

The

our

We must

recognize

society

that

that these necessary relation":
by which our society

I have been

ships

to

lives, and that the rules of law are deduced by apply
ing reason to these relationships. If we are to be gov
erned by law and not be arbitrary will, we should

the science of law and

"have chosen
As

gle

we

meet

here,

particularly

we are

in

a

great worldwide strug

of ideas. It is therefore

our

most

those persons who

in law.

careers

fitting
priceless heritage-the

that

should honor

we

Rule of Law.

Ours

is a government of laws and not of men, because the
founders of this country recognized that the rule of
law and liberty are indivisible. There are many coun
tries today which do not recognize this principle, and
it is

imperative

protect

that

maintain eternal

we

vigilance

to

heritage.

our

Aristotle

said that in all

well-organized gov
nothing which should be more jeal
ously maintained than the spirit of obedience to law,
especially in small matters. He added that lawlessness
once

ernments there is

creeps in unperceived and at last ruins the state; just
as the constant
repetition of small expenses in time
eats up a fortune. The great philosopher recognized
the

importance of

Rule

by

Law. He knew well that

form the basis of the law

recognize

these facts. We should understand natural

law and be able to

interpret

it.

And

through study

of the ideal system of natural law, we should acquire
the ability to perfect the rules of law enforced by
the state.
From this it is evident that not only is law essen
tial for order in

community,

a

but it is also

a

proper

a free
expression
an essential for individual
liberty. Only through
society,

and enforcement of natural law in

law

the

can

rights

protected from
only through law can

of individuals be

the power of government and
the citizens themselves exercise

sovereign power. This
our national constitution which
of
concept
has become a model for free governments.
It is not a collection of "thou shalt, and, thou shalt
nots." Nor is the constitution a reference guide for
government action applicable only to the officers of
is the basic

man, the best of beings, when separated from laws
and justice, becomes the worst of all. For justice is

that government. It is law, basic law, embodying
the principle of exercise of sovereign power by the

the bond of men, and the administration of justice is
the principle of order in any political society.
"Law," said Cicero, "arises out of the nature of

people

He defined it

things."

right

as

reason

cordance with nature, applies to all
mands, he said, this law summons

which,

in

ac

its com

By

men.

men to the
per
formance of their duties; by its prohibitions it restrains
them from doing wrong. Its commands and prohibi
tions always influence good men, but are without effect

upon the bad, Cicero contended. This,
the expression of a natural law theorist.
On the other hand there is the

realist. His view is that law is

of rules

by

which

these definitions

a

state

we

know,

positivist

fundamentally

governs society.

or
a

is

legal
series

Both of

correct, today, in some respects
and wrong in others. To define law properly, both
theories must be judged together. The fallacy of the
one

are

view is that it confounds law with

fallacy

ethics; the

of the other is that it confounds law with force.

As Pascal stated with

government, both
reason and force are essential for
any proper concept
of law. Law without the power of government to
respect

to

enforce it is not law but morals.
basis of
If

a

and

morality

choice

were

law is

reason

things"
we

a

but

necessity

might

cannot

ignore

make

right.

arise out "of the nature of

and her true voice is the voice of

cannot

tyranny.

be made, it is evident that natural
the most important since right will

to

probably
eventually make might,
Law must of

Law without the

is not law but

reason.

Still,

the fact that it is the nature of

our

and their

It embodies three

representatives.

basic concepts. The first of these recognizes that the
individual has certain natural liberties and inalien

able

rights

which the

The second is that the

state

has

no

people shall

power to

regulate.

exercise

sovereign

power in matters concerning themselves, that people
of states shall exercise sovereign power in state mat
ters, and people of the nation in matters
the country as a whole. The third is that

affecting
single
complete sov
no

agency shall exercise
but
that it shall be divided into three
ereign power,
distinct branches, executive, legislative, and judicial.

person, office,

or

Our constitution set forth in

language

that

government

clear, unmistakable

existed for

men, not

men

for government; that men, regardless of their eco
nomic or political stature, were to enjoy these God
given rights; and that neither their officers in the
various

rights

nor their courts, could
deny these
the humblest of ctiizens. It implied that

branches,

to

law is order, and good law is good order. It estab
lished rule by law rather than rule by individual. But,
I also believe the founders of our nation recognized
that many people are controlled by necessity rather

by reason, and by fear of punishment rather
than by love of duty, a very practical outlook.
We recognize that it is through the judicial proc
esses that the
rights of the individual-these practical
as well as the legal rights which our
system of
rights
and
guards-are made effec
government emphasizes
than

tive.

Courts exist for that

reason.

It is to the courts
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that the individual goes to seek justice-not as a mat
of privilege, but as a matter of inalienable right.

ter

To

here

today, these facts may seem a
recitation of something we already know.
America take these rights for
granted and
us

tedious
We

problems

government work. With this
with you

briefly

in

mind,

some

I

of the

in

government are facing.
First of all, we must recognize that there has been
tremendous growth in government processes and

in

assume

in

careers

would like to examine

a

we

that such is the status now, was, and ever shall be.
Unfortunately, we cannot rely on this assumption. In

consequently the administrative law. It would be im
possible to conduct this vast area of government with

many countries today these illusions have been shat
tered. Their citizens realized too late what was hap

out.

to them.

pening

In these countries there

.

as

know them,

we

and

courts

no

the

the iron

individual, by
by
people today are governed

not

no

laws
Rule is

are no

juries.

first, and millions of

by

law but

force.

by

The average American is too pro:p.e to say, "but
it can't happen here." Too
many are engrossed in their
own
to
personal problems
worry about something

which

We need

manner.
now
were

believe

they

ruled in this
not

As

-the

a

fashion, they too had rule of law. We
respect. But somehow, some

superseded by

was

result, millions of

same

rights

that

mockery

citizens have lost their

guaranteed by

are

to

justice.

Courts

are

know them-in many

-as we

the rule of individ

rights

trampled

are

and

and

non-existent

The

of cit

rights

trangressions against public

institutions

private
exception.

a

virtually

cases.

are

the rule rather than the

the active role of

example,

lawyers

in

one

drive for

an

international court of habeas corpus, is a manifestation
of the deep faith the legal profession has in the rights
and freedoms of the individual, regardless of his
his

citizenry,

position,

weath

background.

or

Such

for the individual, I know, exists beneath the
blanket of force which covers much of the earth today,

concern

but, tragically,

is

being smothered, I fear.
spreading across the face of
becomes a struggle of survival. It is

With this evil force
the
no

Earth,

longer

ours
a

matter

toms and
our own

studied

of difference in international
It is

heritage.
orderly processes

lawlessness. We

Nothing

can

be

history.

are

now

a

of law

struggle
against

in the midst of that

more

evident

This has

always

cus

to

preserve
the threat of

struggle

now.

anyone who has
been the first object

to

of any oppressor-destroy the court system-then re
place that orderly system with his own individual rule.
It becomes obvious

legal profession
of

In
we

administrative branch of state

our
were

able

make

to

sweeping,

government,

much

needed

changes during the 1957 legislative session. Particularly
in the area of fiscal control, we were able to
bring
about a centralization of responsibility, and a stream
lining of administrative function. This change is al
ready yielding the state substantial savings in tax
money.
In

our

third branch of

state

government, the

one

which you are most interested, the judicial branch,
are on the threshold of
sorely needed changes. I
certain that most of you

acquainted

are

article for amendment

judicial

which will be voted in

a

with the

in

we
am

new

to

the state constitution

general

referendum this fall.

present judicial article satisfied very well the
needs of the government and population when it was
Our

The awareness, in the legal profession, of this threat
the individual is to the credit of that profession. For

to

tion.

our own con

What law is left in these countries is

stitution.

izens

only

in that

unique

way, this rule
uals.

affect them in any possible
reflect that in many countries

cannot

For the first time in nearly fifty years we are now
legislating in a body which represents the people
fairly. A proportionate voice has been given to all
segments of population and area, and this fair repre
sentation has been insured in future years through a
system of mandatory, periodic redistricting by popula

are

then, that the

closely

interests of the

interwoven with the interests

government itself. So it must certainly follow that an
alert, strong judicial system is a vital part of a vigorous,
alert government. Many of you here will take part in
that system and others of you, no doubt, will find other

established in 1840. But it is
our

woefully inadequate

for

present-day government.

For

a

present

government based

backlog

of

court

It is ridiculous when viewed

law

up in

on

cases

is

the rule of law, the
a shameful
disgrace.

against

the intent of rule

1870 constitution-to

by
give
speedy justice to all. No government based upon
mercy and justice can neglect these facts.
Plato speaking in his dialogues had this to say about
such a situation-and I quote-"Even when laws have
been written down, they ought not to remain always
unaltered. As in other sciences, so in politics, it is im
possible that all things should be precisely set down
in

as

set

writing; for

our

rules must be

universal, but

actions

are

concerned with

particulars" -end of quote.
His words ring true today, just as they did when he
spoke them to his students in ancient Greece. Actions
concerned with

particulars. And the particulars
today
legal delays that can be blamed on
crowded, badly organized courts. We realize that in
any field there is always some tendency to resist
change. We also recognize that any change made
merely for change's sake is senseless. But to resist a
change as sorely needed as the one in our judicial sys
are

are

tem

the

because of selfish

or

local interest is monumental
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backwardness.
Let me say here that the necessity for improving
this situation is an immediate, pressing problem. It is
not something that can be set aside for some future

solving. Citizens are being deprived of their
justice-something that is their basic right.
It is a dangerous situation. People are quick to sense
danger when our legislatures or courts seem to lose
sight of their purposes. But this access to justice is an
element that has fewer automatic safeguards than
have our legislative and judicial systems. If we neglect
it, the dangers are multiplied manyfold.
I sincerely believe that we as citizens are being
denied one of our most precious assets-justice, speedy
indefinite

.

access

justice.

to

I believe that you here who

are

students of

of the Student Lawyer, national publica
of the American Law Student Association. Left to right:
Jay K. Longacre, Marion, Ind., AB., Wabash College; Allan
C. Engerman, Chicago, A.B., University of Illinois; Gloria
Martinez, E1 Paso, Texas, A.B., Texas Western College; Joe
A Sutherland, Editor-in-Chief, Fort Worth, Texas, AB., Texas
Christian University; and John D. Proffitt, Lebanon, Indiana,
AB., Wabash College.
The Board of Editors

tion

reception for Governor Stratton preceding his Law Day
Lecture, left to right, Mrs. Lawrence A. Kimpton, Hon. William
G. Stratton, Governor of Illinois, Lawrence A. Kimpton, Chan
cellor of the University, and Mrs. Stratton.

At the

the law should

keep

in mind these basic ideals not

school, but in their practical application.
only
It becomes important that you who are going to be
in law

lawyers know these facts. If you cultivate
an
intelligent interest in public affairs, you
will qualify as leaders of public opinion and even
tually as our leaders in public office.
the future

active and

Interest and action with respect to all of these
essential to the good lawyers, and, if you

matters are

of Justice Holmes, you
pursue the law in the spirit
results.
Let me end by quot
will achieve the desired

ing him:
"Law is

a

business to which my life is

devoted, and

I should show less than devotion if I did not do what
in

me

lies to

improve it,

and when I

perceive

what

seems to me
future, if I hesitated
to point it out and press toward it with all my heart."

to be the ideal of its

officers and directors of the Law Student Association, left
right: John G. Satter, lr., of Iowa, AB., University of South
Dakota, President, James C. Hormel of Minnesota, Princeton
University, AB., Swarthmore College; John V. Gilhooly of
Rhode Island, St. John's Seminary; Ronald E. Tonidandel of
Connecticut, A.B., Amherst College; and Charles E. Hussey of
Maine, A.B., University of Maine.
The

to
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THE

Simons Lectures

The Law School recently
inaugurated a new bien
nial lecture series, the
Henry Simons Lectures. This
series has been established in
recognition of the con

tributions of

to

Political

in

Henry Calvert Simons (1899-1946)
Economy, and as Professor of Economics

The Goals

of Economic
Policy

By

the Law School from 1938 to 1946. Professor Simons'
essays are collected in Economic Policy for a Free

Society, University

of

HENRY SIMONS LECTURE

GEORGE

J.

Professor of Economics,

STIGLER

Columbia

University

Chicago Press, 1948. His major

work in the field of taxation is contained in two books
published by the University of Chicago Press: Per
sonal Income Taxation, 1938; Federal Tax
1950.
The first Simons lecture

Reform,

delivered in February
Professor of Economics, Colum
was

by George J. Stigler,
bia University. The lecture, entitled "The Goals of
Economic Policy" is to be found in this issue of the
Record. A reception and dinner honoring Professor
Stigler were held at the Quadrangle Club prior to the
lecture.

I

prize the privilege of delivering the first of

a

series

of lectures which will commemorate the work and
character of
in the least

Henry

Calvert Simons.

diminished

My pleasure

is not

the conviction that he would

by
protested at the suggestion of such a series of
lectures-perhaps likening them to the rigid, weathered
structures erected to
military heroes, with the lectures
sometimes
a sufficient resemblance to the nerv
bearing
have

ous,

edible birds which hover about them.

And in

right:

one sense he would, of course, be
wholly
the real tribute to a scholar is the continued life

of his intellectual work, and no amount of praise
periodically heaped upon dead ideas will warm them
to life. The work of Simons has received this tribute:
it continues to be in the center of

a main current of
which
he
did
so much to create,
political economy
and today his thought is as relevant and as far-Sighted

as

it

this

was

in the moment at which it

was

written. From

the

highest compliment one can pay a
scholar is to quarrel with him or to go beyond him,
and I am absolutely certain that Simons would second
viewpoint,

my invitation to future lecturers to exercise the
ilege more freely than I shall.

priv

But in another sense, Simons would have had no
these lectures for

right to protest the establishment of
they honor something that belongs
much
Nathan

Blumberg, Professor Malcolm Sharp, and Dugald
McDougall, JD'37, at the reception for George Stigler.

plex

as

to

him: his character. This
of exalted

man,

to

his friends

wondrously

as

com

integrity, brilliantly witty,

ex

quisite of taste, generous toward others and unreason
ably demanding of himself-this man we are entitled
honor, and without permission. I interpret my lec
ture, not as a tribute-he deserves much better than he
will receive tonight-but as a reminder to the world
that we continue to love our friend.
to

I shall

speak tonight

on

the proper

goals

of economic

policy.
Three goals have long dominated economic
policy in
this country, and in the Western World. The first and
most ancient
goal is the largest possible output of

goods

and services.

under the

ysis,

into

Students, faculty and guests

at

dinner

before the Stigler

output has evolved,

two-pronged goal:
employ as fully as possible-that is, as fully
as the
other goals allow-the resources at the
society's disposal. Unnecessary unemployment of
men and
capital should be eliminated.

First,

Lecture.

impact

Maximum

of social events and economic anal

a

to

The University
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of Chicago

employ these resources as efficiently as
possible. Broadly speaking, no resource should
be used in one place if it would produce more
elsewhere-it should be impossible to reshuffle
resources to achieve more of some goods without

Second,

to

others.

getting less of

growth of the economy.
prospected, capital ac
cumulated, and new products and technologies dis
covered. These forward looking activities have for
their common end a steady rise overtime in the level
of income relative to population.
The last primary goal of economic policy is a com
The second

Natural

goal

resources

is

the

should be

still a vague sentiment when maxi
entrenched for centuries. It is
been
had
output
reduction in income inequality. The goal of
or at least of much reduced
inequality, has

parative

newcomer,

mum

the

equality,
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only the most tenuous connection
with the goals of policy. But every society makes mis
takes in achieving its goals: often it misunderstands
the efficacy of a given policy in reaching a given
goal; and often the announced goals are merely cloaks
worn
by particular groups seeking particular ends.
These aberrations and deceptions do not constitute a
contradiction of the primacy of the goals of maximum
output, substantial growth, and decreased income in
equality.

gram, which have

A

question

goals

that

is whether

can

they

be raised with respect to basic
are
fully attainable. I would

abstract goal gives
say that they should not be. An
direction to economic policy, just as the North Pole
gives direction to a compass, and just as the compass
becomes useless at the magnetic North Pole, so the

policy lose their value as guides once they are
Specific goals, such as so many television sets
must
or dollars of tax receipts,
or highway miles
be
not
should
but
be
realizable,
general goals
usually
realizable.
fully

goals

of

of the great forces of our times.
These three goals, maximum output, substantial
growth, and minimum inequality of income, have pro
vided the justifications for every important innovation
in economic policy. Maximum output is the purpose

fulfilled.

of our free trade within the United States, the com
batting of monopoly, and various antidepression meas

is fair to say that at the

become

ures.

by

one

The

our

growth

of income is intended

to

be served

various conservation measures, much of

education,

our

public

land

policy,

Whether

are

accepts this position or not, I think it
present time the basic goals

widely believed

to

be

tolerably

well fulfilled in the

United States.
Consider income

public

and the current

one

the

progression

inequality.
personal

in the

Few

think that

people

income tax is

seriously

search. Minimum

insufficient and many think it is excessive. Public
sympathy for groups traditionally viewed as disad

income tax,

vantaged,

flirtation of the federal

government with basic

re

inequality is the goal of the personal
agricultural policies, public housing sub
sidies, unemployment insurance, and a host of other
policies. Of course I simplify when I identify a policy
with only one goal-it is a poor protagonist of an
economic policy who fails to argue that it will serve all
the goals of economic policy, and that it is also wholly
in keeping with the Scriptures.
There are, to be sure, a variety of minor goals of
policy. The desire to eliminate racial discrimination
has led to certain regulations of economic life, and
again, the desire for personal equality of treatment
independent of income has led to other regulations,
such as prohibitions on personal railway rate dis
crimination. But these goals have had only minor and
sporadic effect upon economic policy.
One need hardly emphasize the obvious fact that
many of the policies we have adopted have ill-served
any of these goals. The farm program was adopted to
help a class of families with low average incomes and
possibly to conserve resources, but quite probably it
has increased income inequality, at least within agri
culture, and it is extremely doubtful that any useful
conservation
was

of resources has been achieved. The tariff

presumably designed

to increase

but economists believe it has

never

domestic output,
been an effective

policy to this end. There have also been plain raids on
the federal treasury, such as the silver purchase pro-

low ebb.

privileged

labor unions and farmers, is at
be
would
It
wrong to say that "under
classes" has been deleted from the lexicon

in

particular

of neo-liberalism, but the concern for them has lost
urgency and to some degree has been supplanted by
concern for the
peoples with highly developed desires
in

underdeveloped

economies.

The satisfaction with the

productive performance

of the American economy is even more complete. We
feel rich. We believe that on average we are denied
only luxuries over whose absence no one can wax

indignant. It is true that the workingman still has
only a black and white TV set, and his car is several
cares whether a
years old, but so what? Who really
farm program, or
a billion dollars,
American

a

river and harbor

or

less than

economy?

one

Who believes that the

growth of income is seriously
employment of resources in
grievously large?
been silenced
a

nation

or

as ours

performance

pork barrel, wastes
day's output of the

inadequate,
recent

or

rate

that

of
un

years has been

Even the critics of the Thirties have

turned into flatterers. In

populous
productive
they are in

as

there still exist critics of the

of the economic system, but
position of criticizing the form of

the uncomfortable
a

golfer
This

thing.

who wins all the tournaments.

sense

of

prosperity,

The postwar

I

growth

am

of

certain, is
consumer

a

temporary

real income,
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with 1932-45, has been so sudden and so
we have not been able to build
up new

compared
large that

desires, but they

That cele

gradually emerging.

are

brated axiom of economics, the insatiability of human
desires, has survived the much greater increases in
real income achieved at earlier times. In another dec
ade or so we shall be
complaining, and with sincere

pain, of the widespread
decencies such

need to

satisfy elementary

cottage, the electronic
range, the wholly air-conditioned house, and the
a

as

summer

But for the moment

family psychiatrist.

we

well

are

off.

of economic

only should the basic goals
unattainable-they should also

Not

be

of the civilization of
the

a

policy

be part and parcel
Ours are not. Our basic

society.

the basic

goals of the Russians.
equality of income.
Their fundamental ethical claim, indeed, is that they
will remove all income differences not strictly justifi
able by social performance and/or need, and in par
goals

are

same as

The Russians also believe in

ticular will not allot any part of income to a class of
private owners of the means of production. I would

quarrel violently with their belief that private property
basic institution of economic progress, but
argument is being settled for many people by the
substantial growth of output of the Russian economy.
is not

a

the

'1\1 e may also argue that the
inequalities of income in
Russia are large, and not so
related to social

performance

as

these

questions
society achieves
over

policies

that

is

our

in

are

its

own

closely
inequalities. Important

assessing

goals, they

rather than

the

seem

a

arguments

goals.
And the Russians share the goals of maximum out
put and rapid economic growth. Indeed every society
purposive

over

and non-traditional seeks

to

before George Stigler's Henry Simons Lecture, left to
right, Robert Zener, Editor-in-Chief of the University of Chi
cago Law Review, Professor Stigler, and Aaron Director, Pro
fessor of Economics in the Law School, who introduced Pro
fessor Stigler.

antipathy and rivalry. The
goals
goals are the same
has also contributed mightily to the failure of Ameri
can
foreign policy-a policy which has no cutting edge
of political philosophy that might attract the leaders
of other countries. We offer the same goals, and differ
chiefly in promising less with respect to their ful
.The

do

of

set

maximized is chosen

of

primarily by

the individual

con

in the Russian economy the output to be
maximized is chosen primarily by a central, dictatorial

body. Hence,
more

the Russian desired output contains
heavy industrial equipment, as a

munitions and

share of total output, than the American desired out
put, but this again is a difference in content (of im
to be

sure)

rather than in

goal.
N ow, I do not wish to imply that a goal loses validity
because it is shared by an unfriendly person. It does
not seem sensible to abandon Mozart
simply because
mense

one

importance,

encounters

a

boor who also admires his music.

And to spurn a goal such
spurn rational behavior.

as

same

expect

as

two

economic

our

economic

the Russians' is anomalous:

great powers

goals

some

output

is to

to

goals

one

are

would

have carried into their

elements of the

political philos-

a

somewhat different

profess, however,

is not

only body of land on earth
should urgently need to give direction
emphasis to our economic policies. It is high time
we

able

set

aside the details of

dormitory

society

the

were

we

and

wish

we

to

managing

a

comfort

ourselves with the kind

concern

inhabit.

The supreme goal of the Western World is the de
velopment of the individual: the creation for the in
dividual of

with this

sibility.
one

to

a

a

maximum

corresponding

Our very

of

area

personal freedom, and
of personal respon

area

concept of the humane society

in which individual

man

is

permitted

make the utmost of himself.

sponsible,

is

and incited

The self-reliant,

re

creative citizen-the "cult of individualism"

for every man, if you will-is the very foundation of
democracy, of freedom of speech, of every institution
that recognizes the dignity of man. I view this goal
as an

it

Nevertheless, the fact that
the

maximum

we now

ourselves

in space,

among societies arise with respect to what output they
seek to maximize. In our society the output to be
sumers;

goals

than those

United States
or

and

do.

I wish to propose

reason

apart from Russia, nor is it to capture
the intellectual leadership of the neutral world-al
though these are not negligible hopes. Even if the
to set

that

to

and the Russian

our

fillment.

The differences

whatever it seeks

efficiently

that lead to their

ophies

fact that

as

extent to which
to raise

At dinner

ultimate ethical

value; others may wish
arguments.

to

reach

utilitarian

through powerful
It is one thing for

a

value to have verbal

sov

ereignty;
quite another for it to permeate the
social system. Individualism has few enemies in the
United States, but its many friends are becoming less
it is

The
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fervent and its influence upon the
is

shrinking

at

ostracism in

alarming

an

our

University, of

course

of

Chicago
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events

One would incur

rate.

universities if he denied that

man

should be free to think what he wishes, but in
creasingly he is looked upon as a quaint survivor of
ancient times if he believes that man should be master
of his fate, even when he bears the main effects
of his

own

decisions. The faith in the individual has

been much
old

impaired by

a

fairly

belief, and the changing

The

fairly

new

doctrine,

new

structure

of

a

very

society.

doctrine is that of environmental

we owe to men as
diverse as
Godwin and Marx. On an ever-widening scale it is
being argued that social institutions mold the char

determinism, which

acter

of

that the food and

man:

neighborhood,

housing, family,
child have

and education of the

a

decisive influence upon the way he thinks and behaves
as a man. Noone can doubt, in the
light of generations

of social

research, that this theory

Its thrust is evident: interest is

man's exertions
considerable

to

contains much truth.

shifted from

inevitably

the social environment which

degree

to a

determines the nature and direc

tion of these exertions.

The very old belief is that most men are incapable
of conducting their affairs wisely. Only in the nine
teenth century did this belief temporarily lose its
dominance: at the threshold of the
education it

was

widely

period

believed that the

of universal

vast

majority

of the population could be educated to so high a level
of rationality that it could be trusted with the control
of public affairs as well as the proper conduct of per
sonal affairs.
N ow that the great majority of our population re
ceives at least 12 years of formal

education,

it is

no

longer possible
expect great results-one must ob
serve them. And on the whole I sense a
growing dis
to

illusionment, although

direct documentation of this

disillusionment is rather difficult to present because
the miracle of education still provides, for too many
intellectuals, the anchor of their democratic faith and
the emblem of their ethical respectability.
If I may judge by my own discipline, however, the

skepticism
plicit form.
economic

about the individual is

reappearing

in

ex

The consumer,

literature,

is

a

according to professional
complaisant fellow, quick to

follow the

self-serving mandates of Madison Avenue
long distance call from a stock broker located
just beyond the reach of extradition. This consumer
is commonly given only the virtue of
consistency, and
or

of

a

it is not clear whether his choices

ordered because his follies

are

I

are

treated

suspect that other disciplines

were

but

we

well

not, his indif

words-actions. Most intellectuals

creasing governmental control
pulsory attendance, certification

becoming equally
the declining faith
as

strong

as

are

in favor of in

education

over

(com

teachers, control of

of

curricula and school year, etc.) and of increasing
intervention by state and federal governments in local

governmental control of education. Yet education is
surely the one field in which, if education imparts
either wisdom or logical training, one would most con
fidently expect that increasing authority be reserved to
the individual and the small

political

unit.

The last component of the declining faith in the in
dividual has been the increasing complexity and
mutual

dependence

industrial

society.

of

socialrelationships

The effects of

an

in

an

urban

individual's be

havior upon others become large. A farmer with
deplorable sanitary habits may be an affront to hu

manity;
to

his

a

similar

neighbors.

latter is not
costs

throw

a

city

dweller is

immediate hazard

an

pioneer (if this
terms) bears the main
similar entrepreneur can

An eccentric

or

timid

contradiction in

of his deficiencies; a
a thousand blameless men

long, however).

out

short,

A man, in

of work

can

(not very
be trusted with

hostile Indians, but not with friendly citizens.
I hope that I have sketched with some plausability
the
and
deal

of the decline of faith in the

unregulated
unguided individual, for each contains a good
of validity. Each has also been much exagger

causes

ated. No social research has shown that

man's be

a

independent of his will, or that in our society
his potentialities of achievement are rigidly set by
havior is

his environment.

Our trust in education has been

narrow, academic faith, and
that there are such things
or

are

may document
in the individual by something almost

outspoken,

as

reflexive, symmetrical,

and transitive, or because if they
ference curves would intersect.

Steffen, John P. Wilson
Professor of Law, at the reception for Professor Stigler which
preceded his lecture.
Herbert Brook, JD'36, and Roscoe T.

that the schoolroom is

center

we

as

only

have almost

a

forgotten

non-academic abilities

and

not

the

major,
society is grow
also offering a variety of
one,

of education for life. And if

our

ing more complex, it is
opportunities for individual choice quite beyond the
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malnutrition and untended illness.

as

Much

as

we

may quarrel among ourselves as to the proper way
in which to eliminate such ugly things, all of us wish
be rid of them.

to

For the rest, minimum income inequality has a very
dubious congruence with our basic values. One would

fear for the individual in

a

society

where

small

a

group of

extremely wealthy individuals had the (mo
nopoly) power to exploit others or the (financial)
power to subvert the political process. Neither threat
is real or potential: we have too many wealthy people
collude, and

to

The SRO sign was out
Simons Lectures.

as

George Stigler launched the Henry

dreams of earlier times.

nevertheless �oncede much validity to the
of decline of faith in the individual,
and yet not budge one inch from the goal of indi
vidual freedom. That men are not independent of
their environments does not mean that they should
be denied the opportunity of determining their lives,
and their environments, as far as this is possible. That
One

main

can

sources

education does not turn most
not

reduce the value of

men

allowing

into scholars does

them

to

make their

stupid decisions. That the increasing
interdependence of men calls for a continuing review
of their rights and duties is no reason for assuming
own

wise and

either that
or

no

opportunities for

that conflicts

can

be settled

shall wish to revise the

new

only by

freedom arise
coercion.

We

of individ

particular
ual freedom and responsibility as our society, and
as
our
understanding of our society, change, but
there
is the problem-the transcendental prob
always
lem of all liberal societies-of seeking to enlarge the
individual's share in conducting his life. Men are not
mere social animals, to be
governed into prosperity or
into
tranquilized
non-unhappiness.
-Let us return to our traditional goals of economic
policy. Two of them-maximum output and substan
tial growth
are
ethically neutral: they could be
a nation of
adopted by
gourmets or ascetics or war
or
democrats.
What ethical con
riors, by tyrants
by
tent they
has
been
introduced, almost surrep
possess
titiously, by defining output as that which is desired
by free men.
We have placed the main burden of direction of
social policy upon the goal of reduced income
inequal
content

too

few

life.

to exert

a

directive influence

of minimum income

The

political
goal
equality has at best an adventitious, and at worst a
perverse, relationship to individual freedom.
The goal of individual freedom does not lead auto
matically to a cut and dried program of economic
policies. Continuing research will have to go into the
discovery of the meaning of freedom under changing
social conditions and continuing ingenuity of high
order will be required to contrive policies which will
upon

increase this freedom.

It would be much

tractive if I could propose

policies
doxical,

which

were

more

series

immediately
wholly novel, irritatingly
a

at

of

para
and-after the smoke of battle had cleared

irresistibly persuasive,

but in

good

conscience I

can

not.

Precisely because
has been

so

the tradition of individual freedom

fundamental

to our

the most obvious corollaries of it

these

well known, and
corollaries, like the goal itself, will appear out

moded
are

political philosophy,

not

are

many eyes. Yet the implications of the goal
simply a formalized description of life at some

to

admired date in

history:

we

have

never

done

as

much

-

ity,

and it cannot bear this burden.

indeed, quite fairly
of individualism:

one

It

represents,

element of the basic value

humanitarianism, in the form of the
desire to eliminate poverty and its .concomitants such

At the reception

for Professor Stigler, left to right: Gordon
Insley, JD'57, a student in the Foreign Law Program, Pro
fessor James Stauss of Grinnell College, Professor Stanley
Heywood of Coe College, Professor [o Desha Lucas of the
Law School, James Walsh, of Australia, and Robert Carswell
of Northern Ireland, Commonwealth Fellows at the Law School:
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or

well

as

could, and today

we

as

doing

are

of Chicago
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Law School

very

poorly.
Consider the
a

basic role in

freedom and

policy

This

competition.

policy

has

down limitations to individual

striking
challenging

individual

capabilities, in
policy
proportioning
rapidly losing its popular support and its vitality.
rewards

better
'is

of

On the

one

growing faith-it
giant enterprise is the

hand there is

than this-that the

more

efforts. Yet the

to

a

is

no

home

of progress; on the other hand, the argument that
monopoly reduces income has little emotional appeal
to

rich nation.

a

If

we

place

there is

ever,

main value

a

on

justification
our antitrust
policy

no

Since the War

the individual, how

for

our

complacency.

has drifted into

a

blatant forms of

action against the more
conspiracy and monopolization. While the federal
government has been opening up these backlots to
individual freedom, it has quietly been erecting bar
riers to individual action throughout the prairies of
economic life, with its paternalistic small business
programs and the regulation of competitive industries

spiritless

such

as

agriculture,

motor

trucking,

and

me

a

clear instance of the abandonment of indi

vidual freedom not because it is an obstacle to other
goals, but because freedom is not at the front of pol

always do, ease the
by restricting output,
problems
it,
fixing prices-each a policy serving to
stockpiling
decrease the freedom and responsibility of the indi
icy. Should

as

we,

almost

we

of these industries

viduals who

in these industries

are

them? We

enter

purpose

can

by helping

munerative

achieve the

individuals

industries

to

or

same

to

humanitarian

move

localities

and

who wish
to

more re

by providing

educational facilities, informational services, travel
grants, and other policies designed to widen their
range of alternatives.

large federal program
to increase the range of productive activities open to
the individual, or to enlarge the scope for individual
When did

last initiate

we

freedom within
to come

to

by.

answer

if

an

The
we

area?

question

a

Recent

answers

would be

just

are

as

hard

difficult

addressed it to the heads of state and

local governments, even could we distract them for
a moment from such
important work as the licensing

of scores of trades such
oaths from wrestlers that

mostly imploring
over

a

yacht salesmen, exacting
they are not subversive, but
higher governmental level to take
as

their functions.

have innumerable policies designed to
the
consumer,
including some that protect him
protect
low
prices. Obviously we should help to pro
against
tect him against those forms of fraud which he does
seek out, but should we protect him
not
We

now

actively

against

in Breasted Hall.

unwise behavior?

If

we

prohibit gambling

to preserve him from moral weakness or actuarial
myopia, should we not also supervise his investment

portfolio

to

dent level?

housing.

Our programs to assist distressed industries collide
directly with the policy of competition, and they seem
to

George Stigler, speakisig

keep

his uranium

holdings

My complaint against

that the wisdom of

a course

able than that there is

down to

such

of action is

nothing

a

pru

policies is less
usually debat

admirable about

an

involuntary saint.
The policies designed to influence the distribution
of income call for thorough restudy in the light of
the goal of individual freedom. The main objection
to a progressive income taxation beyond that implicit
in the alleviation of

poverty

is that it

imposes differ

efforts that

poorly serve
personal
penalties
do his best.
to
each
individual
of
inciting
goal
Almost the only instrumental defense for such a tax is
that large incomes are "unfair." The main possible
meaning of this charge is that large incomes are not
fully earned. When this is true, and the extent of its
truth has received embarrassingly little study, why
do we not deal directly with the institutions which
give rise to large, systematic, and persistent earnings
beyond what the community believes are just?
ential

on

the

The inheritance of wealth may be one such insti
The right to unlimited, or at least very large,
bequest has customarily been defended in terms of
tution.

its effects upon the

donor, with very little considera

the donees. It has tra
that the donor is led to vast
exertions and to continued thrift. Yet the need for
relatively free bequest to stimulate large efforts is
tion of the

effects

possible
ditionally been argued

surely

debatable:

we

on

find that

men

also make im

politics, the arts, and
the sciences, where the chief legacy of a highly suc
cessful man to his son is an inferiority complex. On
the other hand the large inheritance of wealth prob
ably has the effect of reducing the incentives to the
heir to exercise his full capabilities-he has received
mense

exertions in

areas

such

as
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the

medal

gold

there

the

at

institution,

we

intellectual

gifts!)

beginning

values in the

precious

are

of the

race.

itself

family
gifts (let

Since
as

an

eliminate all

alone
but it may be advis

cannot

and

bequests,
(including gifts during life,
more
severely than we already

able to tax inheritances
but not

much

estates)

do.

These comments

policies

highly tentative,
hope
thorough-going
responsibility would lead to programs that are neither
consistently "radical" nor consistently "conservative"
but I

that

on

our present standards.

by

are

sufficient to indicate that a
they
philosophy of individual freedom and
are

We do not have such

a

thoroughgoing philosophy

at present: we have been
defend the freedoms of the individual once
year, when the attack on them is

content to
or

twice

a

direct and

unusually
our
pol

brutal, and complacently design

icies in

complete neglect of this goal the remainder
of the year. No one has a
greater responsibility than
the university community, which is
among the chief
beneficiaries of a regime of freedom, for
reviving
faith in this goal and for
developing its implications
for economic, and in fact for all social
policy.

Llewellyn Lecture
Continued

from
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avocation

or a
sop to an idealism
leaves
no
room," nor even one
practice
expression of a richly-living man's desire to ride a two
or four-horse team.
But the price for these
conjoint
advances came close to being as
great as the gain.
Both the courses and the full-time teachers were con
centrated on the rules and fields of law,
"positive"
law, the rules largely as they stood at the moment,
indeed dominantly the rules "of substance." There
or an

"for which

for this. The rules and fields of our
chaos; they cried for organization. And

was some reason

law

were

in

one can understand the initial
the school was to provide,

neglect of the crafts if
reliably, precisely what
so
provide.

apprenticeship

did

How

Teaches

Chicago

Less

Story's
on

his

justifiable

not

and

Craftsmanship
unfortunate was Joseph
Harvard
concentrating

more

inRuential curriculum

at

straight "private" law, cutting out that whole
and background of
philosophy and of

perspective

national and international

governmental practice
lawyers as

which had laid the foundation of such

Hamilton, Kent, Calhoun, Webster and indeed Story's
self.

Harvard itself is still

laboring

on

the needed

recapture of what Story butchered out, but like every

first-rate school has long been
school at Chicago, the
trative Law and

at

that

entry-port by

Theory

American law school

of

job; the law
which Adminis

Legislation

world,

was

came

into the

founded with the

objective

Vol. 7, No.2

of such recapture.

It is also difficult to understand

schools all

why,

as

the law

the country became parts of univer
so
sities, they
long and persistently shut their eyes to
their duties of the exploration and inculcation of the
over

principles of craftsmenship. With the waning of
apprenticeship the arts of the legal crafts slipped into
the forgotten or into disrepute; either they were wholly
neglected or they were seen in terms not of deep truths
about man's nature and man's life with his fellowman,
as matters of shallow and often
ignoble artifice and

but

trickery. Yet the arts of law are not only essential to
any professional work, they are also law's common
ground with those humanities which are a university's
core and
pride, and among which law should stand
with the proudest.
When the arts come to be slighted the answer does
not lie in shunting the
responsibility, turning for ex
as Columbia
ample
just proposed to an entrance test
in writing. The
is
job instead to develop in the student
rough carpentry and even skill in writing-in legal
which

as it
ranges from statute and document
the
brief
and the negotiating letter runs the
through
gamut of all kinds of writing there are, outside of

writing,

to

formal verse. This is not hard to do, nor is it hard, as
one works in the instruction for
accuracy and con
ciseness and simple structure, to press also for life
and style. The brief, for example, and the statute,

provide teaching apparatus unmatched by the
college. But the job does take conscious thought,
some

arts

and

effort.

and

Workshop Instruction Go Hand-in-Hand
That thought and that effort Chicago finds time for
on a scale not matched in this
country, readily, if at
all. Hand in hand with it go theory and workshop
instruction in such basic crafts as advocacy and coun
selling-each viewed whole and as a discipline, with
details of substance used as a good case-book uses
Theory

cases:

to

inform discussion and raise questions

more

than to purvey information. The reference here is not
alone to the elementary composition which results for
every student from his first year tutorial research. It
is not alone to the
counselling experience available in
the school-run legal aid work, but to the sustained

theory-and-practice

of such

Law

alone to the

a

"course"

as

"Commercial

Practice,"
general moot court
and
which
is
system
competition
paralleled in many
but
to
the
schools,
developed theory which lays the
basis of the workshop "course," "Legal Argument."
not

Similarly, in the area of legislation, there is not alone
the universal introduction by way of second-year
tutorial work, but the basic theory that underlies each
of the three or more seminars in current legislation.
Three of Chicago curative procedures on the side of

perspective

and vision call for

particular

mention. As

Vol. 7, No.2

The

with many another

school, the work of the federal

government generally and of the Supreme

Court of

the United States in

particular come for heavy atten
from
federal
taxation
and jurisdiction and the
tion,
due process and full faith and credit phases of con
flict of laws on through admiralty, the federal aspects
of labor law and the rest.
But

on

the international side there is not

useful

branching

monly

conceived into

commercial and

seminars),

out

from International Law

only

a

as com

specialized work in international
investment problems (courses, not

but there is

a

most

interesting comparative

law

development: a full year's intensive work in a
foreign legal system and its language is offered, fol
lowed by a year's locally-supervised
study and practice
in the relevant foreign
country-a novel and ingenious
device for equipping an American to do
legal work
across national and
language barriers.
The second next matter

on

the side of vision and

be indicated very

briefly: jurispru
only an intensive course for
second or third year (weekly
papers) on "Jurispru
dence Law in Our Society"; there are in addition no

perspective
dence.

can

There is

not

less than four further seminars in

one or

Law School
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case-book

finest values open to the case-method. The price is of
course in first instance one of
time-consumption: the

case-book is

a

about rules of

complex

as

subject" is visited with
that which faced the editor of

as

seventy years ago.
The

loses the life-contact and

case

which

its

are

Moreover the

the

points

case

has

are

or

the classical

style

of doctrinal architecture in

a

"field"

of law.

The
vance

same

a

"Wasteful

Road"

holds in

in American

regard to the second great ad
legal education, the invention and

spread of the case-book. But not too many students
fully aware of the price we have come to pay for

are

how

edited

alone and

simply

to

rule, instead of appearing

to

cases

to

policy-judgment

into

more

than

a

guess

or

a

day

dream.

Again Chicago

both

capitalizes

the virtues of the

and waste. While

price

case

dominates the first year and even the
it
is
second,
case-instruction based on materials which
in instance after instance have been edited in the
finest

original

tradition:

value and for

selected for discussion

cases

the

presented in full;
excised, the bearing of its
indicated; companion cases presented in
challenge;

cases

if "collateral" discussion is
content is

and the like-with

quantity;
stuff for

"coverage,"

no hesitance at
using text
if the class-hour is filled with in

tensive discussion.

Moreover-and
courses
as

which

not

alone in those federal-oriented

properly

center on the

in the very intensive series of

and

Monopoly-a

narrow area

Supreme Court,
Competition
cases in a
relatively

cases on

whole series of

has been developed (sometimes

from

a

single jurisdiction) to enable real study of growth,
force exact analysis, and afford practice in argument
with the

same

materials which

were

available

to

each

successive bench.

Chicago

Has Achieved A

Healthy

Balance

are the courses which vary the diet
by
on
class-discussion
problems of counselling,
centering
and those which use as the major material for use
statues fresh enough to force original solution of
ques
tions out of the study of their text, without advance
inquiries by any court. These last types of instruction

Finally

Case-Book Instruction Is

on

are

show development or to
distinction
and synthesis and
challenge
thoughtful
in either aspect to clothe the general situation in
ques
tion with detail and flavor enough to turn student's

companion

instruction

distinguished

complexities

presented

communicate its

instructors from four

devoted. And such work-taken by almost all students
-as that in estates,
corporations and taxation provides
full and repeated exposure to what it is fair to call

edited out.

instructive value

value for argument if counsel's
omitted. In addition the case loses its very

discussion value if it is

with

life-meaning

are

training

no

illustrate

no

do their work if its

judges

out, and

when its facts

essence

invention and cuts down

school's first great contribution as to allow the bene
fits of that contribution to slide
away. The full-time
law faculty at Chicago is
and
large,

information

to

that he must "cover" "the

material

another im

perhaps five other and further
points of view. One of the compulsory first year
courses has a full half of its five hours devoted
openly
and happily to
jurisprudence. But the most interesting
deliberate exposure to
divergent points of view is the
third matter of mention. The
general federal govern
ment course, "Constitutional Law" is
given by three
different instructors from three
sharply divergent
angles, while at least three further approaches appear
prominently in other instruction. It is well nigh im
possible for any student to get through the school
without heavy exposure to two or more of these
philosophies of government. The corridors resound.
There has, of course, been no
thought in all of this
of so rebelling against the narrowness of the law

wasteful road

horrifying

law, while the modern editor who feels

portant aspect of jurisprudence, given by five other
or

above all, of the ways in
have tended to defeat the

teachings and,
today's case-books

which

mean

there

grateful change of pace in the instruction. They
easily and quietly with the emphasis on

also work in
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counselling,
and

phrases
drafting.

some

of

practice

The most recent of the

law

can

teaching
and

interest

government

writing,

of

and both

theory

advantages
tire class

major

has been the

inquiry

area

of

into the

problems

innovations in Ameri

spread
general

of materials,
societal and

for government and law.

forty years there has been drive and talk and hope
and experiment in this direction, with more effect on
has achieved
here

the country has yet

as

The

as

than on curric
or the individual class-room.
Chicago
close an approach to healthy balance

scholarly production

into behavioral science

for which the school has become famous have
the main touched the curriculum

Never

....

It has been
occasion

ing

a

job

not in

to

earn

finds interesting direct values for teaching emerging
from the studies of the processes of deciding, and one
alert, and pleased to be alert, to
the human richness of "law"-thinking which can draw

finds the students

(while dominating,

not
being dominated by) the
usable results from neighboring disciplines.
The tradition of cross-fertilization is old at
Chicago.
Its law faculty has contained a
logician-philosopher,
more

contained two economists, has in these
of behavioral inquiry added men from

recent

SOciology
psychology. Such men do not interefer with the
solidity of the school's training in the work of law.
They add-as each of the other aspects mentioned
adds-good measure of rich roundedness and balance.
They add-mostly by way of influence on their legal
colleagues-their part of that which makes the Law
School of the University of Chicago not
only a pro
and

fessional school of the first order, but a school of the
humanities: a place where vision and sound measure
live in concert.

18

more

men

such

as

or

is

not

on

that

generous in prais
His

Llewellyn.

great

Scrutton and Cardozo is

him many

expressed by

clean law-job that bites. Speaking of such
Professor Llewellyn will sometimes strike the
desk with his fist, shake his head and, with a twinkle

lovely,

man,

Llewellyn Profile
Continued from page

is

no one

Llewellyn

Whether

times; these were men with horse sense who could
get to the barebones of a problem and come up with
a

long
days

to overstatement.

well done than Karl

admiration for

money in
intellectually exciting work. But apart from the value
to
any school of having the thinking of faculty mem
bers profit by the ferment of frontier-research, one

on

given

that Mr.

suggested

is so, it is true that

a

opportunity

repeat

paraphrase a statute." Someone in that class
some
day paraphrase a statute, but it is doubtful
may
�e will do �? without remembering that he should

directly, though they

have offered students

a statute, he had his en
several times in unison the phrase,

paraphrasing

well known and has been

seen.

pioneering explorations

of

"Never

For

teachers and on
ular architecture

Vol. 7, No.2

in his eye,

exclaim, "What

other

it is

a

man

it was!"

On the

equally true that few are more devas
tating in condemning a job considered to be poorly
done; Mr. Llewellyn hates a lousy, lazy job and has
no

hand,

for the

use

man

who did it, damn his

does not hesitate to tell him

soul, and

so.

Professor Llewellyn and his wife, Soia Mentschi
koff, also on the faculty of the University of Chicago
Law School, reserve one evening a week for an 'at
home' with their students

affording them an oppor
know their students better. Mr. Llewellyn
is a widely read man, has many interests outside the
law and is happy to talk with students on various
tunity

to

topics

whether

of the

personal

or

not related to

interest Professor

law. This is

Llewellyn

has

typical
always

taken in his students. And many of the men who have
studied under him write from time to time telling
him of their plans and accomplishments.
A list of Mr.

Llewellyn's

should include his
at

Yale.

His

activity
participation

interests outside of law

as a

boxer while

a

student

sports today, however,
mainly around golf which he plays regularly.
The development and care of orchards is another
subject which holds an especial fascination for Mr.
Llewellyn, and is one in which he considers himself
in

centers

somewhat expert. Cats, of course, have been a great
love of his for many years. He has owned several
Maltese cats which he has even used as the
subjects

Yale. He brings to his classes an enthusiasm
for the law and a sensitivity and sincere dedication to
the finer tradition of the lawyer's craft. His robust,
fresh approach to law, and to life, induces him to

of

he

theories and ways of doing things which
enjoys discussing with his classes and his col
leagues. His is the talent, moreover, of impressing a

books of

notion upon the minds of his students with a dramatic,
almost indelible quality. His unique choice of words

His poems deal with a wide range of
subjects which
have interested him; some even deal with certain
aspects of the law. But whatever the topic, they all
contain the vitality and
depth which characterize all

ments at

develop

new

coordination of vocal expres
gesture enable him to communicate with his

and illustrations and his
sion and

students with

forget.

One

an

day

after

and vividness

they do
strongly emphasizing the

intensity

not

dis-

some

of his poems. For, in addition to the many
on law he has
published,

books, articles and lectures
Karl

has found time to put together two
poetry, Beach Plums and Put In His Thumb.

Llewellyn

of Professor

Llewellyn's work, and which, in fact,
Llewellyn himself.
Jack D. Beem, JD '55

characterize Professor

Vol. 7, No.2

The Board

The University

of Chicago
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of Editors of the University of Chicago Law Review, with the competitors for Board Membership. (Editors in Roman)
right, front row: Mark Leiberman, Bangor, Maine, B.A, University of Maine; Herma Hill, Dallas, Texas, AB., Southern
Methodist University; Ralph Long, Chicago, AB., Valparaiso University; Kenneth Howell, Birmingham, Alabama, A.B., Univer
sity of Alabama and John Gilhooly, Providence, R.I., St. John's Seminary. Second row: Ronald Finch, Anna, Illinois, AB., Southern
Illinois University; Julius Kaplan, Washington, D.C., Wesleyan University; Philip H. Hedges, Portland, Conn.; AB., Wesleyan
University; Robert Doan, Chicago, B.S., Indiana University, M.S., University of Illinois; Richard Goodman, Detroit, A.B., Uni
versity of Michigan; and Alan Washburn, Rapid City, S.D., A.B., Shimer College. Third row: Eric Rosenfeld, Pittsfield, Mass., A.B.,
Harvard University; Richard Scupi, Chicago, AB., University of Chicago; Frank D. Mayer, Jr., Chicago, AB., Amherst Col
lege; George Bobrinskoy, Chicago, A.B., Amherst College; Ronald Tonidandel, Stafford Springs, Conn., A.B., Amherst College
and Robert Lofts, Alton, Illinois, AB., University of Chicago. Back row: Merlin Baker, Provo, Utah, S.B., Brigham Young Uni
versity, George Saunders, [r., Birmingham, Ala., University of Alabama, Robert Zener, (Editor-in-Chief), Pittsburgh, AB., Univer
sity of Chicago, London School of Economics; [ohn Ritscher, Lotigmeadoui, Mass., AB., Bowdoin College, and Michael Douty,
Chicago, A.B., Swarthmore College.
Left

to

32
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benefit

own

Theodore Roosevelt and

in material

The First Law Cornerstone

perity

as

well

as

for the benefit of their fellows

ways, that the sum of the national pros
is great. But that alone does not make true

greatness

anything approaching

or

true

greatness.

It

only the foundation for it, and it is the existence of
institutions such as this, above all the existence of
is

the cornerstone

(When

of

the current Law

Building

laid in

April, 1903, the principal address was de
livered by President Theodore Roosevelt. That speech
is reprinted below as it
appe(lrs in the University
was

Record, Volume VII, May, 1902-April, 1903.)
Mr. President, men and women of the University,
and you, my fellow-citizens, people of the great city
of the West:
I

am

glad

indeed to have the chance of

being

with

you this afternoon to receive this degree at the hands
of President Harper, and in what I have to say there is

little that I

do

can

save

to

emphasize

certain

points

made in the address of Mr.

Judson.
University, to

speak to you of this
you who belong
the institution, the creation of which has so nobly
rounded out the great career of mercantile enterprise
I

to

and

prosperity

which

but of which in

a

Chicago not merely embodies,
peculiar sense the city stands as

symbolical.
It is of vast

well-being.

a

to our

well-being
deep and

as a

foundation

No nation

can

amount to

great unless the individuals composing
worked with the head

or

it

nation

broad of

anything
have

so

with the hand for their

photograph showing the site of the new Law
Buildings. The American Bar Center is on the left; a portion
of Burton-Judson Courts, in which law students are housed,
may be seen on the right. The photograph of a model of the
new Law Buildings, shown directly above the site they will
occupy, is reproduced in approximately the same scale.

A composite

institutions

turning

out citizens

know you turn out, that stands
great assets of which a nation
claims true

of the type which I
as one of the
really
can

speak

when it

greatness.

From this institution you will send out scholars, and
it is a great and a fine thing to send out scholars to add
to the sum of productive scholarship. To do that is to
take your part in doing one of the great duties of
civilization, but you will do more than that, for greater
than the school is the man, and you will send forth
men; men who will scorn what is base and ignoble;
men of
high ideals, who yet have the robust, good
sense

high
It

necessary to allow for the achievement of the
ideal by practical methods.

was one

of

our

American humorists

also

who, like all

humorists,
sage, who said that it was
easier to be a harmless dove than a wise serpent.

true

was

N ow, the aim in

importance

that there should be
material

.

merely

the

a

production
production of

of

citizenship must not be
citizenship. Of

harmless

The University
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of Chicago

that you should not harm your
are
through with life, all that
said of you is that you did not do

course, it is essential

addition

fellows, but if, after you

comes

can

be

truthfully

any harm, it must also
did no particular good.

truthfully

be added that you

sides,

to

be harmless

doves and wise

as

to be moral in the

and broadest

as

serpents;
of the

highest
morality that abstains and endures,
and also the morality that does and fears, the morality
that can suffer and the morality that can achieve re
sults-to have that and, coupled with it, to have the
en�rgy, the power to accomplish things which every
good citizen must have if his citizenship is to he of
word;

to

we

Judson

need

genius,

are

not

community.

said in his address
elemental.

brilliancy,

elemental virtues.

but the

The

today

that the

things
produce not
homely, commonplace,

We need to

reason

we

won. in

1776, the

that in great trial from 1861 to 1865 this nation
true
metal, was because the average citizen had
rang
in him the stuff out of which good citizenship has
reason

been made from time immemorial, because he had in

him

honesty, courage,
Brilliancy and genius?

common

Yes, if

sense.
we can

have them in

the other virtues. If not, if brilliant genius
accompaniment of the substantial

qualities

of character and soul, then it is a menace to
comes in addition to those
qualities,

the nation. If it

get the great general leader, we get
get the man who can do more than

course we

the Lincoln,

we

any common
done.

man can

have the

real value to the
Mr.

sense

to

without the

then of

Remember that the commandment had the two

33
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The

men

do. But without it much

can

be

who carried musket and saber in the

armies of the East and West

through

the four

grim

years which at last saw the sun of peace rise at Ap
pomattox had only the ordinary qualities, but they

pretty good ordinary qualities. They were the
qualities which, when possessed as those men pos
sessed them, made in their sum what we call heroism.

were

And what those

had need to have in time of

men

have in time of peace, if we are to make
this nation what it should ultimately become, if we are
war,

we

must

make this nation in very fact the great republic, the
greatest power upon which the sun has ever shone.

to

And

no one

quality

-remember that I

is

am

enough.

using

First of all is

honesty

the word in its broadest

signification-honesty, decency, clean living at home,
clean living abroad, fair dealing in one's own family,
fair dealing by the public.
And honesty is not enough. If a man is never so
honest, but is timid, there is nothing to be done with
him. In the Civil War you needed patriotism in the
Continued on page 34
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soldier, but if the soldier had the patriotism, and yet
felt compelled to run away when that was needed, he
not of much

was

use.

with

Together

honesty

must

you

have the second

of the virile virtues, courage; courage to dare, courage
to withstand the wrong and to fight aggressively and

vigorously

for the

right.

And if you have only honesty and courage, you may
and
yet be an entirely worthless citizen. An honest
valiant fool has but a small place of usefulness in the
common

honesty, with courage, must go
ability to work with your fellows,

With

body politic.

sense:

ability when you go out of the academic halls to work
with the men of this nation, the millions of men who
have

not

an

academic

who will accept your
consideration, and that is if you

training,

leadership on just one
show yourself in the rough work of actual life fit and
able to lead, and only so.
You need honesty, you need courage, and you need
common sense.

be done in the
laid
men

today,

Above all you need it in the work to
building the corner-stone of which we

the law school

out

who at the bar and

construe, and in

of which is to

on

construing,

come

the

the bench make and

make the laws of this

country; the men who must teach by their actions to
all our people that this is in fact essentially a govern
ment of orderly liberty under the law.
Men and women, you the graduates of this univer
rests a heavy
you the undergraduates, upon you
been
has
much
burden of responsibility;
given to you;
A
from
be
much will
great work lies
you.
expected

sity,

before you. If you fail in it you discredit yourselves,
cause of education. And you
you discredit the whole
if you work in the spirit
succeed
and
will
can succeed

of

impression
Taft,

who

massive

appointed

Justice

His capacity for work
like it.
he was a member of
while
Indeed,
the Louisiana Supreme Court White wrote 80 opin
ions in 14 months." During his 27 years on the Su

mental
was

structure was

...

enormous."5

he prepared more
preme Court of the United States
than 700 opinions.P" His memory was prodigious. His
opinions, which were usually lengthy, he delivered

orally.
He showed

strong

a

Taft, after pointing
a

of

sense

out

judicial responsibility.
study of cases with

that the

view to their decision in conference is

than the

preparation of opinions,

chine is sold

.

.

.

with the license restriction that it
with the stencil-paper, ink and other

and the A. B. Dick Co. sued this manufacturer alleg
an infringement of its patent. A majority of the

ing

court held with A. B. Dick Co.

page 1

father

Justice

his

new

colleague

as

"Grand

Brandeis."2

playing the father role
is revealed in Holmes complaining to Laski, "The
C.J., who occasionally speaks to me as if I were un
known to the world at large, said the people thought
Another instance of White's

I didn't work when I fired off decisions

they

were

given

soon

after

reluctance to dissent is

case:

First, because the

parties

to

Umbreit wrote of Edward Douglass White that he
looked so much like a Chief Justice that he might
appearance alone." He
monumental man, who gave the

position

refers to him

a

as

on

ruling

Supreme

overcome
now

mere

in

this

made has

a

interest of the

this record, since, in my
in

is to

opinion,

the

a

the

isolated cases, but will be as broad as
itself, affecting a multitude of people and

society

capable
subject of

of operation upon every conceivable
human contract, interest or activity, however in
tensely local and exclusively within state author

ity they otherwise might be. Third, because the
gravity of the consequences which would ordi

narily

to me."3

have merited the

White's dissent fore

shadowed the present majority view of the
Court. His argument in part follows:

very large
destroy,
ruling
judicial authority of the States by
unwarrantedly extending the Federal judicial
power. Second, because the result just stated, by
the inevitable development of the principle an
nounced, may not be confined to sporadic or

White-

change by addressing

one

may be used only
supplies made by A. B. Dick Co." The purchaser of
the machine bought ink from another manufacturer,

measure,

from

no

in this

than Chief

effect of that

you.

Continued

greater task

more
regard
Justice White." In the opinions themselves
White's sense of responsibility impelled him to dwell
continually on the "consequences" that might follow
a
particular decision.
A suggestion of his general view in all cases is
is revealed in Holmes' complaining to Laski, "The
A. B. Dick Co. sold a mimeographing machine to
which was attached a plate which stated "This ma

could have been

your faculty today.
I thank you for having
to

a

stated that

conscientious

much wider scope than the

speak

suc

dignified,

"My

the chance to

and later

ceeded him in that office, said of White, "Massive,
impressive as was his physical mould, his

of the words and the deeds of President Harper and
of those men whom I have known so well who are in

given me

Howard

William

strength.

him Chief

vated

arise from such

the

ruling
by
not only vastly extends

a

now

result is

made,

greatly

aggra

since that

ruling

the Federal

judicial

power,
all the innumerable

above stated, but as to
subjects to which the ruling may be made to
as
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makes it the

apply,

duty

of the courts of the

United States to test the

rights and obligations
of the parties, not by the general law of the land,
in accord with the conformity act, but by the
provisions of the patent law, even although the
subjects considered may not be within the em
brace of that law, thus disregarding the state law,
overthrowing, it may be, the settled public policy
of the State, and injuriously affecting a multitude
of persons
"I cannot

....

bring my mind to assent to the con
clusion referred to, and shall state in the light
of reason and authority why I cannot do so. As
I have

ent;
which
.

said, the ink
.

not

was

covered

by

the pat

This curious

.

anomaly then results, that
not embraced by the patent, which

was

Law School

of Chicago

Boone moved into Missouri. After the Louisiana Pur

chase,

in

served

1803,

Jefferson appointed

him

judge.

a

He

the bench until his death six years later.
His son, the first Edward Douglass, became
judge
of the City Court of New Orleans in 1825, at the
on

age of 31. He was elected to Congress in 1831 and
served three terms consecutively. One of his contem
was David Crockett. He voted
Tariff in 1833. That caused his
defeat, when he ran for his 4th term in Congress,
but in the next year he was elected Governor of

poraries
for the

in

Congress
Compromise

Louisiana
tinction

the

on

Whig

Governor.

as

not

ernor was

before he retired

Chief

mistakenly allowed and included in an express
claim would have been inefficacious, is now by
the effect of a contract held to be embraced by

mother

Justice

ticket.

He served with dis

Under Louisiana law the Gov

for

eligible

However, he served

could not have been embraced therein and which
if
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second consecutive term.

a

two

in

terms

more

Congress

his sugar plantation. There the
born, on November 3, 1845. White's
to

was

Catharine

the patent and covered by the patent law
This paper will be concerned with White's contri

Sidney Ringgold, a daughter
pioneer Maryland family, whom the Chief Jus
tice's father had met while serving in Congress. The
Chief Justice's uncle is the Ringgold immortalized in
the song, "Maryland my Maryland."9 White's father

of American law, prin
field of admin

died in 1847 at the age of 53. His mother married
again, to a man named Brousseau.

"

....

bution to the

cipally

development

in the antitrust field and in the

law.

istrative

and his

family background
the

it will

But, first,

Court.
of the fourth

sketch his
before he reached

briefly

career

Supreme

He

was

prominent
ation to

serve as a

White,

was

as a

young

generation

in the American

scene

His

judge.

great

born in Ireland and
He became

man.

of Whites to be

and the third gener

grandfather, James
merchant

years of age, except for a few months when he is
believed to have studied in the Jesuit College in New

Philadelphia, and his name appears as a signer
Non-importation Agreement of 1765. That he
was of some
scholarly bent is shown by his will, in
James

his son, also named
White, the Chief Justice's
to

studied medicine. He moved to Fayette
ville, North Carolina, and was elected a member of
the Continental Congress from North Carolina in

grandfather,
May
U. S.

of 1786, and

by

letter

Carolina.

moved
elected

to

after

was

appointed

the first

of Indian Affairs of the Southern

Superintendent

Department. His
tinental Congress
a

soon

interest in the efforts of the Con
to draft

the Constitution is shown

Governor Richard Caswell of North

to

After

short stay in North Carolina he
County, Tennessee, and was

a

Davidson

delegate
Assembly was
a

to the

Territorial

Assembly

and

by

elected a delegate to the Congress
of the United States from Tennessee. He was ad
mitted to the bar in 1890. His son, Edward Douglass,
the father of the Chief Justice, was born in Nashville
the

year, James White intro
duced a bill in the Assembly of the Territory of Ten
He moved to
nessee to found· Grenville College.

in March 1794.

Louisiana in

In the

1799,

at

same

about the

this school, he transferred to Georgetown College,
where he remained until the outbreak of the Civil

as a

the

The second

enrolled in the College Preparatory De
of
the
partment
Jesuit School in New Orleans at the
of
6.
Four
age
years later, he attended Mount St.
in
Mary's
Emmitsburg, Maryland. After a year in
was

War in 1860. That ended his formal education at 15

in

James.

White

America

of

which he left his Latin books

a

to

came

prominent

of

was

same

time Daniel

the following year.
White
enlisted to fight for the Confederacy
16,
private. He was promoted to the staff of Brig.

Orleans
At
as

a

during

General Beale. He

prisoner

saw

active service and

was

taken

the Battle of Fort Hudson in 1863.

at

In 1865, at 20, he commenced the study of law in
the office of Edward Bermudez. Louisiana, of course,
retained the civil law as enacted in the Code Napoleon,
so all White's
early training was in Civil Law. But
after White was admitted to practice, at age 23, he

applied himself to
as

the civil

law,

the

so

study of the common law as well
might represent clients with

that he

in the federal courts.

litigation

developed

a

In

a

short time, he
state and

successful practice in both the

federal courts.
He

fight

was

also active in

of the

people

government of the
have used

to

overthrow the

in

1874,

served
him

an

at

one

a

Kellogg

age 29,
term.

Associate

and took

against

reconstruction

musket in

to

politics

of Louisiana

to

an

era.

part

the

in the

carpetbag
reported

He is

armed battle

Government. He

on

the levee

was

elected

the Louisiana Senate where he

Then Governor Nichols appointed
of the Supreme Court of

Justice

Louisiana.
The theme of White's
was

the bitter
the

against

and White

political
on
by the Nichols forces
lottery. In the end Nichols

affairs of the Association.

state

he

and the

triumphed

lottery

was

abolished,

struggle

Court, the Nichols administration got the legislature
revoke the charter of the
After White

began

'lottery

his service

on

company.
the State Supreme

Court the anti Nichols-White forces succeeded in

the state constitution to write the

amending

lottery

7,

was

made

This

ship.

a

position

member

on

he retained until after his election

United States Senator. This committee also

as
on

duct. On November

passed
unprofessional con

of

complaints against lawyers

17, 1883, he moved the appoint

(on which he served) to reor
of
the records of the District
keeping
ganize
Orleans
The following year he was
Parish.
of
Court
a member of the committee to persuade the State

ment

of

committee

a

the

books in the State Li

Legislature to transfer the law
brary to the Law Association.

always proud of his service on the State Court,
during the short period of his service the
court caught up on its docket, which had been heavily

chairman of the State Board of Bar Examiners.

the next decade White did not hold

During

He devoted himself to the

office.

forming

a

first of

partnership,

political

practice of law,
& White and

Spencer

term as

governor. The issue

He became Senator

States Senate.

almost all his time, not taken up in court appearances,
in his office. It was said that there the light seldom

Supreme

extinguished until dawn. To pursue his research
in civil law he would consult the original sources in

White married Mrs. Leita

was

a

languages

the French
to

Spanish

second mother

he

spoke

tongue

to

and read

French, indeed,
him, and the other
He lived in

RuentIy.

of New Orleans until he moved

Quarter

great deal of his law practice
from the French community. In fact, some

Washington,

was

and French.

thought

and

that the

a

as

an

good

senators

teaching
resigned

regard

New

as

great lawyer

of both civil and

During

the

with

common

same

period,

a

profound knowledge

law.
he

of the

moving

1882, when
figures in founding Tulane University.
New
White was 37, Paul Tulane of Princeton,
Jersey,
placed a large endowment in the hands of trustees,
In

including White,
that the

cause

to

found

a

university.

Believing

of education in Louisiana would be

if the proposed university were to be
combined with the State University, White devised
a
plan, implemented by a constitutional amendment,

strengthened

which allowed a transfer of the State University to
the Tulane trustees to found what is now known as
Tulane University. White remained associated with
the administration of the University until 1897.
White
became
ation

was

a

active in Bar Association activities.

He

member of the New Orleans Law Associ

(the predecessor

to

the Louisiana State Bar

He

famous for

was

on

food and

good

intimate terms with

subordinated to the work of the
of his

in

with service
vice

as

University.

was one

the Supreme Court,
Montgomery Kent, a widow

court.

For

interest in

spite
continuing
George
University, he refused its offer of a chair in the
law school, although Harlan and others combined

example,

a

an

and congressmen and other public figures.
joined the Supreme Court all other activ

were

town

in

December 7,

After he

he continued his

practice

on

appointed by Grover
Associate Justice of the

was

appointment to

hospitable couple,

Le Blanc. Even after his ascent to the

life undertook the

after his

conversation.

Orleans, White earned universal

had

the

of a Washington lawyer, an old friend of his, and a
sister-in-law of the late Senator Gibson of Louisiana.
They had no children. The Whites became known

ities

name

was

Court of the United States.

Shortly

originally been
Supreme Court
interest in languages and late in
study of German. By his years of

family

politics

for Nichols in his

lottery. Nichols won the election
and rewarded White by supporting him for the United
1891, and served until he
Cleveland, in March 1894,

Latin, Italian,

as

notorious Louisiana

later White, Parlange & Saunders. His practice was
successful. White was primarily a student. He spent

was

returned to

old, he
campaign manager

and became

bid for another

arrears.

White also served

In 1888, then 43 years

because
in

the
the

On November 20, 1880,

member of its committee

into the state's fundamenal law and to set up a new
Supreme Court. The entire court was out. White
was

No.2

Association), on June 10, 1871, and after leaving
State Supreme bench he took an active part in

carried

fight

corrupt

life in Louisiana

had its ups and downs. At about
of
White's
the time
appointment to the State Supreme

but the

to

Vol.
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He

on

the

president

even

refused

to

Gridiron Club, because of his
the court. When President

place on
Spain and

a

Supreme

Court.

He

of the board of Tulane
attend dinners of the

care

for the

McKinley

dignity

offered

of

him

peace between
the United States in 1898, he declined the

the commission to

negotiate

appointment.
with Theodore Roosevelt began in
1901. At that time Roosevelt sought his advice on
the question of beginning legal studies which would
His

friendship

occupy his time and fit him to be a better presiding
officer in the Senate. White advised him that attend
ing a law school would be derogatory to the office

proposed that Roosevelt read
prepared by White and that
him
a
quiz every Saturday after
give

of Vice President. He
law books from a list
White would
The work

noon.

the

plan

was

was

to

have started in the

abandoned when

Mckinley's

Fall, but
assassina-
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tion made Roosevelt President.

Roosevelt in

Henry Cabot Lodge, dis
Supreme Court, said,

letter to

a

Lurton's fitness for the

cussing

"On every question that had come before the bench,
he has so far shown himself to be in much closer
touch with the
than

in which you and I believe

policies

White, because he has been right about
corporations where White has been wrong."lO White's
even

point

of view

on

and economic

legal

questions

was

much closer to President Taft's than to Roosevelt's.
In 1909 and in 1910, Taft consulted White about
appointments to vacancies on the court. As late as

the

campaign of 1916, Taft sought information from
concerning whether Hughes would accept the

White

for the

nomination

Republican

White

presidency.
appointed

assured Taft that he would."! Taft

Chief
was

in December of 1910. The

Justice

White
Prior to Mr.

Fitzpatrick's lecture, shown above are, rear row,
members of the Executive Committee of the Committee for
the Edward Douglass White Lecture Hall, Walter J. Cum
ings, [r., P. Newton Todhunter, JD'38, Thomas R. Mulroy,
JD'28, Chairman, Michael I. Igoe, Jr., JD'57, and W. McNeil
Kennedy. In the front row, Hon. William J. Campbell, Judge,

appointment

well received.

generally

Before the

and after Fuller's

appointment

Holmes wrote to Pollock

follows: "As

as

to

death,

the Chief

U. S. District

Justiceship I am rather at a loss. I should bet he will
appoint Hughes, who has given up a chance of being
Republican nominee for the Presidency, but I know
nothing. I think White, who is next in Seniority to
Harlan (too old, etc.) the ablest man likely to be
thought of. I don't know whether his being a Catholic
would interfere. I always have assumed absolutely
that I should not be regarded as possible-they don"
appoint side Judges, as a rule. It would be embar
rassing to skip my Seniors, and I am too old. I think
I should be

nation

so

far

as

I

can

judge

afraid White has about

Taft's brother, Horace,
cember 15, 1910: "The

glorious

.

.

.

I

see

came

to

me

towards

little chance

as

I

1."12

President,

De
was

but favorable comment."13
new

joined

the

Supreme

Court

exaggerate the importance of this field
Because White's long service on the

of law

today.

bench

(27 years)

coincided with the need to

spell

the role of the Interstate Commerce Commission

regulating the railroad industry and because of
White's interest and aptitude in this field, this branch
of the law owes more to White than to any other
judge. In fact, he might be called the Father of Ad
in

ministrative Law in the "case and
as

controversy"

sense,

Ernst Freund is the Father of the academic

sideration of administrative law.
The rise of government by administrative

inevitable. With the

passing

body

con

was

of the frontier and the

complexity

of economic and social

Interstate Commerce Commission created in 1887.

appointment by the
of its reception.

almost non-existent. It would

in size and

it became evident that there would have to be

comparable development in the machinery of govern
ment. The tasks were
becoming too many to be car
ried out by old agencies of government, separated
from each other in three branches, executive, legisla
tive and judicial. A new system was evolving. A
particular area of governmental concern would be
set aside by Congress and entrusted to a new
agency
which would have governmental power (partly legis
lative, partly executive and partly judicial) in the
field assigned it. The prototype of this new form of
organization, the regulatory commission, was the

a

of White

nothing

was

to

limited admiration.

wrote to the

At the time that White

out

as

within 15 minutes

administrative law

be difficult

seems
a

appointment

The confirmation of the
Senate

life,

better administrator than White, but
more
politic. Also the President's incli

type for which I have but
am

growth

a

he would be

Court, Honorary Chairman, Han. F. Ryan DuffY,

Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
Honorary Chairman, Han. Michael I. Igoe, Judge, U. S. Dis
trict Court, Honorary Chairman, and Hon. Julius
Hoffman,
Judge, U. S. District Court.

.

Immediately following the Civil War there was a
great period of railroad building. This railroad ex
pansion was subsidized by grants of right of way,
loans, subsidies and outright gifts of millions of acres
of public land. Additionally, state governments, coun
ties and municipalities almost competed with one
another in generosity to the railroad builders. In the
panic of 1873, the people of the Middle West and
Far West began to realize that they were not receiv
ing the advantages that they had expected from the
were abuses: exorbitant
freight and
watered
stock,
rates,
discriminatory rebates
passenger
to powerful shippers, and free passes to state

railroads. There

legis

of influence. These evils were
the attitude of certain of the railroad

lators and other

aggravated by

people

magnates. Thus Leland Stanford said, speaking to a
gathering of railroad officials, "There is no foundation
in good reason for the attempts made by the general
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government and

the

by

especially
might and it is
to

states

control

to your
your affairs. It is a question of
interest to have it determined where the power re
sides."14

endured the abuses

The American

people
extraordinary patience, believing

with

"That government

governs best which governs least." However, in the
midwestern states there was a growing reaction and
the Illinois Constitution of 187015 contained a clause
the legislature to pass laws to prevent unjust
discrimination and extortionate rates of freight and
state.
passenger tariff on the different railroads in the

directing

to the courts.

gress and
the court

over

the commission

right

in

socialistic, but when it reached
Supreme Court, in Munn v Illinois/6

denounced

as

1876, Chief Justice Waite upheld the Illinois Stat
of the

extension of the historical

state

right
regulate businesses with a public interest, such as,
inn-keepers, common carriers and ferries.
On the same day that the court sustained the valid
ute

as an

to

ity of the
approving

Illinois Statute, it handed down decisions
the right of a state to establish maximum

by

a

state

mission invalid.l" These decisions

adopted

regulation

an

procedure,

the

parties had

the

would respect its role and not usurp it.
important administrative law cases de

courts

One of the

White

by

Texas

was

&

Justice

Pacific Railway v.
explained

Frankfurter

of this decision: "In order to avoid
mischievous opportunities for the assertion of individ
the

significance

by shippers as against the common interest
uniformity in construing railroad tariffs, this Court

ual claims

of

construed the Interstate Commerce Act in the
case as to withdraw from

so

famous Abilene Cotton Oil

the

shipper

the historic

the courts for

quired

common

law

right

unreasonable

charging

to sue in

rates.

It

re

resort to the Interstate Commerce Commission

because not to do

so

would result in the

impairment

in the first instance-there would be considerations

end to

com

state

Congress responded with the
Act of 1887. It specifically pro

of railroads.

Interstate Commerce

a

and

legislative

put

by

Supreme

"long

and three years later the court

short haul" evil!",
declared rate regulation

the commission

general purpose of that Act. It did so because
even
though theoretically this Court could ultimately
review such adjudications imbedded in the various
judicial judgments-if a shipper could go to a court

freight and passenger rates."? The period of public
regulation of railroads by state governments lasted
about ten years. Then the United States
Court nullified an Illinois law attacking the

definite

to insist

cided

was

a

that it be followed-and perhaps most
important of all-that when the commission was given
a function of
government to perform by Congress that
a

Abilene Cotton Oil CO.20

the United States

had to be
to

by

established basic

had to follow proce
dure consistent with due process of law, that when

ination and

tion

White and

by

presided

principles, such as, that there
grant of governmental function
Congress, that the commission

The

legislature then passed laws prohibiting discrim
establishing a maximum rate, and created
warehouse commission to regulate rail
a
and
railway
and warehouses. This legisla
elevators
roads, grain

Decisions

which he

of the

of fact which this Court could not

possibly disentangle

the necessary uniformity. The benef
icent rule in the Abilene Cotton Oil case was evolved
so

as

to

secure

by reading
it

were a

the Interstate Commerce Act not

as

though

collection of abstract words, but by treating
instrument of government growing out of

pooling, rebates, discrimination of any char
higher charges for a short haul than for a
It provided that all charges be "reasonable
haul.
long
and just" and it required the roads to post their tariffs.
To administer this law Congress established the first

it

permanent administrative board of the American
Government, the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In 1906, the Hepburn Act authorized the Interstate

remarkable power and facility in statesmanlike inter
pretation of statute law'." Finally, Justice Frankfurter
his evaluation of White's opinion as "A

Commerce Commission to determine and

creative

hibited
acter

and

prescribe

ideas which

course,

are

clear to

us

today

were

not so at the time that White started to write his
famous opinions on the Interstate Commerce Commis

sion.

It

was

White's contribution to the

of law that he
sion into

our

integrated

private

and

the

public

development
regulatory commis
common

law,

and
child

way that it appears almost a
law. This was not an easy task be
cause it involved the division of authority between
the national government and the states and the delin
did it in such

of the

a

an

with certain evils and addressed to

their correction. Chief
case was

Taft,

as

J ustice

characterized
a

'conspicuous

by

his

White's

opinion

in that

Chief

Justice

successor,

instance of his unusual and

epitomizes

act

of

adjudication unanimously

accom

plished.">'

maximum rates.

Of

as

long experience

common

eation of the relationship of these new agencies to
the executive branch of the government, to Con-

precedents in administrative law
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan.t? This
case involved the
validity of a congressional act em
a custom's official to
impose penalties. The
powering
statute was attacked on the ground that the imposition
and enforcement of penalties was primarily a judicial
function. White rejected the contention because it
magnified the judicial to the detriment of all other
departments of the government. The effect of this
Another of White's

is Oceanic Steam

give greater scope to the action of admin
istrative agencies, and, like Marshall's decision in
Marbury v. Madison, to define the power of the
case was

to
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courts.P
In the

Co.

of East Tennessee,

case

Virginia

&

Georgia

Interstate Commerce Commissioni" White
Ry.
held that substantial findings of fact of the commission
v.

made after

hearings were not subject to review if they
questioned in the lower court. In
another case he further developed the law with regard
to findings of fact made by an administrative
body
had not been

to

its determination to the effect that if the

support

findings by

the commission

not

were

of

sufficiently

substantial character to sustain the order then the
court did not have
ent

investigation

the

duty

to

undertake

an

independ

of the facts in order to substantiate

the order."
Another decision of White

Southern

City

Railway

v.

was

U. S.

ex

rel Kansas

Interstate Commerce Com

mission.26 An amendment to the Interstate Commerce
Act

empowered

owned bv
to do

that it

thi�

even

was

the Commission to evaluate property
carrier. The commission failed

a common

at

the request of the

railway, claiming

to arrive at

evaluation. White

impossible

an

held that the Commission had erred in refusing to
exercise the authority granted to it, and that in so

doing,

it

was

actually assuming authority

it did not

possess.
A landmark decision of White in this field was U. S.
27
v. Sante Fe,
wherein speaking of the commissioner
of the general land office and his subordinates, White
held that the function of government sought to be
exercised by the administrative body must be one

which

comes

under the role

assigned

to

the

of the Mandel Legal Aid Associa
responsible for student participation
in the work of the Mandel Clinic. Left to right, Darrell Kel
logg, Hiawatha, Kansas, AB., U of Kansas; Matthew E. Bris
lawn, Pullman, Washington, AB., Washington State College;
Alford Penniman, Rockford, Illinois, A.B., Carleton College;
Neale Secor, President, Maywood, N. J., A.B., Drew University;
Frederick P. Roehr, Kansas City, Mo., A.B., Rice Institute;
Carter D. Peebles, Oak Park, Illinois, University of Stockholm,
A.B., DePauw University; and James Weldon, Glenside, Penna.,
AB., Amherst College.
The Officers and
tion, the student

Directors
group

body by

Congress.
White,

in

another

case, stated

the basis of

judicial
follows: 28
rulings
"Beyond controversy, in determining whether an

review of administrative

as

order of the commission shall be

suspended

Continued

on

or

set

page 40

Donald H. Fradkin,
the

Hon. William J. Campbell, Judge of the U. S. District Court
and Honorary Chairman of the Committee for the Edward
Douglass White Lecture Hall, introducing Mr. Fitzpatrick.

a

student in the Law School,

offices of the Mandel Legal Aid Clinic.

at

work in
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corrupt and dishonest practices and by the
resources of the country were

to end

White-

from

aside,

must

we

fear that the natural

page 39

Continued

a, all relevant

consider,

questions

of

constitutional power, or right; b, all pertinent ques
as to whether the administrative order is within

being ruthlessly exhausted and that small businessmen
were
being faced with ruin. In 1890, the Sherman
Act was passed by Congress. Every contract, com

tions

bination,

the scope of the delegated authority under which it
purports to have been made; and, c, a proposition

spiracy,

which

state

we

independently, although

it may be contained in the

although

even

previous

one,

in its

essence

viz., whether,

the order be in form within the dele

gated power, nevertheless it must be treated as not
embraced therein, because the exertion of authority
which is

has been manifested in such

questioned

an

to cause it, in truth, to be
that the substance, and
rule
within the elementary
the
determines
not the shadow,
validity of the exer
is that the powers
as
it
Plain
cise of the power

unreasonable

.

just

stated

and which,

as

manner

.

.

of the

are

therefore,

essence

of

may not be

judicial authority,

curtailed, and whose
proper case avoided,

discharge may not be by us in a
it is equally plain that such perennial

powers lend no
support whatever to the proposition that we may,
under the guise of exerting judicial power, usurp
administrative functions by setting aside a

merely

lawful administrative order upon our conception as
to whether the administrative power has been wisely
exercised."

and of two others handed

Speaking of this case
by White on the same day,

down

Edward H.

Mosely,

Secretary of the Commission, wrote to F. W. Car
penter, then Taft's secretary, explaining, "I am
three opinions of the Supreme Court of the Umted
States,
through Mr. Justice White, which

sen�ing

speaking

were

rendered last

Monday

and which

so

strongly

"29

..

strengt h en th e power 0 f t h e C omrmssion.
I think the
In a letter to Laski, Holmes said ",
.

credit is

his

wholly

(White's)

about

,

making

the

re

lations between the Interstate Commerce Commission
and our court clear and putting the whole important

sound and workable

footing."30
speaking of White's opinions
in this field said: "( They) are models of clear and
satisfactory reasoning which give to the people, to
state legislatures, to Congress, and the courts a much
needed knowledge of the practical functions the Com
merce Commission was to discharge, and of how they
business

Chief

were

on a

Justice

chinery

Taft in

be reconciled to

to
.

.

.

They

are

existing government ma
conspicuous instances of his

unusual and remarkable power for facts and states
manlike interpretation of statute law."31
Somewhat similar to the need to control and reg
ulate the railroad

Vol. 7, No.2

industry

was

the need to control the

great combinations of wealth that grew up

in America

toward the end of the 19th century. Laws to regulate
trusts and monopolies were motivated by the desire

in the form of trusts

in restraint of trade

several states

be

illegal,

or

attempt

merce

with

or

or

otherwise,

or commerce

foreign

nations

was

or

con

among the
declared to

and every person who should monopolize
to monopolize any part of trade or com

among the several

made

states was

guilty

of

a

misdemeanor.
Taken literally the Sherman Act would have forbid
den almost every contract or combination. White
would not accept such an indiscriminate application

of the law. In his famous dissent in United States

v.

200, 351,
Freight Assn.,32
argued, "To define the words 'In restraint
of trade' as embracing every contract which in any
degree produced that effect would be violative of
166 U. S.

Trans-Missouri

( 1897)

he

reason

because it would include all those contracts

which

are

the very

equivalent

to

saying

therefore, nothing
would

essence

necessarily

tracts in restraint

of trade and would be

that there should be

to

no

trade,

restrain." The dilemma which

defining the words (con
of trade) so as to destroy by render
arise from

the contracts upon which trade
and yet pre-supposing that trade would contmue and
should not be restrained, is shown by the argument

ing illegal

�epends,

advanced, and which has been compelled by the

exigency of
The

the

premise upon which

it is based."

following year the Addyston Pipe case ap
on
appeal before the 6th Circuit Court of

peared
Appeals."

William Howard Taft wrote the

opinion
sustaining the government's conten
tion, that the combine in question was illegal, Judge
Taft began by stating that the (majority) opinion in
for the court. In

the Trans-Missouri case would he a sufficient answer
to the defendants, since the majority opinion held
Sher
every restraint of trade to be forbidden by the
Act. However, he then proceeded, by an analysis
of the authorities, to show that the practices of the
defendants could not be considered reasonable in the

man

common

by

law

sense.

the government

Five years later suit was brought
dissolve the holding company

to

and Harriman, the Northern
Securities case.33a The majority held that there was

set

a

up

by Hill, Morgan

violation of the Sherman Act.

There

were

four

dissenters: White, Fuller, Peckham and Holmes, on
the ground that the Sherman Act did not apply to
contracts

It

was

concerning the ownership of stock.
in the Standard Oil34 and American Tobacco

cases'" that

White, then Chief Justice, speaking for

the court, with only Harlan
explained the rule of reason,

dissenting, defined and
distinguishing between

Vol. 7, No.2

The University

those economic combinations that were harmful and
those that were useful in modern society.
Two criticisms have been made of the rule of

first, that

reason:

Standard Oil

it

was

Company

obiter dictum because the

and American Tobacco Com

pany were violative of the Sherman Anti-trust Act
under any interpretation. Therefore there was no need

of

distinction between reasonable and unreasonable

a

Law School

of Chicago

from the

origin
Act

was

41

law, and that the Sherman
prevention, in modern con

common

adapted

the

to

ditions, of conduct

dealing effecting the wrong, at
law doctrine was aimed. This, it
was said, is 'the dread of enhancement of
prices and
of other wrongs which it was thought would flow
from the undue limitation on competitive conditions
which the

or

common

caused

by contracts or other acts of individuals or
The court declared, page 59, that
corporations
'the statute was drawn in the light of the existing
practical conception of the law of restraint of trade,'
'

restraints of trade.

Secondly, that in basing the rule of
reason on common law
principles White erred in that
the common law only made the distinction between

...

matter

and drew the conclusion that the restraints which were
condemned by the statute are those which, following

tract

the

reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade in the
of contracts that were ancillary to a main con
of sale and reasonably adapted and limited to
the contract's lawful purpose. The charge that the
"rule of reason" concept does not comport with the
common

law is well answered

Stone and from

by quotations

from

Holmes.

Justice
Justice
Justice, later Chief Justice, Harlan F. Stone, said:
"In seeking more effective protection of the public
from the growing evils of restraints on the competitive
system effected by the concentrated commercial power
of 'trusts' and 'combinations' at the close of the nine
teenth century, the legislators found ready at their
hand the common law concept of illegal restraints of
trade

took

In

or commerce.
over

that

enacting

concept by condemning such

wherever
the

the Sherman law

they occur in or
states. They extended

statute to restraints

the form of trust

affect

commerce

they

restraints

between

the condemnation of the

effected

by

any combination in
conspiracy, as well

otherwise,
as
by contract or agreement, having those effects on
the competitive system and on purchasers and con
sumers

of

goods

or

or

or

services which

were

characteristic
law, and they

of restraints deemed illegal at common
gave both private and public remedies for the
flowing from such restraints.

injuries

"That such is the scope and effect of the Sherman
was first
judicially recognized and expounded in

Act

opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co. (CCA 6th) 85 F 271, affirmed in 175
U. S. 211, written by Judge, later Chief Justice Taft,
and concurred in by Justice Harlan and Judge, later
Justice Lurton of this court. This court has since re

the classic

that the restraints at which the
is
Sherman law
aimed, and which are described by its
terms are only those which are comparable to re

peatedly recognized
straints deemed

complished by

law, although ac
other than contract and which,

illegal

means

at

common

for constitutional reasons, are confined to transactions
in or which affect interstate commerce.
"In Standard Oil Co.

United States, 221 U. S. 1,
decided
in
this
court, speaking through
54,55, 58,
1911,
Chief Justice White, pointed out that the restraint of

trade

contemplated by

v.

section 1 of the Act took its

law

common

This view

was

United States

analogy

v.

106, 169, where

it

more

or

undue:

stated in

explicitly

American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S.
was said:
it was held in the
'

...

Standard Oil Co. Case that
trade'

'unreasonable

are

followed and

as

the words 'restraint of

law and in the law of this country
the time of the adoption of the Antitrust Act only

at

at

common

embraced

acts

or

contracts

or

agreements

combina

or

tions which

interests

operated to the prejudice of the public
by unduly restricting competition or unduly
the due

obstructing

course

of trade

because of their inherent nature

or

which, either

effect

or because
of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously re
strained trade, that the words as used in the statute
or

were
designed to have and did have but a like signif
icance.' In thus grounding the 'rule of reason' upon
the analogy of the common law doctrines applicable

restraints of trade the court gave a content
meaning to the statute in harmony with its history

illegal

to

and
and

plainly

man was

was

hibit

legislative purpose."36

one

of his letters to Mr. Wu,

United States, 229 U. S. 373, 376, 377, a
indicted under the Sherman Antitrust Act for

trade. It
law

its

v.

in restraint of trade and to

conspiracy

a

by

Holmes said in

Justice
"In Nash

indicated

was

objected

bad, because

only

that

as

a

monopolize

criminal statute the

it had been construed to pro

such contracts and combinations

as

unduly

restricted competition or unduly obstructed the
course of trade, and so construed it was too indefinite
for

a

criminal law. But in the

p. 377, that 'the law

opinion

I

pointed

is full of instances where

a

out,
man's

depends on his estimating right, that is, as the
jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree,'
that an act might be murder, manslaughter or mis
adventure according to the degree of danger attending
it according to common experience in the circum
fate

stances
.

.

.

known

to

the actor. As I put it in

'The conditions

human, and

a

are

as

permanent
great body of precedents

a

later

anything

on

the civil

coupled with familiar practice make
paratively easy for common sense to keep to
side

sa f e.

'''37

case

as

it

com

what is

That White's construction of the Sherman Act was
beneficial is generally conceded by his critics. Pro
fessor Dishman in his article on "Mr. Justice White
and the Rule of Reason,"38 although rejecting the

law historical basis of the rule of reason,
states: "This is not to say, as some critics have said,
that the rule has seriously hampered the Depart
common

of

ment

Justice

the antitrust law.

in

enforcing
authority of

We

Thurman Arnold that
on the
without the rule the Sherman Act would have been
unworkable because every combination between two
have it

in business is in

men

some measure a

restraint

of trade.

The rule, he has said, has the effect of preventing the
antitrust law from destroying the efficiency of those
combinations which are actually serving, instead of ex.

the consumer."39

ploiting,

to
space to discuss White's contribution
other fields of law. However, someone is bound to
where did White stand on the great
raise the

There is

not

question,

social issues of his
It is

day?

Was he

a

liberal?-like Holmes?

squeeze the massive White into a
impossible
however labelled. There is always a de
to

pigeonhole
mand to

Court

put Supreme

into

Judges

It eliminates the need to examine what
to read what

or

categories.

they

decided

said-we know all about them

they

First and foremost White

law

was a

discipline in the
methodology.
goals
a

was

own

and

lawyer.

academic

sense

the

be consistent with symmetry and
order or even to be a starting point of a symmetry
and order theretofore unknown."39a That White had a
to

classical notion of "facts"

as

well

law is shown

as

by

his remark to counsel during the oral arguments of
Stettler v. O'Hara,40 "Mr. Frankfurter, I could gather
twice

much material to show that

as

wrong and should be abolished,"41

is

data

luctance to

regard sociological
the equivalent of
hypothesis
as

private property

manifesting a re
gathered upon a

evidence

emerging

from direct and cross-examination.
His rule

of

reason

sistent interest in the

defined

by

cases and his
per
law
administrative
field of

in the antitrust
new

Dean Pound

as

under which the executive
.

.

"that branch of modern law

department

of government

interferes with the conduct of the individual for

the purpose of promoting the well-being of the com
,"42 is evidence that White had a feeling
munity
.

for the

.

43
unity of society. Freedom

not freedom

pression

of the minimal social

criminal law

duty

as

if it

the

was

ex

exacted of the in

the government. 44
White sensed that the danger to be avoided in

dividual

by

social reform

that it

might destroy society by
knew society only existed by
fragmenting
reason of people combining together formally and in
formally in countless ways. The search for a balance
was

He

it.

the

compromise that

and
the

their

yet guide

would leave

associating

of the

well-being

men

so

free

to associate

that it would

community-may explain

serve

his dis

the Trans-Missouri Freight Association case
where White said "the construction which reads the
rule of reason out of the statute embraces within its
sent in

inhibition every contract or combination by which
working men seek to peaceably better their condition."
It may explain his adherence to the majority in the
C oppage45 and Adair cases'? which struck down

legis
forbidding employers to discriminate against
a workman because he belonged to a union if his
action is judged wrong in these instances.
During White's time in the court, with White voting
with the majority, the following legislation was up

lation

from the

obligations

is

A state law

seen

A state law

by

him

as

of association with

limiting
limiting

the hours of work in minesr'?
the hours of work for women.t"

The Illinois Child Labor law;49
State workmen's compensation laws;

cases

allowed

scrutinized,

are

Judge Hershey of
expressed the same idea

to associate.

Court

Supreme
regarded the

with its

When he decided

judges, as it is expressed by Cardozo,
new
problems arise, equity and justice will direct
mind to solutions which will be found, when they

"as

freedom

as

when he

To him the

before him, he decided them according to legal stand
ards, that is, the law he found in the constitution, the
statutes and the case precedents, with a permissible

leeway

others but

the Illinois

7, No.2

held:

from the label.

.

Vol.
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A state law

setting

50

safety regulations

up

for coal

mines.P!
A state law

requiring

be redeemed in
A state law
was

that

script used

to

pay miners

cash;52

requiring that coal be weighed before it
computing the wages of miners.:"

screened in

forbidding contracts to limit the liability
employer for injuries sustained by his work

A state law

of

an

men.v'
A state law

prohibiting pool rooms.i"

law

that

private employment
upheld but one abolishing
agencies
private employment agencies was overthrown."?
A

state

requiring

be licensed?"

was

Employers Liability Act was upheld.r"
limiting hours of railroad workers
and for the duration of a specific emergency fixing
their wages was upheld.!"
The state right to fix intra state rates was upheld.s"
The grandfather's test of eligibility for voting was
The Federal

The Adamson Act

held bad;61
A

city

particular
were

ordinance
area

white

was

if

forbidding

more

negroes

to

live in

a

than half the householders

held invalid; 62

The power of a congressional committee to
for contempt was limited.'"

punish

Vol.

7,

The University

No.2

of

Congress forbidding the interstate
transportation
goods manufactured by child labor
was held unconstitutional.v' and White
silently dis
sented in the case upholding war time rent control
However,

act

an

of

during World

War I. 65

White's last

judicial

Case.v"

There

berry

that

majority,

jurisdiction
In

conclusion,

was

White

Federal

the

over

act

primary

his dissent in the N ew

insisted,

the

against

Government

did

have

contests.

I think to understand the

greatness

of White, we have to see it apart from the subject
matter of his decisions. He is a great man because he

the

typifies

in

Judge

society.

You recall the famous

controversy between Sir Edward Coke and James the
First.

that

67

the First had

James
concerning

arose

behalf of the court,
Then the King said

in

Law School

of Chicago

given judgment
ownership of land. Coke, on
set the King's judgment aside.
that he thought the law was
a case

procedures. To' a degree, the acceptance of
procedure is of little importance is a
on the ideal of
yielding
government by law and not by
personalities.
J ames the First was not the last legal primitive. The
simplicist notion of law is the cause of a great deal of
misunderstanding, and of unfair criticism of the courts.
When Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth was a young man
in New England it was expressed as follows: The
common law was
only "adapted to a people grown
their

own

the belief that

old in the habits of vice" while the law which the
courts

this tradition is sometimes heard

decisions of the
The law is the

by

great endowments of

law is

learned in the laws of his realm and

Majesty

cases are

was

not

not to be

decided

by natural reason but by the artificial reason
judgment of law, which law is an act which re
quires long study and experience. At another time,
Coke remarked that the law was "an artificial perfec
tion of reason gotten by long study, observation and
and

experience
"N 0

and

of every man's natural reason; for
artifex."68 This might be translated

not

nascitur

nemo

one

is

a

born

White is the

Judge."
This is

professional judge.
by his expertness in procedure. In a sense
procedure is the beginning of competence in the art
of being a lawyer or a judge, because procedural law
is the means by which litigants obtain the benefits of
other laws. When White went on the Supreme Court
a
great number of cases involving questions of pro
cedure were turned over to him. The same thing is
shown

true

of his service

on

the

state court.

This is unusual.

Ordinarily, questions of procedure and jurisdiction are
decided by the chief justice of an appellate court or
are
assigned by him to one of the senior associates.
It is one of the noteworthy things of White's judicial
service that 54 of the 80 cases decided by him on the
Louisiana Supreme Court were concerned with pro
cedure, and about one-third of all the cases decided
by White in the United States Supreme Court were
concerned with

procedural questions.v?
From the lawyer's standpoint procedure is the ad
venture of the law, and from a judge's standpoint,
procedure pertains to the due process according to
which he decides controversies.
ministrative

that

In the field of ad

law, for example, reviewing

administrative

agencies

Supreme
dividing

of the

battlefield,

or a

fog

act

courts insist

consistently

with

in criticisms of

big

truths

in which disembodied

which,

to

spirits pass

recognition"71 into the little truths
everyday life may be regulated. What the

each other without
which

trying

to

do in the field of action is

a

little like

Morris Cohen's search for concepts with a smaller
twilight zone in the field of reasoning." This is not
done in any free hand style. White's opinions, like the
judgments and opinions of other competent judges, are

painstaking practice

a

its

own

of

an

ancient art

according

to

tested methods.

White's opinions are also an answer to the sophis
ticates, who would require such certainty of legal
definition that the law would be

type of the

today

Court.

quote Arthur Miller, "define humanity and the right
way to live, so that the world is a home and not a

founded upon reason and that he and others had
reason as well as
judges, to which it was answered by
Coke, as he reports it, that no doubt His Majesty had
but His

of Connecticut administered "was derived from

the law of nature and of revelation.Y? The voice of

the

nature

43

alike unable

to

serve

the

straight jacketed

community,

or

do

and

justice

between individuals.

By honoring White our faith and pride in our tradi
justice by means of the law is renewed. We
hold
our heads a little higher because Edward
may
tion of

Douglass

White lived.
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Law School

of Chicago

private groups should depend on the con
majority of those governed.
There are those who would repudiate the require
ment of
majority support on the ground that a union,

political
by

sent

at

or

a

least if it represents

industry,

is

automatically

a

substantial

giance and support.

I find this

for several

First it

reasons:

segment of

an

entitled to the worker's alle

argument unacceptable

ignores

value of collective

the fact that the

both to the

bargaining
enterprise
employees depends on consent, by the
employees affected, to the bargaining agent's role
and to the agreement he has negotiated. Majority
support, although it is not sufficient, is generally nec
and to the

essary, for such consent. For the purpose of deter
mining the existence of such support, the "industry"
an abstraction far removed from the
employee's
interest, which is generally centered in the plant or

is

the

enterprise which employs him. Accordingly, the
plant or the enterprise and not the industry appears

general to be the largest unit which can be appro
priately used in determining whether the necessary
majority support exists. Secondly, the use of the
smallest possible unit, consistent with orderly and
stable collective bargaining, will minimize the need
for subordinating the preferences of large and con
in

centrated minorities to the
R. H.

Maudsley

Professor in 1959.

Maudsley,

after first class honors at

Birming

and six years of war service received
the B.C.L. with first class honors at Oxford University.

ham
He

University,

was

then

lege, and/ has

appointed
held that

a

Fellow of Brasenose Col

position continually

to date.

He will be at the Law School from

until the end of the Summer

February, 1959,
Quarter of that year.

MeltzerContinued

from

page 3

union and non-union, in the unit.

dentally,

(This duty,

is not easy to enforce in the

blatant forms of discrimination such
race.

as

inci

absence of

that based

on

)

Although

the statutory scheme involves

a

limitation

dissenting minority, this limita
tion seems justifiable on two grounds: First, it is nec
essary for orderly collective bargaining, which has
important values. Secondly, the requirement that the
bargaining agent have the support of the uncoerced
majority makes his authority consistent with the gen
erally accepted principle that the government of
on

the freedom of

a

of institutional arrangements which pro
the subordination of the interests of individuals
and minorities to those of larger groups .. For these

mote

pleased to announce the appointment
Maudsley, of Brasenose College, Oxford,

Visiting

a

Mr.

majority

expansion

The School is

as

of

Minimizing the coercion of such minorities is
still an important value in our society,
despite the

Visiting Professor
of Mr. R. H.

requirements

rule.

reasons, I believe that the architects of

policy

were

wise in

rejecting

the federal
the notion that unions,

like the state, are entitled to any automatic
allegiance.
When we move from the statute to the real world,
we

are

union
ent

confronted with familiar and controversial

organizing techniques

with the basic

which appear inconsist
of both the Wagner Act

philosophy
Taft-Hartley Act. I refer, of course, to recog
nition picketing and to its close relative, if not its
transparently disguised twin, organizational picketing.
An appraisal of such picketing requires a judgment
about the underlying purpose or. purposes involved.
This judgment is, in turn, complicated because such
and the

may vary with the individual situation.
Nevertheless, the following generalized and familiar

purposes

description seems reasonably valid:
Picketing is an attempt to isolate the employer from
his suppliers, his customers, and his employees. Al
though it involves communication, its primary signifi
cance is not as
argument appealing to reason but as
an instrument of economic
pressure. The severity of
that pressure will vary from case to case. It will de
pend on the allies of the picketing union, the sympa
thies of the employer's employees, the sentiments and

fears of his customers; the location of his

premises,

Vol. 7, No.2
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and

host of other factors. But

a

one

aspect of picket

constant; it is

the

designed
the employer and,
on
his
employees.
directly or indirectly,
Where a union which lacks majority support pickets
for immediate recognition, and the Taft-Hartley Act
or similar state
legislation is applicable, it is almost
certain that the picketing is designed (1) to cause
the employer to violate the statute by recognizing the
union despite its lack of majority support; (2) to
force the employer to coerce the neutral or anti-union
employees to join the union, again in violation of the
statute; and (3) to force the employees to join to
avoid the obvious danger to their jobs or earnings
resulting from the losses suffered by the enterprise.
The picketing may, as we will see later, also have
other objectives, but such objectives supplement,
rather than supersede, those just described.
When the union placard reads "join us" and the
union urges that it is only organizing and that it
doesn't want recognition until its has "persuaded" a
majority of the employees, is the situation any differ
ent? Since organizational picketing inflicts the same
kind of economic damage as recognition picketing,
the pressure on the employer to disregard, or to coerce
his employees' preferences, is the same, and the pres
sure on his
employees to surrender their preferences
for their jobs, is also the same. There may, of course,
be skepticism about the union's disclaimer of any
ing

relatively

is

maximum economic pressure

interest in immediate

to exert

on

recognition

in view of the trou

ble, the expense, and the commitment of union pres
tige which is involved in maintaining a picket line.
at face
Even if the union's disclaimer is

accepted

value,

two

disturbing

considerations remain:

First,

the coercive aspects of such picketing necessarily in
volve a threat to the employees' free choice; secondly,
alternative and non-coercive organizational devices

protected by the federal statute although
naturally controversy as to both the content

exist and

there is

are

and the administration of the statute. Under the fore
going circumstances, does the union's future interest
the threat to free choice and the
in

recognition justify

economic loss

ently

There
such

which

organizational picketing

pres

entails?
are

four

principal arguments

in

support of

which I do not find per

picketing, arguments
singly or in combination,

suasive, either

the

where union

protection of the

Taft-Hartley
organization enjoys
or similar
protection under state statutes.
( 1) The first argument, that peaceful organizational
picketing has the constitutional protection of free
Act

speech, has been outmoded by a sensible shift in doc
trine by the Supreme Court. The V ogt case, decided
last term, held that where there is a reasonable basis
for concluding that picketing was designed to coerce

the

employer
employees, a

with free choice by the
injunction against such picketing

interfering

into
state

protection of free speech

is consistent with the

em

bodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. The V ogt case
thus appears to dispose of the question undecided in

namely, whether, for free speech
purposes, organizational picketing should receive
more
protection than recognition picketing.
the Gazzani case,

The second

(2)

is that non-union

argument

em

if

ployees, they get less than unionized employees, are
undermining union standards, and if they get as much
or

from union activities but

more, benefit

I find that both

are

aspects of this argument

free riders.

unpersuasive.

employees get less, they ought to be ripe for
non-coercive organization. If they get as much or
more, it does not follow that they are free-riders.
If the

The forces which govern wage determination are too
complex to warrant that easy assumption. In many
situations, a forceful argument can be made that
has not raised wages in the organized,
the unorganized area. But whatever the

organization

let alone,
truth here, the acceptance of so expansive a free-rider
concept would flatly repudiate the desirable principle
that uncoerced
unit is

a

majority support in an appropriate
recognition.
argument has been recently advanced by

condition of

The third
Professor Cox of the Harvard Law School. In essence
it is that the primary significance of picketing is not
as economic coercion but as a demonstration of union
power which offsets the unorganized employees fear

of

running

ingly,

may be

a more

his

employer's

concludes,

reliable

poll

a

than

wishes. Accord

vote
a

after

vote

picketing

without

com

pressures. Professor Cox suggests, however,
union which has lost a Board-conducted elec

peting
that

counter to

Professor Cox

a

tion should not be

privileged

tional picketing.
I find this reasoning
culties.

subject

to continue

organiza

principal diffi
being squeezed

to three

who is

First,
employer,
by picketing, may not defer recognition until an elec
tion. His early surrender may, for practical purposes,
foreclose any test by the ballot rather than make such
test more reliable.
Secondly, the pressure on em
which
organizational (or recognition) picket
ployees
ing necessarily involves cannot, in the nature of
things, be nicely adjusted so as just to offset the em
ployees' fear of their employer. Picketing pressure
may in fact be so strong as to destroy employee free
choice. In any event, pressure on employees as a
an

of

means

lous

protecting their free choice seems anoma
It's like saying that a fellow applying for

to me.

your bodyguard is privileged to show his
by cracking you on the jaw.
Secondly, the picture of the cowed and fearful
employee may be overdrawn for many industries and
a

job

as

muscle

for many

regions

in the United

States,

now

that the

The
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statutory protections, including

employee,

it is not easy to

should end with

reliable

It could be

that

a

poll

continuous

until

next

require

argued
picketing

fears of their

offset

tion,
employees'
which presumably have been increased
weakness reflected in a losing election.
to

The third and most

see

election which

an

the union loses.

may

are

accept the full implications of

of the fearful

image
why the picketing

elections,

secret

are,' presumably, increasingly

20 years old and
familiar. Indeed, if we
over

the

University of Chicago

elec

employer,

by

the union

important difficulty

with Pro

unspoken appraisal
position
of competing interests involved. First,
there is the interest in organization on the part of
those employees who remain fearful despite compre
hensive statutory protections, including a secret bal
of the four

sets

Secondly, there
sector in expanding
lot.

however,

is the interest of the unionized

influence,

its

is not entitled to much

which,

interest

an

picketing is more persuasive. Coercive self-help to
rectify the inherent limitations of the law is a doubtful
and dangerous expedient. The acceptance of such
limitations, until the law is changed, is plainly one of
the conditions of an orderly society.
The acceptance of such imperfections is, I believe,
also necessary for orderly and stable collective bar
gaining. The adjustments required when a plant is
first organized are especially difficult for all concerned.
The difficulties

involves his

fessor Cox's

under

weight

a

stat

stressing uncoerced majority support in an appro
priate unit. Thirdly, there is the opposing interest
of those

employees

who

are

not

lawful

ing

us

employer.
why, that

afraid

to exercise their

is the interest of the

Professor Cox assumes, without tell
the interest of the fearful employees

organization should prevail over
competing interests. I find this value

and of the union in

the two other

judgment highly

dubious.

The final argument for organizational-recognition
is related to the argument advanced by Pro

picketing

fessor Cox.

It

emphasizes

that many

employers

do

obey the law, and that, they are often able to
nullify employee free choice by unfair labor practices
which cannot be proved or which even if proved and
ultimately remedied by the Board nevertheless suc
ceed in frustrating legitimate organizational attempts.
not

are

increased when the union lacks
it often will if

an
employer grants
majority support
he
wants to be rid of pick
because
recognition merely
eting, "organizational" or recognition. In opposing

as

the closed

shop,

Samuel

Compel's

and Louis Brandeis

among other friends of the union movement, warned
that a healthy labor movement and stable relation

ships within
compulsion.

a

plant

These

could be

warnings

union

jeopardized by

are, I

believe, relevant

here.

The

ute

statutory rights. Finally, there
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point

recent

to

disclosures

additional

by
dangers.

the McClellan Committee
Coercive

actual

picketing,

threatened, has been the weapon of the shake-down
artist, who will forego organization for the right price.

or

Such tactics, unfortunately but
the good name and the legally

inevitably, endanger
recognized privileges
of decent as well as corrupt union leadership. Organ
ization from the top by the employer also invites the
sweetheart contract by which unscrupulous employers
and so-called union leaders sell the men out under
soft contracts which, however, often include the union

shop and check-off provisions.
Although Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act makes
it illegal for employers to make, and union officials
to receive, certain payments, that Section is probably
not applicable to pay-offs designed to forestall organ
ization.

The sweetheart

contract

made with

a

union

most unorgan
that
stay
way. Furthermore,
employers
the inherent limitations of the law, as well as bad ad

lacking majority support may be nullified by the
Board. But in the absence of a rival union, recourse
to the law is discouraged by the union-employer solid

ministration, permit some employers, by unlawful
coercion, to deny to unions the bargaining status
which they would have otherwise achieved. But these

front. In any event, these perversions of picketing and
collective bargaining will be facilitated so long as em
ployers are subject to the threat of organizational or

It

is, I believe, fair

ized

to

assume that

want to

considerations, troublesome

as

they

the indiscriminate use of
against lawful as well as lawless

rant

are,

do

not

war

coercive

picketing

employers

and their

employees. The law attempts to surround non-coer
cive organizational efforts with comprehensive pro
tection.

Although

the law in this area,

as

in other

necessarily imperfect, such imper
fections do not justify coercive self-help. We would
give short shrift to an employer who sought to justify
reprisals against innocent employees on the ground
that some employees acting for a union had used tac

important

areas, is

were coercive but which could not be
be
so. It is not clear to me why an essen
proved
similar
tially
argument invoked to support coercive

tics which
to

recognition picketing
its

and the law and unions sanction

use.

What 1 have said
is

far suggests that recognition
incompatible with the basic and desirable
so

picketing
principle of free choice embodied in our national labor
policy and should not be lawful. It suggests also that
organizational picketing, although somewhat more
defensible, involves substantially similar difficulties.
Furthermore, any difference between the
of

picketing

is

essentially

two forms

verbal and is too tenuous

basis for different legal treatment. Accordingly, my
suggestion is that both forms of picketing by a union
a

which lacks

majority support

and which
Continued

enjoys
on

the

page 50
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basic

diction

page 47

from

the

protections granted by

Act

Taft-Hartley

should be unlawful.
submitted

analysis which I have
part, by the NLRB in

in

Brothers decision.
earlier

by

In that

precedents, held
immediately

union

a

the

the Board,

case

was ac

Curtis

recent

rejecting

"recognition picketing"

that

after it had lost

violation of the

election

an

I lack the

Act.

Taft-Hartley
time for an extended analysis of the decision but you
may be interested in the following high points: (1)
Four members of the five man Board looked beyond
the union placards to determine whether the picketing
involved was to be treated as recognition picketing.
a

was

Three members of the Board indicated that the
decision would be extended to minority picketing for

(2)

recognition and, indeed, to any other technique, such
as unfair lists or the instigation of consumer's boy
cotts,

interferes

which

the

with

free

employees'

choice, regardless of whether an election had taken
place. These three, however, reserved judgment on

organizational picketing. (3)
(J enkins) declared that the

A

concurring

decision

member
confined

was

the situation where recognition picketing continued
after the union had lost an election. ( 4) Member
Murdock, dissenting, urged that neither recognition
to

nor

organizational picketing

before

after

or

tion should be declared unlawful but went

that

recognition

and

an

to

say

are

in

on

organizational picketing

elec

distinguishable.
Before the Curtis decision, Secretary Mitchell had
indicated that he would recommend federal legisla

prohibiting recognition picketing but not organ
izational picketing. If the Board pushes the Curtis
reasoning to its logical conclusion and proscribes or
ganizational picketing the Secretary may be some
tion

may be forced either to
distinction or to press
verbal
essentially
for legislation which would enlarge, rather than nar

what

embarrassed.

He

abandon his

legally permissible picketing.
On the state level, the problem is dominated for
the present by the interplay of the Supreme Court's

row,

pre-emption

doctrine and the NLRB's

refusal, for

budgetary and other reasons, fully to exercise its stat
utory jurisdiction. Under the Court's doctrine, the
by virtue of the Taft-Hartley Act, may not
enjoin peaceful picketing or other non-violent union
techniques directed at an enterprise which is subject
to the Board's statutory jurisdiction, i. e. an enterprise.
states,

which «affects" interstate
will not take jurisdiction
exercise its

will in

general
enterprise meets

measures

of

a

the states from

precludes
ing.

The

result is

net

commerce.
over

But the Board

all such

enterprises;

jurisdiction only

certain tests of

size, which

substantial effect

on

it

where the
are

interstate

rough
com-

restraining peaceful picket
which makes

one

a

lawyer

somewhat uncomfortable. Peace

laymen
speaking
ful picketirig, which
to

The basic

cepted,

Nevertheless, the existence of statutory juris
by the Board, even though it is not exercised,

merce.

falls within the Board's theo

jurisdiction can not be directly
though state and federal law each
separately recognizes that injunctive relief would be
retical but unexercised

restrained

even

appropriate.

expand

requires action, which
(1) The Board could

this no-man's land

Plainly,
could take

of two forms:

one

the

area

in which it

exercised its

actually

Chairman Leedom has indi

statutory jurisdiction.

cated that the Board will take such action, the result
ing increase in the General Counsel's and the Board's

presumably require increased ap
propriations by Congress. (2) Congress by legisla
tion could modify the preemption doctrine so as to
revive state authority, at least in the area where the
work-load would

national Board refuses to act.
such

Pending

modification of the

a

doctrine state law

can

furnish

peaceful picketing only

injunctive

to an

ill-defined and

category of businesses, those which do
interstate

preemption
against

relief
not

narrow

"affect"

commerce.

I do not

mean

state action is

to

an

imply

that the

argument against

narrow

state

scope fer

legislation.

the contrary; the small enterprises which
found
be
may
by the courts not to "affect commerce,"
and their employees are particularly vulnerable to

Quite

to

picketing pressures and
legislative protection.

particularly

are

in need

of

hand, smaller employers probably find
get away with discriminatory reprisals
against employees for union activity. The principal
On the other

it easier to

and in my view, the decisive deficiency,
of H. B. 702, which was defeated in the last session
of the Illinois Assembly, was its failure to provide
for protection against such discrimination. H. B. 702

deficiency,

prohibited minority picketing whether for recognition
or
organization. It provided for elections, although it
failed to lay down criteria to govern unit determina
tion.

It failed also to indicate whether such determi

nations

were

to

be

reviewable. But its fun

judicially

damental

defect

ing which

the Bill would have outlawed.

its

failure

to provide any
of
protection against discharges
pro-union employees
or
against other employer conduct which is at least
as destructive of
employee free choice as the picket
was

Such pro
of
necessary. part
any anti
I
this
that
would
picketing legislation.
recognize
mean that Illinois would have to face all of the
tough
tection

seems

problems

to

me

to be

involved in

a

writing

a

comprehensive

labor

and the expense of administering such legislation.
I believe, however, that such legislation, which could
act

The University
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J

draw

on

experience of other states, such

the

as

Wis-

and New York, would be desirable. During
period, I will be glad to explore meth

cons in

the discussion

ods for

achieving

the maximum

between labor and management
such an act.

possible agreement
on

the content of

controversy about arrangements compelling em
ployees to belong to or to give Rnancial support to
and about the so-called right-to-work laws
which would forbid such arrangements. I say "so
called" because such laws plainly do not give anyone
unions

right to work and because their exponents are gen
erally silent about restrictions on occupational choice
a

unless such restrictions flow from arrangements fa
vored by unions.
The controversy is so often confused by imprecise
rhetoric that it may be worth while to differentiate
the three principal arrangements involved.' First,

there is the closed

shop,

under which the

employer

may hire and retain in his employ only employees
who are, and remain, members of the union involved.

Secondly,

there is the traditional union

shop,

which

permits the hiring of non-union employees, but which
requires them to join the union within a specified
period and which also makes continued employment

membership. Finally there
union
"Taft-Hartley"
shop. Under that statute,

dependent
is the

amended,

as

retention of

on

a

union which has

majority support

the unit and which has satisfied certain

requirements
all

employees

in

procedural

may enter into an agreement requiring
involved to pay periodic dues and uni

form initiation fees within

thirty days

after their

em

ployment. The statute, however, confers on the states
the authority to prohibit even this limited arrange
ment.

The closed

shop plainly

confers great powers

on

imposes corresponding limitations on
the freedom of both the employer and his employees,
present and prospective. The dependence of em
ployment on union membership prevents manage
ment, despite its responsibilities, from hiring those
whom it considers most qualified, only union mem
bees-are eligible. This dependence also restricts the
occupational choices of members of the labor force
who are denied membership in the union involved
or who are
unwilling to accept such membership. The
the union and

closed shop thus empowers the union to determine
how many and who shall work in the enterprises in
volved, which may comprise substantially all of the

competitors

in

industry or an area. Even the state
seeking such powers in time of
special areas such as the public utility

an

has refrained from

peace, except in
ReId.
The substantial powers conferred by the closed shop
can be, and have been, used for purposes which are

society. For
been, used for private

our

and has

schemes

extortion

those in control of admissions to the union
stiff entrance fees on those who want to enter

whereby
impose
a

In the time which remains, I want to tum to the

generally accepted values of
example, the closed shop can be,

with the

incompatible

trade. It

can

be, and has been, used to implement
on race, creed, or sex, as well as

discrimination based

jobs hereditary. It
can be, and has been, used to create or to
intensify
labor shortages, thereby facilitating the exploitation
arrangements for

of

making

certain

and of other workers, who are forced
occupations. These consequences,

consumers

into less attractive

it is true, presuppose that the closed

shop is coupled
partially closed union, and this
combination has been subjected to judicial limitations
in some jurisdictions which generally sanction the
closed shop. Such limitations raise the question of
whether the evils of the closed shop could be reme
died by regulation without curtailing the benefits
which it allegedly creates-a question which I will
with the

mention

wholly

later

again

Although

them. The closed
as

a

industry

an

monopoly dangers
danger of ex
is
probably more
shop

I want to note the

shop,

reflection, than
where

power. Generally,
to obtain a closed
of

on.

I have referred to the

of the closed

aggerating
signiRcant

or

shop

over

or

a

a

as

a

a

over

of union

cause,

union is

strong enough
segment

substantial

Significant

number of

com

local market, it is also strong enough to
petitors
inflate the wage scale without recourse to the closed
in

a

shop. "Unduly high wages" indirectly result

in the

of entry into occupations which can be
achieved directly by the closed shop. Nevertheless,

restriction

the direct control

ferred

by

tion of

over

the closed

entry and

permitted by
occupation.

Even
can

though

high

a

such

result, such

a

rates

on

the union to engage in

con

behalf of
a

particu

permission has been granted,

be withdrawn since under

employees expelled
As

shop

entrants

facilitates both the restric

exaction of

those
lar

the number of

a

closed

shop

from the union forfeit their
contract vests

it

contract

jobs.

the union with far

reaching control over its members' activities on and off
the job. This power may be, and has been, used to
discipline not only wildcat-strikers and strike-breakers,
but also members who are critical of union policies
or of
corruption by union officials or who refrain from
paying assessments to support union legislative pro
posals which they personally oppose.
The foregOing criticisms of the closed shop have
been met by a defense which rests on the following
principal grounds:
( 1) The closed shop gives the union needed and
desirable security against anti-union attacks
by em
factionalism
within
the
union's
ployers, disruptive
own ranks, and raids
rival
unions.
As
a
result, the
by
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union

can

be

"responsible"

more

both in its demands

(2)

permits

the union to

see

to it

that

employees

have the skills necessary for the jobs involved.
( 3) It makes possible an adjustment of the supply
of workers to the "need for them."

( 4)

Most unions have used their powers

sibly";

"respon

employers have, indeed, found those

some

useful

powers

promoting plant discipline

in

and

I find these

enjoy

Hartley
Despite

Act

arguments unpersuasive

the
or

as

protection conferred by
similar protection under
of such

the inherent

to

unions

the Taft
state

law.

legal

pro

imperfections
they present a substantial obstacle to union
busting techniques on the part of employers and
tections,

represent,
free

in the

main,

a

reasonable balance between

choice and

for the

bargaining
changes in the
details of such protective regulation are required, they
should be effected within the general regulatory frame
work and scarcely justify the closed shop.
N or is the closed shop necessary to Insure either
proper skill or discipline on the part of employees.
As to discipline, the employer, if he is not unduly
restricted by the union, has in most cases the incentive
as well as the
authority to take appropriate action,
And even if an occasional employer should wish help
employee

representative.

stability

To the extent that

from the union, his desires should not be more con
trolling than the union's, in view of the other interests

employer's self-interest can
generally
employees of requisite
skill. Where, however, the public interest requires
additional control, the appropriate remedy would ap
pear to be regulation by politically responsible"
authority rather than by private groups. This point is
equally applicable to regulation of the supply of
particular workers.
Finally, neither experience nor analysis supports the
view that "union responsibility" can be relied on to
avoid abuse of the broad authority granted by the
closed shop. This authority is too closely related to the
involved.

Similarly,

be relied

the

on

to insure

union's power interests and its drive for maximizing
the gains of its members to be kept in check by an
amorphous concept of responsibility which, except in
small and ill-defined category of cases, is not backed
up by legal sanctions. We have not, in general, relied
a

on

"employer responsibility"

science"

tion

I lack the time to argue the
�

that arrangement.

ject

to

to

the

"corporate

a

This

qualification,

choice.

employees

in

develop

a

a

does not

shop

require

union

condition of hire, but does require
the union within a specified period

are

and if it is

high,
expulsion

likely

costs

for

new

that unions will

power after entry, employers
will be reluctant to hire new employees without union
clearance. Under such circumstances, the union
shop by another name.

shop

would be the closed
It

seems

unlikely, however,

that this theoretical dan

ger has been a real one. In the mass production indus
tries, the traditional union shop has apparently not
been used

to

achieve indirect control

over

the

hiring

process. And in other industries, there has been little
occasion to resort to such indirection since generally,

although not always, both the closed shop and the
traditional union shop have been legal or illegal.
Even if the danger of indirect control over hiring
is dismissed as
imaginary, the traditional union shop
suffers from the objection that it gives the union far

reaching power over the lives of the employees after
they have been employed. This is true because their
continued employment is dependent upon their con
tinued membership in the union. Some unions have
established internal procedures designed to prevent
abuses of this power, and the courts have sought to
subject it to a concept of due process. But the pos
sibilities for substantial abuses which remain suggest
that the traditional union shop, like the closed shop,
should remain

illegal-provided that the protections
Taft-Hartley Act, or similar protections, are in

of the
effect.
This
such

proviso is an important one. In the absence of
protection of organizational interests, the em

choice

is

privileged to
by tactics that

important interests. There is no reason for being more
sanguine about the effectiveness of "union respon

history.

sibility."

union

problem have been equally
self-regulation in an area which

sub

which I will

Nevertheless, if the break-in

exercise their

curb business conduct which threatens

Other students of the

suggestion is, however,

membership
employees to join
after they are employed, and to retain their member
ship thereafter. This arrangement theoretically does
not limit the employer's
right to select his employees
and imposes a much gentler restriction on occupational
as

ployer

distrustful of union

I believe that such

moment.

con

or

point,

regulation would adequately protect the interests
involved only if it in substance denied the powers
flowing from the closed shop. It seems to me more
efficient to deny such powers directly by proscribing

This traditional union

stability.
which

individual

disciplining

It

exploitation of the public and tyranny over
employers. But they have urged that regula�
rather than prohibition, is the answer. Although

invites

workers who engage in activities,
such as wildcat strikes, which are inconsistent with
plant discipline and orderly collective bargaining.
and in

Vol. '7, No.2

frustrate the

employees'

free

sorry chapter of our
Under such circumstances, the argument that

the arrangements

we

are

a

have examined

are

necessary for

appealing despite the fact that such
arrangements may be used to exploit the public and to
tyrannize the employees.
security

are

The University
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position con
cerning the closed and traditional union shop. It enter
prises in particular industries or in any given labor
market were evenly divided between open shops and
closed shops, I doubt that there would be any case for
There is another

either the closed

prohibiting

of my

qualification

union

or

Under

shop.

such circumstances, the monopoly problem associated
with the closed shop would be obviated by cornpeti
tive pressures from open

shops. Workers,

moreover,

the open shop according to
pick
their individual preferences. The existence of these
the closed

could

or

would
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bel'S of the unit
non-union

fairly and
minority 'from

More

concretely,
bargaining agent
union employees,

the

at

same

time to free the

any financial

responsibility.

require the union as
the grievances of non

it is unreal to
to

process

sometimes at considerable expense,
their interests in collective bargaining,

and to protect
while freeing them from
Such

result is not

a

that the

draw

right

obligation.
general argument
includes the right to with
the

to association

withhold financial support. The union as
agent is not like the ordinary association

to

or

any financial

justified by

bargaining

diversity of employment opportunities is not suffi
ciently wide-spread to make this qualification relevant
to current problems of labor policy.
The Taft-Hartley-union shop, unlike the two other
arrangements, conditions employment, not on con

depart at will. The anti
employee, so long as he remains
in
the
unit
is, to repeat, subject to the bar
employed
gaining agent's authority and is entitled to fair repre
sentation. In this context, the usual right to withdraw
from a voluntary association is scarcely relevant, let
alone controlling.
You may, of course, suggest that the theoretical duty

tinued union

of fair

alternatives and the

justify

competition

regulation of the
agreements. But this

abstention from the

state

of collective

terms

discipline

of

bargaining

membership, but only on financial sup
the
of
port
bargaining agent. This is a significant
difference because it operates to minimize limitations
both
and

the

on

the

freedom

employer's
employees' personal

to

select his

employees

from which
union

or

member

interests

can

is not in

representation

non-union

ality

a

non-union

employees
neglected.

Arbitrators

are

and

point

to

practice realized as to
grievances and

and that their

dispute

where unions have

cases

that gener
fought the

freedom. It also limits

battles of non-unionized members of the unit. There

the need for state interference in the union's internal

are
many motivations for such battles. The interests
of union employees may call for vigorous protection

on

affairs.
I shall not

spell out the competing arguments con
cerning
desirability or prohibiting even this limited
form of compulsion. You probably have heard them
all. I will merely describe the basis for my conclusion
that the Taft-Hartley union shop is a reasonable com
promise, which should not be superseded by the en-.
actment of so-called right to work laws. As I develop
the

my position, you will notice that abstract arguments
about the right to join or to stay out of associations

persuasive than judgments about the
distinctive character of the community which we call
the ba�'gaining unit and about the prerequisites for
seem

to

orderly

me

less

collective

bargaining.
already seen that under the majority rule
principle the bargaining representative has exclusive
bargaining authority, subject, however, to a duty to
represent all members of the unit fairly. It is that
principle which involves the fundamental limitation on
the freedom of the dissenting minority in the organ
ized plant-a limitation more drastic than that imposed
by the share-the-cost principle of the Taft-Hartley Act.
We have

This

fundamental

limitation

is

tolerable

because

rule is necessary for stable and orderly collec
tive bargaining, and collective bargaining has im

majority

portant values which. the community wishes
the
the

The

to

pre

continuing authority
responsibility of
with
to
all members of
bargaining agent
respect
unit, justifies, I believe, the requirement that all

serve.

of them should pay
unreal to require the

and

a

fair share of the

representative

cost.

It is

to treat all

mem-

of the non-union

ones.

the

The

bargaining agent may wish
employees in the

of non-union

good-will
they will become members or at least
abandon active hostility or any disposition to join a
rival. And the bargaining agent may be moved by the
ethical and legal obligation represented by the duty
to

earn

hope

that

of fair

representation.

In any event, the law

impose

the

duty

the obstacles

of fair

to its

continue to,

representation notwithstanding

full

A

union

does, and should

discharge

coherent

in favor of

labor

non

would

employees.
policy
scarcely be advanced by ignoring that duty when the
issue is that of fairly allocating the costs incurred by
the bargaining agent.
The
union

argument

I have made for the

Taft-Hartley

is not the conventional

shop
argument that the
non-union employees benefit from union activities and,
accordingly, should pay a fair share of the cost in
volved in getting union benefits. The benefit argu
ment is, of course,
open to question. Perhaps non
union employees have the initiative, the industry and
the skill which would bring them more rewards,
psychic and financial, than they get under collective
bargaining. Perhaps, in a given situation collective
bargaining produces no benefit for any employee. On
the other hand, perhaps non-union employees do bene
fit and are merely playing the paying members for
suckers. In any event, the paying members will feel
like suckers and the resultant bitterness
may add to
the difficulty of achieving the
of
statutory

objectives

protecting the employment of the non-union minority
and of insuring that they are fairly represented.

are

which complicate
union dues are used to finance
First,
my argument.
activities which are remote from collective bargaining
and which also may be opposed by employees forced

are

Let

me

turn to two considerations

finance them. I refer

to

primarily

to

political

activities

which unionism seeks to affect
action and to advance its idea of the
I recognize that the problem here is

and related activities

for the non-union member, who lacks
even the theoretical
possibility of shaping the union's
official position. But the problem is also important for
who belong to the union because of its

employees
bargaining

activities and in

spite

of its

political

ac

The problem involved thus affects all who
finance union activities, and it should, I believe, be
handled as a general problem, rather than by way of
tivities.

of the

Taft-Hartley union shop.
complication is union corruption, which
is now being urged as an independent reason for such
a
prohibition. Compulsory dues naturally aggravate
the corruption problem because they increase the loot
and reduce the ability of members or dues payers to
protest by withholding financial support. But, again,
corruption is a general problem affecting both the
majority and the dissenting minority. And, again, I
believe that is should be treated as a general problem
and should not be attacked by way of the Taft
Hartley union shop.
Before concluding, I should like to make two general

prohibition

The second

points, which may help to put the right-to-work con
troversy' in proper perspective. First, I doubt that
"right-to-work" laws are significant in relation to the

problems

raised

by

the concentration of power in
can
substantially influence

centralized unions which

policies on an industry-wide basis. Union secu
compulsory union arrangements are, as I in
rity
dicated earlier, more significant as a consequence,
wage

or

than

as

a

are a case

of such power. The railroad unions
point. Although the Railway Labor Act

cause,

in

until 1951 barred all such arrangements those unions
grew in numbers and did not lag behind in bargaining.
The

legal

exploiting

our

traditions of freedom

the union movement;
blindly ignoring the many
at

snipe

where the

protection of

the

or,

merely to
secondly, that they
of economic life

areas

dignity

of the individual

is stilI unfinished business and where

some

employers

their economic and moral power to

not

are

using
job.

get

with the

on

by

governmental
good society.
especially acute

a
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remedies for the power of the centralized
are
any wise remedies-will

Class

of

1938-

Continued

de

from

page 5

and International

Legislation Comparee, France;

Institute of Public Finance, Paris.
Bert Ganzer presently is Supervising

Investigator

for the United States Civil Service Commission.
was

for

Military

Government Court Officer in

He

Germany

two

years.
Others of us

occasionally have been active in gov
ernment work.
Quintin Johnstone was attorney for
the OPA; John R. Canright was Deputy Attorney
General for the Territory of Hawaii for six years;
Henry Hill was in the General Counsel's Office of
the Civil Aeronautics Board in Washington for five
years; Franz Joseph has been General Counsel and
Director of American Council of NATO; Governor
of the Atlantic Union Committee; and Chairman of

European Foundation. Willis Parkin
Special Agent for the FBI. John Lynch
has occasionally served as Special Judge; Frank Mahin
is Police Judge at Pewee Valley, Kentucky.
Our legal ability is evidenced by our success in
staying out of the army. Fifty percent of us success
fully evaded (or do I mean avoided?-we never did
get to Income Taxes in Prof. Crosley's course on Tax
ation) military service. Those of us who did serve,
did so with distinction. Dick Mullins, Bob Hay
thorne and John Canright achieved the rank of Lt.
Colonel; Mel Cohen and Walter Berdal were Majors;
Art Sachs, Sheldon Bernstein and Roger Baird were
Lieutenants in the Navy; Tom Megan was Captain
and Battery Commander in Hawaii, the Philippines
the American
son

has been

and Okinawa.

Irwin Askow also achieved the rank

Captain. The overall average was dragged down
somewhat by a couple of clods like Jim Stevens and

of

Rosenfield. who

got above the rank of

national unions-if there

Maury

have to be much

Private, but the overall picture was good.
We have been reasonably active in civic and pro
fessional affairs; Robert Macdonald was a member

Although

more

heroic than

the second

it should not be

point

right-to-work

may sound

suppressed. Exponents

laws.

ungracious,
of

"right-to

work" laws should consider whether their insistence
on

freedom of

occupational

choice and the

dignity

of

the individual may not be excessively specialized, To
take only one example, they may wish to consider the
of restrictive

employer hiring policies as
well as FEPC legislation to the symbol of individual
freedom which they invoke. Otherwise, they will be
open to one of two unpleasant charges: First, that they
relationship

of the Board of

never

Managers

of the

Chicago

Bar Asso

ciation for two years and Chairman of the Entertain
ment

Committee

of the

Chicago

Bar

Association;

Frank Mahin is Elder and Clerk of the Session of the
Pewee

Valley Presbyterian Church; Henry

Hill is

a

member of the Board of Education of School District
No. 34 in
a

Glenview, Illinois; Richard Mullins has been

member of the Board of Park Commissioners and

The University
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of the
Shaw
a

City Planning

of Chicago
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Wichita; Lee'

Commission of

Chairman of the Grievance Committee and

was

member of the Board of

Managers

of the

Chicago

Association; Franz Joseph has been Chairman of

Bar

on Naturalization and Confiscation
of the International Bar Association and on the Com
mittee on Extraterritorial Application of Taxes of the

the Committee

American

Association; Zalmon Goldsmith has
County Bar Association,

Bar

been President of the Kane

Vice President of the Aurora Bar

Association, Presi

dent of the Aurora YMHA, Chairman of the Aurora
Committee for Constitutional Revision, Chairman of
the Aurora

Red

First Aid

Cross

Committee, and

Chairman of the Professional Division of the Aurora
Irwin

Community Chest;

J.

ian, Member of the Board of

Askow has been Librar

Managers

and Chairman

of the Public Relations Committee of

the Chicago

Bar Association; John R. Canright has acted as Direc
tor and Secretary of the Lanikai Association, Oahu;

John Lynch has acted
City of Lafayette, and

as

School

Attorney

for the

Officer of the Crown Point

Lowell Bar Association; Walter Berdal is Warden of
his Church; Harry Kalven, Jr., is a member of the Illi
nois Supreme Court Committee of Jury Instructions;
Marcus Cohn has been Chairman of the Committee

of the Examiners of the FCC Bar

Cooperation

on

Association,

on

the

Legislative

Richard

Board

the

Party;

a

Member of the

Chicago

Bar Association

has been

James Stevens
of Managers of

and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the First
Unitarian Church of

of

Fred L. Strodtbeck

Committee of his PTA

and Precinct Chairman for the Democratic

KalvenContinued [rom page 8

Chicago.
again the result is to add a degree of freedom to
jury, leaving them without even the guide that

have done some writing in the legal
field. Franz Joseph has published articles on Discre

once

tionary Trusts, Domicile and Residence, Organizing
International Businesses, International Aspects of N a
tionalization, Income Tax Treaties, Death Tax Trea
ties, Estates of Aliens; and Foreign Sales. Harry
Kalven, Jr., is working on a case book on Torts and

recent

A

couple

us

co-author of "The

is

Case for

Uneasy

Progressive

seem

to

be

a

sedantary

group. About the

only

who has revealed any activity in sports is Irwin
Askow who was Chicago City Champion in the

one

J.

Squash Racquets B League. Walter Berdal has devel
oped a considerable, interest in astronomy and is a
member of the Atlanta Astronomy Club; and Richard
James Stevens was one of the winners of the Chicago
Bar Association Duplicate
Bridge Tournament two
years in

a

row.

Other than that,

we

seem

to

have

eyes glued to the TV Sets.
Melvin Cohen summed it up pretty well with his

kept

our

remark "I claim to be
we

roughly comparable cases might offer.21
Finally, there is one point at least on which in
structions might be much improved. This is the han
dling of the reduction to present value Iormula.P In
the case of serious disability or death of a relatively

a

successful father." All in

not have set the world

may
haved ourselves

reasonably

on

well.

all,
fire, but have be

The

quickly to

convey
it and

we can

reference to

the discount is of course very
point is a notably subtle one to
the layman not already familiar with

earner

young wage
substantial.

Taxation."
We

the

be certain it is not

limiting

of the losses."

Our

study

conveyed by

a

mild

"the present value
has at least one example

the award

to

where a serious split in the jury on damages seems to
have arisen directly from the failure to make the dis
count point effectively to the jury. The low and high

award factions

as

in fact in virtual
amount

this and

post trial interview disclosed were
agreement separated simply by the

of the discount. Yet neither side

they finally

were

forced

to

recognized

compromise

the

difference.
It is true that in

make the discount
the

jury's difficulty

a

carefully

tried

case

counsel will

point and may well handle part of
by using annuity tables. This raises

last reflection

one

jury

the

on

damages. Many

on

themselves

in sort of

as

problems

controlling the
regard

of

trial courts tend to

partnership

a

with counsel in

the presentation of the case, and more particularly the
law, to the jury. Able closing arguments will sub
stantially increase the communication of the relevant

perhaps the chief hope of orienting the jury
on
damages lies with counsel. And this in turn suggests
the query whether defense counsel have not despaired
too much of their potential for arguing damage points
law, and

with

vigor.

writes the law of

jury

damages

in

personal

what kind of law does it write? The
injury
cannot perhaps be answered quite so bluntly.
question
But what can be noted with almost endless variation
cases

and interest is the response of the jury's common
sense
equity when confronted with the formal legal

paraphrase Justice Holmes, the jury pro
legal litmus paper for testing and
the
policy dilemmas concealed in our
illuminating
general personal injury damage formula. The jury is
rules.

To

vides

kind of

a

the most

interesting of

emerges

are

points

seen

not

with

so

the critics of the law.24 What

much

fresh

a

be not that the

jury

totally
emphasis.

is at

war

new

points

For the truth

as

old

seems

with the law but that

but at

somewhat askew the traditional legal
The jury agrees wholly with much of the law
times it makes distinctions the law chooses to

ignore

and at times it

its views
norms.

are

ignores distinctions the law

chooses to make.

The Rrst
the

point

job really

reach decision

is.

and conflict

on

And to

ten years from now?
have
This ambiguity,
said, greatly increases the
them the chance to use
freedom
and
affords
jury's
as we

cide

special equities,
so

not be
as

much of

jury

one

a

has been

left in the

but it also disturbs them to de

man's future fate. And

puzzled as to why
custody of the court

the future events

require

more

than

the future

can

to

be

adjusted

much in the fashion of

In any event, the jury reminds us
of the great architectural rules of the per
sonal injury damage law is the rule that the whole
controversy must be disposed of now, once and for

alimony payments.

that

one

all.25
Almost every familiar rule appears immediately
arresting when seen as the jury struggles with

more

it.

Take first

a

in

duct. If

imagine for

we

moment

a

a

series of

cases

in

damages remain identical but
the facts as to liability range over the full and rich
possibilities of negligence,26 the legal view is that the
award should be constant throughout the series. The
jury's view is that these may be signiRcantly different
to

as

cases.

In

a case

such

as

Fuentes

Tucker'"

v.

an

echo of the

problem may reach the appellate court. Here in a
wrongful death action the defendant admitted liability
and sought unsuccessfully to keep out of the trial the
facts as to liability. On appeal the admission of this
evidence was challenged as error. The majority of the
California court speaking through Justice Gibson held
that such evidence, except as it might bear on dam
ages,

was

firmed the

irrelevant and its admission error, but af
judgment for the plaintiff since there was no

evidence that the award itself

concurring opinion Justice

disagreed

that it

heart of the

was error

matter.

was

excessive.

Carter with his usual
at

In

a

vigor

all and went close to the

His statement is worth somewhat

lengthy quotation:
impresses is simply how difficult
The jury almost always is asked to

much will the dollar be worth

their

virtually every
liability and issues of
damage are totally separate. If the trier is persuaded
that a preponderance, however narrowly, favors li
ability he is then to award the full damages proved.
He is not, that is, to discount damages because of his
doubts as to liability. And equally, in a negligence
case at least, he is not to increase
damages because of
his view of the degree of fault in the defendant's con
jury

The rule is that issues of

case.

that

imperfect, incomplete
a
stunning degree this is true
where future damages are claimed in the personal
injury action. Here the jury is asked to guess the
future. How long will plaintiff live? How quickly and
how fully will he recover? How long will he need
medical treatment? How long will the pain last? How
evidence.

ing

articulation but which faces the

which the facts

23

II

If the

to
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rule which

rarely

reaches

appellate

"The effect of the majority holding in this case is to deny
an injured person the benefit of presenting to the trier of
fact the entire factual situation surrounding the accident out
to

of which the injury
trial

or

a

It cannot be denied that either

arose.

judge is
amount of damages in
to have been guilty of

jury

a

award a substantial
a case where the defendant is shown
gross negligence and his conduct was
more

disposed

to

as to indicate a reckless disregard for the safety of others,
than where the negligence amounted to only an error in judg
ment. The present holding will make it possible for a defend

such

ant who has been guilty of the most heinous kind of reckless
and wanton conduct, including intoxication, to conceal from
the trier of fact the extent of his culpability, and thereby gain
any advantage which might flow from the absence of such
disclosure. Theoretically and technically, and judged by aca

standards, this practice may be justified, but when
gauged by actual experience in the administration of justice
it favors the worst offenders by permitting them to escape
from a larger award of damages which the trier of fact might
feel justified in awarding if the entire picture were presented.
demic

This does

not

mean

that

a

person

injured

as

a

result of the

negligence of another should receive more damages because
his tortfeasor was grossly and wantonly negligent than another
with like injuries whose tortfeasor was only slightly negligent.
But it simply recognizes the human tendency to weigh liability
against culpability. Since the law must be administered by
human beings, the effect of this tendency must be considered
as

incidental

requires

a

to

its

administration.

denial of the obvious.

To argue to the contrary

The Unioersitu

Vol. 7, No.2

"Therefore, if I were disposed to hold, contrary to the"
weight of authority and the long settled rule in this state, that
it was error for the trial court to permit plaintiff to prove the
facts relating to defendant's negligence, I would be required
to hold that such error was prejudicial and compelled a re
versal of the judgment. This conclusion would be required
because of the probability that the damage award was increased
as the result of the evidence erroneously admitted. If it cannot

less finds for the

damages

in any

admission of such evidence
case,
a

and

to

necessarily
could not be prejudicial

hold its admission

erroneous

is

as

idle

as

in

We

it

right

fighting

it is

bonus in the

jury
necessity
discriminatory to deprive

majority

him of it

only

ages

are

allowable in the

plaintiff altogether

in the

Yet

given.

point

so sure

may be

again

the rule sub

modify
The

not

we are

once

how

we

in

willing

as

on

interesting

damages

.

ticulate

may be clear enough to make
it evident that the verdict must have been reached by

damages

may then find the verdict bad
inadequate or because the result of so

compromise. The
either because

naked

a

But it is

our

impression that

in

many cases the discount results from something more
subtle and impossible to detect in the verdict. The
individually and within their own minds may

jurors

fuse the liability and damage issues sufficiently
shade their estimates of the damages.
and frequently the point may arise not
And

party

and

among tortfeasors-that in brief the old

contrary

as

to

common

be. Thus in

sense

of

one

as

our

which involves two de

legitimate

the

jury's

sense

of the

the suit.

to

What is

so

impressive

about the

often

jury's equity

is that its view is in fact the law in another state

is at least

reform

that has

or

proposal
spokesmen in the literature. And where it is
the reason is simply that the equity is too subtle

country

or

a

ar

not,
to be codified.

Many

court

compromise.

that

equities. But in the absence of such legislation the
jury can "apportion" only when the other tortfeasor is

jurors favoring liability with substantial damages.
the

a

would

ment statutes

not

casionally

already makes it evident
tendency to apportion fault

as

fendants, the jury has been known to ask if it could not
award $5,000 against one defendant and $70,000
against the other. Certain of the modern apportion

that the

Oc

perhaps
unit

long been thought to
experimental jury sequences

when the shoe

and

family

a

law rule is

common

the other foot.

jury;

of the

reality

it has

our evidence in a variety of ways suggests
discount. At times the discount may
does
jury
reach the appellate court when it is the product of a
compromise between jurors favoring no liability and

the

compromise

29

also has

jury

hence

jury

Presumably a plaintiff with sound
doubtful
and
liability might attempt to stipdamages
ulate damages and seek to contest only liability to
prevent the jury from discounting damages. In all
likelihood this is the far more frequent problem for
is

litigation.

the

rosa.

is at least

tolerable

What has been said

case

feel about the

to have the

a

and the modem rule that

much the

too

ignores

and I would suppose that Justice Carter would agr�e
that it is error to instruct a jury that they may be

rule, and

jury reaching

between the harsh old rule that barred the innocent

cases

ordinary negligence

have the

again

case.

not

Where

fault in de
fendant's conduct or the ambiguities in the basic
evidence itself. And as to imputed negligence we may

In any event once more we have the
familiar problem. The rule is clear that punitive dam

occasional

rule in

jury sees-the subtle gradations of moral

about the

of

law, if

the

that would accommodate the other distinctions the

jury behavior in such matters. And the argu
ment for his policy conclusion is that since the plaintiff
this

general juris

some

and

would, recognize

these matters.

fact of
has of

of

point

a

To what extent could the

interest.

legitimate
jury's
contributory negligence is in
issue the law can do so by adopting a comparative
negligence formula. But it can hardly write a formula

any

Who has the better of the debate? Is the plaintiff
measure of
jury justice or is he en
titled, when control is feasible, only to what the formal
Carter is

then to

come

prudential

entitled to the full

Justice

by

than the formal rule-and, it is important to note, not
always in the direction of favoring the injured victim.

windmill."

rule allows? I think

but finds less. And this is

which it not

rules

follow that the

It must

case.

plaintiff

infrequently reacts to the
against imputing negligence. It does so not. by a
logic directly challenging the rule but by discounting
defendant's burden because he was not totally respon
sible. Thus the jury law may look a good deal different

the route

be said that the effect of such evidence was to increase the
award of damages in this case, it likewise cannot be said that
such evidence would have the effect of increasing the award
of
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Law School

of Chicago

other

examples

of the

jury's polite

the law could be offered. We touched
Section I: the

obvious

are

jury

reaction to

examples.

others. The first is the
of

a

Let

jury

on

fees, interest, and

me

consider

with

war

several in

briefly

taxes
a

few

response in the death action

Today when the labor value of a
be negligible and the costs of raising

young child.

simply

child is

to

him considerable the harsh fact is that strict obedience

finally

doubtful about defendant's con
jury
duct but because it feels that someone else was also at
fault and that the defendant should not bear the entire
burden. This is the source of its behavior when in the

because the

teeth of the

is

so

contributory negligence rule'"

it neverthe-

to

the

likely

legal

to

rule

means

no

damages.

Yet the death of

young child must be the most serious of all per
sonal injury damage. Once again we reconcile the
a

formal rule with
to not
use

our

conscience

follow the rule

some

discretion.

fully.

by relying

And the

on

the

jury

appears to
It does not attempt the heroic

jury
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�:

payi�-g

the parents fully for their grief; it disbetween killing the child and per
clearly
tinguishes
him. But it does honor the parents
disabling
manently
task of

grief somewhat.

And

tolerable solution of

once
a

again

difficult

this is

perhaps

policy point

on

a

quite

which

understandably reluctant to legislate.30
example is the collateral benefits rule.
n is widely recognized of course that this poses a
problem to which there is no altogether satisfactory
we are

The second

solution.P But what evidence we have suggests that
the jury does not like the rule. Their plaintiff sympathy
does not extend to

which

other

some

they recognize

compensating the plaintiff for a loss
source has
already made good. And

more

instances of the issue than does

the formal law. In another of

the
her

experimental
plaintiff is injured while driving as a passenger
employer's car. The suit is against the driver

cases

our

employer

she

cannot

something for
fully as before

will do

work

as

be considered in

the

plaintiff

do not somehow

done in

treating

the

sum as

Consider for the moment the well known

$lOO,OOO

quick

behalf of

on

recovery and

and

McNulty

verdict of

restored to his former

earning

power since

fare

a

double amputee who made

a

was

the verdict

as

of

an

only $3,000.

award for

a man so

job,

a

in

The court

impairment

handicapped might

of
not

well in the future whatever his present position.
Mr. Belli reads the case as an award "solely for pain
and suffering."34 I would incline to guess with Pro
fessor Jaffe however that this is an example of the
so

young widow whose damages were reduced
because the jury found her attractive. Their view as

explicit pain and suffering but
simply
gross
plaintiff's bodily in-,
I
the
thrust
of Professor Jaffe's
tegrity.
appreciate
and
stated
carefully
sensitively
challenge to the
such
of
decisions.
And
premise.
perhaps the award is
excessive. But as long as we have a system of per
sonal injury damage awards it would, I think, seriously
disturb us to place the plaintiff's damages at $3,000.
And I will add the brave guess that had plaintiff's ob

disclosed in interview in brief

jective

tractive would have

covered

"something" ought

to

estimating how

Reverting

recognition of the pain

case'" where California Court affirmed

justified

if

add up.

suffering.

of

and that this

quite

experimental jury,. we have in
stances where the degree of permanent disability is
very difficult to assess although the injury was gen
uinely painful. Here a juror sometimes argues for a
given total by the twin position that either the dis
ability may turn out to be serious in which case the
sum is
justified or if it does not then no injustice is
data from the

to

again

curring special damages

car

the

was

damages

in

and there is little to suggest negligence
on the
employer's part. Yet a frequent theme in the
experimental jury deliberations is the likelihood that
the other

real and serious but where the other

accident

much the defendant should pay. A similar notion ap
pears in cases we have studied by post trial interview

where

person with adult children has been
jury looks in part to the children
as
almost
support
though the plaintiff had

elderly

an

Here the

injured.
supply

to

accident insurance. And then there is the

case

of the

attractive

was that a
girl that at
trouble in remarrying and if
she did not remarry it was pretty much her own fault
and a failure to properly mitigate damages.

The third
verse

no

example

is

closely related.
plaintiff has

situation where the

It is the ob
a

family

to

support. The law is clear that, death actions apart,
the tort is to the plaintiff and not to his family but
the

jury

is

mind. It is

likely
our

to

keep

impression

the

family very much in
that where the facts as to

liability and damages are ambiguous, damages are
likely to vary in accordance with the number of de
pendents looking to the plaintiff for support. And this
may suggest one source of the jury's coolness toward
contributory negligence as a total defense. They may
often see it as imputing the plaintiff's negligence to
his family-a point which has been explicitly noticed
by commentators where the plaintiff is killed and the
question is whether his negligence bars the claim of
his survivors.F
I have not talked

cussed

examples; pain

yet about
and

two other

suffering,

widely

dis

and insurance.

impressions is that the jury is less respon
sive to pain and suffering than popularly supposed.
Its chief importance may well be in cases where the

Briefly

our

to

so

violation of

a

losses been $50,000 he would not have

re

appreciably
Finally turning again to Professor Jaffe's heroic thesis
that it is unsound to recognize pain and suffering as
a head of
damages. I would suggest that an explicit
of
the law to deny such damages might not
change
affect jury verdicts very much. The situation might
well

child.
mal

the

more.

turn out

as

It is not

case

it has with the death of the

likely

where there

special

case

to matter too
are

Finally
the

a

jury

word about the

points of "jury law"

widely recognized.

young

much in the

nor

serious other

like McN ulty

the courage to say the
ing at the rule.

we are

would be wrong in blink
and insurance. Of all

jury

this has

There

damages and in
not
likely to have

is

long

been the most

familiar law

on

the

propriety of

insurance

admissibility
poses during

of evidence of insurance for limited pur
trial. In states like Texas and Tennessee

there
as

not to

jury reacting

are

surance

in

even

report

precedents

on

voir dire and

on

that the mention of in

jury deliberations may impeach a verdict."
the prevalence of insurance has affected the

Certainly
thinking of
in

questions

everyone about tort and the project will
detail about its impact on the jury.

some

Thus there is evidence

suggesting

that the

lawyer

strategy
does

work;

they

interesting suggestions that

are

it

most

of the

jury

point of the insurance ques
think there is insurance anyway. There

understand the

tions. But

as

voir dire does not

on

not

were

to insure

a

jurors, echoing

some

in the failure

position.

kind of

evidence that

another is

Ehrenzweig.P" see
negligence. There is

to

as

the

insurance leaves the

on

propriety

of

considering

jury

in

it. There is

the appearance from time to time of the juror who is
explicitly concerned with the level of insurance pre
But the

cases

points

First that

I should like to underscore here

liability

insurance,

at

are

least in auto

frequent

that its

enterprise defendant, is
impact on the jury is prob

ably reduced. Second that it may have a somewhat
different relevance for jury thinking ondamages than
for their thinking about liability. There is the arrest
ing suggestion

in

some

of

our

data that the effect of

insurance may be not so much to inflate damages as
it is to persuade the jury that the full loss be placed

the defendant. That is, doubts as to insurance
to cause the
jury to award less than what it

on

.

are
re

the

adequate award, out of regard to the
burden it places on the defendant. And finally there
is the underlying premise which an occasional juror
puts into words. Insurance and ability to pay are
relevant only in the case of real doubt. There is no
simple jury rule that the insured defendant cannot
as

Rather it is that where there is doubt and con
sequently the risk of injustice and error in deciding the

win.

case

is made

argument

either way, it is better to risk error against the'
against the injured plaintiff. The

insurance fund than

result therefore is

particularly

on

a

subtle shift of the burden of

damage

issues,

This last observation invites

a

proof,

the insurance fund.

to

strong

note

of caution

unavailable,

likely
place and the damage sum
remain unchanged. And to return to the moral of the
insurance example, the jury's special equities are likely
to come into play only where there is a gap of am
biguity in the facts, where, that is, the controversy is
to

take its

freedom created
law

by

jury may utilize the
some
equities the

the doubt to add

ignores.

and for the business

now so

likely
gards

But if that

close to indeterminate. Then the

miums.

three.

decides. The quest especially in damaging is, as we
have said, for the felt appropriate sum. An argument
about pain and suffering or children to support or
fees or insurance may supply a useful defense of a

Professor

the silent instruction

the dark
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III
Our third

general point

is to look at the

issue somewhat less from the

and

more

The

jury project

as

damage

viewpoint of the lawyer

the student of behavior would see it.
has been a collaborative effort by

lawyers and social scientists and here we pick up their
emphasis. The difference is chiefly one of emphasis
however since their points will have their legal coun
terpart.
The first
variance in

verdicts. The

has made

nique

making

it

is what

we
might call the
experimental jury tech
important contribution here by

general point
jury

an

possible

to

try the

same

and compare the results. This is

legal system
it does

can

very

case

an

rarely provide

several times

opportunity
and

the

when

even

always a somewhat different case on
key point then is that if we run say ten
trials of the same personal injury damage case we
are
very likely to get ten different results. And the
experimental jury results provide therefore direct ex
perience with the range of possible verdicts in a given
case and also some sense of their relative
probabil
ity.38 This underscores the familiar point that jury
it is

retrial. The

when confronted with the various

law is unstable and uncertain, and more
important
it provides the proper intellectual model for
thinking
about jury decision making. A jury verdict is

On many

verdicts for the single
case.P" And this in turn means that at most we should
talk of averages when we talk about jury tendencies.

not

The first

as

to what

has been said in this section. I have been

reporting primarily

on

what the

jury

talks about'"

damage issues. For
several reasons such data although relevant must not
be taken too literally as prediction of
jury decision.
points we have at most suggestive anecdotes
systematic data. Again what has been reported is
almost always the reactions of some individual jurors,
not the consensus of the jury as a whole and it is the
jury as a whole that makes the decision. The give and
take of the deliberation process and the requirement
of a group decision operates to limit greatly extreme

simply

one

of

series

point

of

possible

then is

simply

that this is the way it

is and that this variance is somewhat concealed

really
from

a

our

normal view of the

try the case only once.
But from a slightly different

jury by

the fact that

we

aging

process is

standpoint

this

aver

familiar to the trial

see

jurors may
conventional and in

quite
lawyer. It
what
he
must
in
be
explicit
part
conSidering
when he evaluates a case for settlement.s" If he

accord with the law than is the individual juror. As
we shall note more
fully in the next section, jury dis

$20,000 he means not that a jury will
invariably give $20,000 and, if he is very thoughtful

tendencies
it.

The

to

jury

cussion is

alizations

do

is

equity

likely

as one or

to be more

highly fluid, arguments
or

rhetoric

or

face

two

frequently ration
saving gestures making
are

possible changes in position and there may be a wide
gulf between the way the jury talks and how it finally

makes

says

a case

is worth

about it, not that any jury will give $20,000. He means
rather that the average of a series of verdicts in this
case will be around $20,000 and that therefore he
runs the smallest risk of error in
settling as

against

$20,000 figure. Our first experi

trial if he sticks to his

mental

supplied

case

had taken

our

script

vivid

a

from

example
actual

an

of this.

case

We

which

was

just before the verdict for $42,000. We ran
ten experimental trials of the case; the verdicts ranged
from $17,500 to $60,000 with only one $42,000 verdict
settled

and

only

one

ten cases

was

Yet the average for the

$40,000 verdict.
$41,000.41

The settlement process in personal
integral part of the total decision

tion; the

vast

settlement

only

majority

of

mechanism;

the small

cases are

and

minority of

but those settled
tlement is the

as

injury

cases

law

jury

is

institu

making
disposed of by

an

controls

the
not

finally tried to verdict
yardstick for set
jury decision. And in

cases

well since the

of

expectation

weighing such expectations the bar more 'or less ex
plicitly recognizes that they are dealing with the aver
case.
age verdict in the individual
of
this
source
The
variability in verdict is two fold.
the
It results from
ambiguity of the facts and the law
in viewpoint, and from
difference
for
which makes

wide public from which the jury is
recruited, which makes it likely that those different
will be differentially represented on differ
the

enormously

viewpoints
ent juries. In brief, particularly on issues of personal
injury damage the jury system puts to the public
precisely the kind of question on which differences
in background, temperament and experience are likely
to produce a difference in opinion. Or to put this

another way, it is still regarded as a somewhat refresh
ing point to observe that changes in the personnel of
the United States Supreme Court may have some

thing
the
as

to

jury

changes in its decisions. But
for granted that personnel as

do with
we

take

rule and tradition make a difference.
From the viewpoint of the social scientist the
a

great variety

it is therefore

pertinent

about what kinds of

Roughly

we

can

to

people

break

see

our

dispose

one

any given
what can be learned
into two

stages.
will

and

experience
background
juror to a given view at one
and before the deliberation begins,

individual

end of the trial

and second what kind of

jurors

will be influential in

the deliberation process where the view must weigh
if it is ever to matter to the result.
This is not the place to detail the results of our

inquiry.
we

find

But this much

repeated

might

be

emphasized. First,

correlations between

some

tend

individual Scandinavian business

back-

be

might

man

en

juror types
thusiastically pro-plaintiff. Fourth,
who are most strongly pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant
are most
easily influenced to change their views in
some

the deliberation process. But again the traCing of
juror influence in the deliberation is a subtle and

have made

difficult matter.

Fifth,

of the

variations in awards which

regional

we

a

special study
permits

fair map of the award "temperature"
in the United States. But once again the explanation
us

to

make

as

to

why

to

a

regions differ

different

so

much is hard

comeby,

by now that what
we talk of
demographic var
bias
is altogether
iables and juror pre-deliberation
alien
the
trial
familiar to the
bar however
vocabulary.
It should 1:)e

abundantly

clear

correlations between

as

The institution of voir dire examination is the law
version of the

lawyer plays

these check
somewhat
results

a

migratory
are

and how

results.

closely

Suffice it here

has observed well and it is

for mutual

congratulation

that

our

largely

so

tort suit

in

Men differ

and here

again

the bar and

we

agreement.

jurors not only because of the
backgrounds but also because

as

in their

ences

lawyer

matter

practice

our own

close to his; similarly our study of
variation has its obvious counterpart in the

are

regional

in actual

with

out

that the

to note

point. In his exercise of
is practicing the art of the

One

concerned with

the

same

phase of our study is therefore
finding out what rules and hunches

social scientist.

jury

issue. And

inquiry

the average, business men of Scandinavian origin
to be conservative on damages, but this or that

en

peremptory challenges he

have what kinds of views.

First what kind of

as

in the

damages

well

rich

on

factors such

on

yer's

lations between

of sentiments

ethnicity and the jury's view
particular case. Second, as
point
with the social sciences in general at this stage of
their development.t'' the factors which correlate best
are the
demographic variables like ethnicity, occu
etc. But these are relatively crude
income,
pation,
indices and do not contain on their face the explana
tion for the correlation. Our quest for deeper factors
such as personality traits or basic sentiments which
would both explain more and correlate more tightly
has been only modestly successful. Third, we are
again speaking only of averages; there is great vari
aticn within any general category of individuals. Thus
ground

with

possibility for exploring further the corre
background and opinion, a topic of
wide general interest to him. We have talked thus
Far of the jury's sense of equity as though it were a
single uniform sentiment interestingly different from
the legal norm. But the truth of course is that so
heterogeneous a population as the American jury has
offers

a
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differences in their

esting chapters

differ
of the

experience. One of the most inter
jury study concerns the juror's

of the

of extra-record information in the deliberation.
Whatever the law's interest in keeping the trial record
aseptic, it cannot in fact prevent the juror from aug
use

experience. Thus the rec
jury room by juror testimony.
enlarged
the documenting and inventorying of this addi

menting

it out of his

ord is
And

tion to the record is

One

recurring

own

in the

a

fascinating

instance of this has

business indeed.

special

relevance

Vol. 7, No.2

for the

issue. It concerns the

damage

medical

to

The

testimony

University of Chicago

juror's reactions
general. It

and to illness in

Law School
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components. The impression,
of considerable

already noted, is one
argument-the sum is more

in

fluidity

as

may be as simple as the juror's identification with
the injured plaintiff where he himself or a close friend

important than the arguments advanced
If this

argument

experienced a comparable injury. The
bar has recognized this in its aphorism that the risk
of having the aged and infirm on the jury is that the

place.

And

defendant will have to pay for their ills as well as
those of the plaintiff. It may take the form of grave

and

or

relative has

of ills less obvious than the broken

suspicion
the

view that

general

no one

feels

leg, on
altogether healthy

anyway, or more concretely as in the case of a rail
road man plaintiff where several jurors knew railroad
men
intimately that no real railroad man would com
Or the very vagueness

about such minor ills.

plain

of the ailment may turn in the
antee of authenticity as in the
where all the medical
In

such

one

interview

a

case

juror

of such

plained

which

that he

was

The

a

tended

a

guar
back ailment
to

show that

nothing organically wrong.
studied through posttrial

we

indicated that his mother had
an

ailment for

doctor had been able to find

driac.

of

case

testimony

could find

the doctors

jury's

eyes into

certain his mother

com

years, that

thirty
anything
was

not

no

wrong, and
a

hypochon

faced with the delicate choice of

jury

believing the plaintiff or
a
hypochondriac sided in
There remains then the

of

charging

his mother

the end with the

pooling

as

plaintiff.

of individual

juror

views in the deliberation process to yield the group
verdict. Here again the jury involves an important

of research in contemporary social science-the
study of small group behavior. And here the blending
of the
perspective with its emphasis on the
area

lawyer's

logiC of argument with the social scientist's perspec
tive with its emphasis on the social process of the
a
group has proved a considerable but rewarding job.
is likely to view the deliberation as simply
The
lawyer

a

it

formal debate; the social scientist is likely to view
but
as
group problem solving where everything

the content of the

problem

is of interest.

dynamics of group behavior in the jury room
is too complex a story to attempt here. The great
point is that a jury verdict is a group product, that
The

the

jury

must

is not

work

to

a

simply

an

atomistic

electorate, but

solution which is at least tolerable

all the subordinate

overall

is

likely

to

We have

of the

most

important strengths.
anticipated in the prior discussion several
important points about the jury's behavior

have

when it turns to the damage issue as a group. The
cardinal point is that the quest is more for the appro
sum than for the summation of the
specific

priate

jury

can

reach

try for agreement

on

Juror A may rate pain
than Juror Band Juror

premises.

sum.

touched earlier

on

their view

as

We

fees

lawyer's

to

award fees? The

Do

as

they actually
damages.
simple. They frequently discuss them in the
deliberation. They see no impropriety in so doing.
They are frequently well informed, although not al
ways, about the level of contingent fees today. Does
this then mean that awards are higher by the amount
of the fee? We seriously doubt it.43 First we virtually
answer

is not

have

never

jury

a

adds it. We have
the

is

damage

which after

then decides

damage figure

some

agreeing

on

the fee

on

as a

property damage

objectively

more

the proper
group and

cases

where

and in these the

set

jury does not consider the fee. And
of suggestions that the fee point is

have

variety
simply as a
device in argument to facilitate agreement. Perhaps
the most vivid illustration occurs in an experimental
deliberation where

jury

reach

agreement

In

effort

an

jurors
out

the

a

used

majority

a

on a sum

we

of

jurors finally

which does not reflect fees.

persuade one of the hold-out
point is made for the first time.
to

low award

The hold

agrees he has overlooked fees and raises his
An

accordingly.

over

then asks about the

award and is

logical

member of the

majority adding

figure

majority

fees to their

quickly

and

decisively

The miracle of the

jury

is that it is somehow able

to

reach agreement

despite

the

rebuffed.

divergent

which it enters the deliberation.

views with

This is the result

of many pressures including a great reluctance to fail
do their job and have the jury hcmg. In part it is

to

the result of
on

matters

a

decent respect for the opinions of others
certainty is hard to come by. In

where

it is the result of

sensus

not

the

One illustration of this will have to suffice.

merely that twelve heads may be better than one
but that a verdict hammered out as a group product

major

its behalf.

suffering more important
B may take disability as more substantial than Juror
A. They will air these differences, to be sure, in the
deliberation but they will not insist on their resolution
so
long as by whatever route they can agree on the

part

vidual

reason

is that it does not

agreement

twelve. One result is that the filtering of indi
eccentricity through the group process fur
nishes a
safeguard in the jury system. It is
to all

important

one

on

is disallowed another will take its

ception

of the facts

We find with

now

tion.

a

as

subtle shift in their

own
per
the deliberation continues.

high frequency

that

a

genuine

has been reached at the end with the

con

jurors

preferring the jury verdict to their original posi
And finally in part it is the result of
negotiated
when argument

go no further.
Is the dam
verdict.
quotient
award
the
of
the
twelve
indi
age
simply
quotient
vidual answers? Here again the answer is compli
cated. The final awards will not infrequently come

compromise
We

come

then to the

can
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yes/no issues of guilt and liability. It permits the
small adjustment, the slight shift and if
necessary,
the full

sible.

compromise which

The

likely

to

reflect the

makes the verdict pos

verdict therefore is

damage

composite

especially

view of the

jury as a
product of the single strong
juror or the strong faction. Perhaps the legal system
should seek some way to avoid having questions of
such flexibility and indeterminacy arise, but so
long
group and

not to

be the

as

it continues to furnish them the

to

provide remarkably congenial

jury would seem
mechanism for their

official resolution.
And to return once more to pain and
suffering.
Whatever else may be said for or against
recognition
of it in damages, it does because of its
ambiguity
provide a useful grease for the jury machinery.
IV
We have left to

a

brief

postscript

the consideration

of the

A. B. Bates College, of Maine, a third-year
together with Robert Cornwell, B.A. Central
State College, of Oklahoma, coached the Student Forum, the
University's intercollegiate debate organization, to an unusually
successful season.

Brody,

Morton

student who,

parallel performance in comparable cases of
the judge. Logically perhaps, this is the first
ques
tion to ask about the jury-how
differently do judge
and jury decide the same case. We are
by no means
clear on how much like the judge and how different
from him we wish the jury to be. If it is too much
like the judge, the jury may lose all claim to a dis
tinctive function.

disturbed

by

how

If it is too little like him

easily jury equity

we

elides into

are

jury

anarchy.
close

to

the

original pre-deliberation

averages for the

group. But this will often be the result even though a
quotient is never taken. There is a natural tendency
for the extremes to come toward the middle as the
range of positions is disclosed. The jury often takes
a
quotient early as a guide but then goes on with its
deliberation. And in the cases where the quotient
is the final answer the compromise usually comes late
after a serious effort to bridge difficulties by other
The merit of a compromise verdict is thus
difficult to assess without knowing the full context
means.

of the deliberation.
In

general

we

difficult
the

position
jury. Surely

issue in many

likely
faith
want

The question is specially
pertinent for the personal
injury case where the jury is so widely thought, as
jury waiver ratios indicate, to favor the plaintiff. A
major segment of the jury project is devoted to a

survey in which trial judges have reported on a case
by case basis how they would have decided on bench
trial actual cases tried before them with a jury.v' Once
again the results indicate considerably more com
plexity than the popular view supposes. I shall not
report that data here except to note two points. First,
the difference is not monolithic. While
jury awards on
the average are higher than judge awards, there are
a

have concealed from ourselves, the
in which the formal law may place
there is nothing about the damage

personal injury

cases

which makes it

that twelve

men
acting seriously and in good
reach full agreement on it. What do we then
the jury to do? There are only two alternatives

surprising proportion of cases in which the judge
given more than the jury in fact did.

would have

Second, the detailed profile of judge-jury differences
obtained from the survey
tive on the jury's sense of
cess

in

controlling

gives us another perspec
equity and the law's suc

it.

can

left: negotiated compromise or a hung jury.
practical jury almost always prefers the former

The
with

the interesting result that the function of the jury in
the end may be not to adjudicate the case, but, as
it were, to settle it vicariously.
In any event, the nature of the damage question

permits

the jury

to

behave

differently

than do the

The

judge

and

remarkably different
reaching
objective-fair im
personal adjudication of controversies. The judge
represents tradition, discipline, professional compe
tence and repeated experience with the matter. This
is undoubtedly a good formula. But the endless fasci
nation of the jury is to see whether
something quite
institutions for

jury

are

two

the

same

The University
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layman amateur drawn from a wide
public, disciplined only by the trial process and by
the obligation to reach a group verdict-can some
how work as well or perhaps better. And in any event
in its persistent struggle to dispose of the difficult
issues our legal system gives it-among which meas
uring personal injury damages occupies a prominent
place-the jury throws much light on the ultimate
different-the

issues of

involved.

justice

J

the extent that lawyers'
be considered part of plaintiff's loss.
7
Yet it is error to omit the instruction. Benedict v. Eppley Hotel
Co. 159 Neb. 23, 65 N. W. 2d 224 (1954).
8
There is a useful collection of cases in which damages were
excessive in a lengthy note in 16
as
on
6

Again, this

challenged

A.L.R. 2d 3
actions

published

ulus

innumerable discussions

of

as

well

as

to

their

note

covers

On

damages
control

appellant

all

cases

In

other than death
297 of the 1339

only
appealed was the award
generally see Miller, Assess

the decade 1941-1950.

were

of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 14 Minn. L. Rev.

(1930); Jaffe, op. cit. supra, note 1.
example, Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones, 60 So. 2d
(Fla. 1952) affirming as not excessive an award of $50,000

See for

396

Allen Barton, Saul Mendlovitz, Rita James, and Philip
Ennis. Their work will in the reasonably near future
in its own right. The debt is to the stim
be

overstatement to

to

are

appeal
(1951). The

over

modified.

9

major debt to the work of sev
eral colleagues on the jury project; in particular to
Fred Strodtbeck, Hans Zeisel, Dale Broeder, and to

slight

a

in which excessive

cases

ment

owes a

is

fees and interest

216

This article
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housewife for loss of future earning power.
The point is less forceful in death actions where the dis
is
ability is unambiguous and pain and suffering of the survivors
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experimental jury work and to a lesser degree from post trial
interviews.
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the jury actually talks and behaves.
experimental jury tends to exaggerate
the variances somewhat for two reasons. First, our
experimental
cases may be more
ambiguous on their facts than many actual
jury cases; second, our experimental juries, although drawn
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from actual jury pools, have not been subjected to voir dire
and include therefore relatively more jurors with extreme views.
39
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trial
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it would appear that the model is
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Variance also provides the key rationale for the doctrine of

correct
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Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 9

see

Stan. L. Rev. 281

(1957).
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This raises the amusing point that a lawyer who refuses to
settle say, for $20,000 and is hit by a $40,000 verdict may in
fact have been more right than his opponent. It may however
be small comfort to him, or to his client, to realize that had the
case been tried over and over to
eternity the average of all
verdicts would approximate $20,000.
42

See Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties
(1955); Blum and Kalven, The Art of Opinion Research: A
Lawyer's Appraisal of an Emerging Science, 24 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 1 (1956).
To balance the impressions here I should report a
jury
anecdote I recently heard from a lawyer. The particular jury is
said to have begun its deliberation by deciding first on the
lawyer's fee and then multiplying it by three to get the dam
ages. Occasionally an appellate judge will himself be explicit
about lawyers' fees when he is appraising whether a verdict is
excessive or not. In Renuert Lumber Yard, Inc. v.
Levine, 49
So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1950) where the court entered a remittitur of
$15,000 on a verdict of $75,000, Judge Hobson dissenting said
in part: "Moreover, although there is no
legal basis for the in
clusion of an attorney's fee in the judgment it is a matter of
common knowledge that in
personal injury actions lawyers do
not customarily perform services for the
plaintiff gratuitously.
As a practical proposition it is indeed
probable that after paying
for the services of his attorney appellee would have
little, if
any, of the $30,000 left
Such circumstances cannot be
ignored by the writer in performing his part of this appellate
court's duty to determine whether the
judgment is so grossly
excessive as to shock the judicial conscience."
The survey is based on a nationwide sample of some 700 trial
judges and includes some 5000 actual jury trials. Roughly 1400
of these are personal injury cases. The results will be
reported
out in detail in the publications of the Project.
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